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ABSTRACT 
 
“Reaching the Unreached”: (Un)Making an Inclusive and World-Class Delhi. 
(December 2011) 
Richa Dhanju, B.A., Lady Shri Ram College; M.A., Tata Institute of Social Sciences; 
MSW, Washington University in St. Louis 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee, Dr. Cynthia Werner 
         Dr. Kathleen O’Reilly 
 
 
 This dissertation focuses on the nature of governance of the urban poor and 
examines the ‘behind the scene’ politics as well as the ‘side effects’ of a recent good 
governance project designed to serve six million poor citizens in Delhi, India’s capital 
city-state with a total population over 14 million. Over the past decade, Delhi’s march to 
become a world-class city has further marginalized its poor residents as the government 
has demolished slums, threatened informal livelihoods, and diverted social welfare funds 
to host international events like the recent Commonwealth Games 2010. Overwhelmed 
by the growing disparity and a concern for its impact on attracting global trade and 
tourism, the Delhi government initiated Mission Convergence in 2008, a ‘good 
governance’ project implemented in partnership with over hundred community-based 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to survey every poor person in Delhi, 
streamline and extend welfare service delivery, and to empower poor women across all 
low income areas in the city-state. The slogan of this initiative was “reaching the 
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unreached” – to make the aspiring world-class city inclusive and caring of its poor 
citizens.  
 Twelve months of ethnographic research with slum residents, partnering NGOs, 
elected politicians, and government officials, indicates that Mission Convergence 
introduced a new institutional arrangement for the exclusive governance of the poor in 
Delhi as an additional two million poor citizens entered the government’s welfare 
registers and more than 400,000 poor women participated in Mission’s women’s 
empowerment programs. Such tangible results defined Mission as a successful example 
of efficient inter-sectoral governance in the global South, but also disturbed the political 
economy of pre-embedded traditional service providers like elected politicians, local 
leaders, and welfare staff. This dissertation examines the competing logics of good 
governance as traditional and new arrangements wrestled to claim authority over serving 
the poor as the world-class city aspirations continued the social and spatial 
marginalization of the poor. Mission Convergence was expected to reduce the growing 
disparity that spawns out of exclusionary urban development policies. However, this 
dissertation engages with theories of neoliberal governmentality, neoliberal urban 
development, and feminist economics, to show that supposedly efficient inter-sectoral 
arrangements could disturb regressive power relations and streamline services for the 
benefit of the poor, but work in nuanced ways to enable the state to sustain its political 
legitimacy and to create an aura of its caring and inclusive intentions towards the poor at 
a time when fast-paced city modernization violated their basic rights to shelter and 
livelihood in the aspiring world-class Delhi. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: REACHING THE UNREACHED 
 
 “… so fixated is the modernizing gaze on the city as an object of planning and 
development that it can approach the urban space as a constellation of problems that 
require solutions.” 
             (Foucault 1986:22) 
	  
1.1  A broken wall 
 Fatima Bi was a 50 year-old Muslim woman residing in Wedal slum colony in 
the north east district of Delhi since early 1970’s.  She lived in a two room shanty with 
her husband, two daughters, two sons, two daughters-in-law and five grandchildren. 
Fatima’s shanty was located in the Muslim-dominated area of the slum and overlooked 
an open, overflowing sewer. A wall that previously hid the sewer from the sight of the 
residents had crumbled without effort last monsoon and the sewer water had seeped 
inside her home. I had known Fatima as an active member of a people’s movement I 
worked with in 2003 - 04. When I went to meet Fatima in May 2009, she told me that it 
had been almost nine months since the wall’s collapsing, but the municipal staff never 
came to fix it despite several complaints. As we stood outside her home and talked about 
the broken wall, the sewer water gently lapped up and touched her doorsteps.  
 Across the sewer was Jaan slum colony, bustling with activity as hundreds of 
home-based factories manufactured winter jackets and embroidered wedding dresses. 
Further ahead was the metro rail station with its posh super market and clean compound. 
_______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Geoforum. 
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Families dressed in their best clothes visited the metro station and ate pastries and pizza 
at the super market café on Sundays. The metro station seemed like a misfit in this 
crude, informal, chaotic environment but was cherished as a social space by its 
neighboring residents. On the other side of Fatima’s shanty was a government school for 
girls and an open drain separating the school from a dilapidated piece of land. This land 
held together the skeleton of a community toilet, ripped off of its doors, taps and toilet 
seats by thieves several years ago. I visited Wedal colony several times since 2003 and 
these sights always offered the same vision of the city to me – a mix of raw economic 
and social energy and a depressing reality that in the capital of the world’s largest 
democracy lay vast zones of poverty where a majority of people had no access to basic 
amenities. Spread around me was a part of the slum-dense north east district in Delhi 
with a total population of approximately 1.8 million people (Census of India; 2001).  
 Standing at Fatima’s doorsteps by the overflowing sewer reminded me that more 
Indians lived in poverty than outside it. But if we walk into the metro rail station, the 
untidy and crowded spaces are replaced by modern infrastructure, technological devices 
and glitzy lights. If we sit in the metro rail and travel towards the heart of the city, we 
cross the sewage-filled Yamuna river (almost like a symbolic rite of passage) and enter 
specific zones in Central and South Delhi with their clean and wide roads, structured 
residential colonies, chain of flyovers that mostly keep you off the ground and hundreds 
of construction sites indicating the fast pace at which Delhi is expanding and reinventing 
itself. Two cities exist in one – separated by a few miles and by rampant disparity, as 
illustrated in figure 1.1 below.  
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Fig.1.1. Google Earth images of fieldwork sites (including Fatima’s slum). First 
image shows a slum area in north east Delhi. The second image below shows 
River Yamuna dividing east and north east districts from the rest of Delhi (A cloud 
cover hides its details). Mission Convergence headquarters are located on the left 
side of the river, close to the banks of River Yamuna. Slums exist across all nine 
districts of Delhi but their density is highest in east and north east Delhi. 
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Fig.1.1. Continued.  
 
 
 
 After some time Fatima said, “they [government] don’t care about us. No one 
will come to fix the wall”. And then she asked me whether I knew the fate of her slum. 
“Will it be demolished? When are they coming with the bulldozer? Where are we to 
go?...” She rapidly fired one question after the other. In Fatima’s mind, the 
government’s lack of concern about the broken wall and sewer-filled homes hinted at the 
looming demolition of her slum. Since 2006, Delhi residents like Fatima had been 
witnessing an unprecedented increase in the pace of slum demolitions as the city 
5	  
	  
	  
	  
prepared itself for the upcoming Commonwealth Games in October 2010.1 By the time 
we met in May 2009, Fatima was convinced that the government would not care to fix 
the wall if the slum itself had to be demolished. A few days ago I had come to know 
through another resident of Wedal colony named Prasad, that the government was 
planning the on-site resettlement of the slum for its original residents.2 Fatima was one 
of the original residents and I shared the news with her without hesitation. She replied, 
“Oh yes, that is what the ‘center’ people were saying when Munni was there for her 
henna- painting training yesterday…but I am not sure still.” She told me that her 
youngest daughter, 16 year-old Munni is learning henna painting (as a part of the 
beautician training) free of cost at this center. Since most NGOs in the slum areas are 
known as ‘centers’ (meaning center of the slum, and/or a space where many services for 
the poor3 are centrally provided), I thought Fatima was mentioning one of the many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Commonwealth Games in Delhi in October 2010 was seen as a major urban renewal exercise impacting 
the material and well as human landscape of Delhi. It cost the Indian government $15Billion, seven times 
its original planned cost. 120,000 beggars, 60,000 pavement squatters and 800,000 slum dwellers were 
banished from the city in preparation for the games 
(http://www.tehelka.com/story_main46.asp?filename=hub110910Gameon.asp). Besides, government 
funds for social welfare were diverted in preparation for these games. For example: “A total of Rs. 744.35 
crore (157 Million USD approx.) originally meant to improve the standard of living of poor sections of the 
community through various government schemes and programs was diverted to the 2010 Commonwealth 
Games projects.” (http://www.bbc.co.ukhttp://www.bbc.co.uk, July 21, 2010) 
 
2 An on-site resettlement of a slum colony means that the space where the slum exists would be sold by the 
government to private corporations for building multi-storey housing units for the original inhabitants of 
the slum who have been living in the slum before 1998 and have legal paperwork to prove the same. The 
residents who came to the slum after 1998 would most probably be provided no resettlement (on-site or 
peripheral) and will be rendered homeless. Half of the slum space is converted into housing units and the 
other half is leased or sold to businesses. The idea is for the government to extract profits from the land 
where the slum is located. Slum residents who are chosen for on-site resettlement have to pay a subsidized 
amount to the government for their new housing unit. To be resettled on the same space as their slum 
comes as a relief to many slum residents because they can then continue to maintain their economic and 
social networks. 
 
3I use the term ‘poor’ to refer to an individual or family facing vulnerability because of their poor social, 
spatial, occupational, and income conditions. Mission Convergence uses the concept of ‘vulnerability’ to 
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NGOs that run short courses like tailoring and henna painting for women’s 
empowerment.  
 I asked Munni to take me to this center so that I could talk with the staff and 
gather more information about demolition and resettlement. Munni and I crossed over 
from the predominantly Muslim area of the slum to the Hindu area across the road and 
reached a big community center, bustling with different vocational trainings attended by 
women and adolescent girls from the Wedal slum colony and the adjoining resettlement 
colony. The first thing that caught my attention was a temporary board with Delhi Chief 
Minister Sheila Dixit’s photograph on it and bold letters stating (translated from Hindi to 
English):  
 This is a free Gender Resource Center (GRC) run by the government of Delhi. 
 We provide vocational training for women. We provide legal and health 
 counseling for women and girl child. We fill up and verify forms for social 
 welfare schemes like old age pension, widow pension, Ladli scheme, widow’s 
 daughter marriage, disability pension, etc.  
 
 A colorful sign of a handshake printed alongside “Bhagidari” (partnership) 
signified that the GRC was an extension of the Delhi government’s4 famous good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
extend the definition of poor and poverty above and beyond its narrow confines to income ($1.25 a day or 
2,200 calories per day in urban India). In metropolitans like Delhi, few people live below this poverty line 
but the majority still live like poor people due to the abovementioned vulnerabilities, all of which are 
interconnected. I use the term ‘poor’ and ‘slum resident’ interchangeably. I understand that there is no one 
set definition or measurement of poverty and that residence in slum does not automatically qualify an 
individual or family as poor. However, I use the term ‘poor’ to refer to the vulnerabilities that slum 
residents face by virtue of residing in a spatially vulnerable space and the accompanying lack of basic 
amenities and opportunities that define the slum. 
 
4 Throughout the dissertation, I use ‘Delhi government’ to refer to the Government of the city-state of the 
National Capital Territory of Delhi. Delhi is the capital of India but it is also an independent union 
territory and a state with its own government. The federal government in India is often referred to as ‘the 
government in Delhi’ or sometimes, only as ‘Delhi’. I use the term ‘federal government’ to refer to the 
Government of India. 
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governance project known as Bhagidari, indicating a government-civil society 
partnership there. The name of the NGO that operated this GRC was Sharan (meaning 
‘shelter’). Sharan has been working at Wedal colony since 1994 on issues ranging from 
reproductive health, disability, environment and youth self-help groups. Inside the GRC, 
I met with the staff who introduced me to the new government program called Mission 
Convergence, under which several community-based NGOs like Sharan were partnering 
with the Delhi government to open GRCs across all slums and resettlement colonies in 
Delhi. As of August 2011, there were 104 (and growing) GRCs run by 104 different 
NGOs in different zones of poverty5 in Delhi. Each GRC worked for an approximate 
population of 25 thousand families (between 150,000 to 200,000 individuals) in their 
“catchment area” – a term used by NGO staff to define the geographic boundary of the 
area where they work.  
 Rajan, the young Hindu male project coordinator explained to me that Mission’s 
motto of “reaching out to the unreached” (in English, no Hindi translation) meant that 
the Delhi government wanted to extend its welfare services to the poorest people who 
have so far been left out by the welfare system. Even though the Delhi government had 
been providing welfare services to the poor for at least five decades, the impact of the 
services was limited and their reach questionable. Corruption, confusing regulations 
across multiple departments and lengthy paperwork distanced the poor from benefiting 
from these services, thus routinizing instead of ameliorating the everyday suffering of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5I use the term ‘poverty’ to indicate the social, spatial, and occupational vulnerability faced by people 
despite their income level, even though people facing any or all the three vulnerabilities are mostly 
income-poor or below poverty line. Mission Convergence defines poverty on these criteria (detailed 
discussion in Section 2). 
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the poor. Gupta (1995) uses the term “malign neglect” to explain this kind of systemic 
and ordinary suffering of the poor. Mission Convergence was implemented to reach out 
to the people suffering such malign neglect by not only reforming and expanding the 
welfare system but also by empowering poor women through vocational training, self 
help groups, and health and legal counseling, etc, at their doorsteps. Rajan said,  
The GRC is the community center where the poor can easily avail government 
services, [vocational] trainings, free medicines and check-ups, and legal 
counseling at a stone’s throw from their home.  
 
While Rajan was enthusiastic about the Delhi government’s new initiative towards 
reaching the unreached, Fatima was certain that the government does not care [to reach 
her and fix the wall]. Neither was she aware that Mission Convergence was a unique and 
recent initiative of the Delhi government. For her, it was one of the many “centers” 
where some free training and services could be availed.  
 Unlike Fatima, another resident at Wedal named Prasad was well informed about 
Mission Convergence. 65 year-old Prasad’s hobby was to read newspapers all day long 
and then inform his friends and neighbors about the recent government promises and 
policies for the poor. Prasad was so poor that he often borrowed money to buy 
newspapers, and to use the public pay toilet. He worked part-time as a political party’s 
karyakarta (party worker) at the party’s local office. As a karyakarta, Prasad’s job was 
to moblize the community’s support towards the party by helping them access different 
government services such as old age pension and admission in a government school. 
However, most of Prasad’s time was spent in reading and disseminating news. He was 
known as the khabari (news-giver) of the colony. When I met Prasad in May 2009, he 
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informed me about Mission Convergence and its 104 GRCs. He looked excited while 
telling me that this new initiative would provide welfare services at the doorsteps of the 
poor. But it was only a few days later that I actually came across the GRC with the help 
of Fatima’s daughter Munni. In the meantime, a question that Prasad had raised could 
not leave my mind, “but why now [is the government implementing Mission 
Convergence for the poor]?” This question paved the foundation for my research on 
Mission Convergence. 
 It was Prasad’s question coupled with Fatima’s conviction that the government is 
uncaring, alongside Rajan’s optimism about the government’s new initiative for serving 
the poor through NGOs like his, that increased my interest in understanding the 
intentions and workings of Mission Convergence (Henceforth ‘Mission’, as many slum 
residents call it). While Fatima Bi feared that her jhuggi would be demolished by the 
government in preparation for the upcoming Commonwealth Games, Rajan was certain 
that the government had sincere plans about serving poor people like her. Slum 
demolitions for city modernization and welfare services for the poor were not 
unprecedented. On the contrary, the two had simultaneously increased and expanded 
over a period of time in postcolonial India, and especially after the liberalization of the 
Indian economy in 1991. However, the Commonwealth Games of 2010 were one of the 
largest efforts of the state to make Delhi a world-class city that would attract global 
capital (Batra, 2010). Mission was one of the largest efforts of the state to make Delhi an 
inclusive city that would care for its poor. Both these large-scale developmental efforts, 
in their specificity between slum demolition and slum welfare, stood in contradiction and 
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produced an evident tension and confusion for people like Fatima and Prasad. Fatima’s 
worry about her slum’s demolition and Prasad’s surprise about Mission Convergence are 
interlinked. They both force us to understand that the relationship between the 
government and the poor citizens is a complex one wherein, despite knowing their rights 
and making demands as political voting citizens, the poor have come to normalize the 
continuing neglect from the welfare state, and therefore question the intentions of its 
pro-poor projects.  
With the introduction of a mass-scale government-NGO partnership for 
exclusively serving the poor, set notions about who or what is the government, and what 
the government does for its poor citizens at a time of fast-paced development of an 
aspiring world-class city – are thrown into disarray. Noted scholars have rightly pointed 
out that there is much discourse around the assumed decline of the developmental state 
in the era of neoliberalism, but little is said or known about the kind of state that is 
replacing it (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010; Ferguson, 2009). This dissertation 
takes up the challenge posed above. My ethnography of Mission Convergence aims to 
examine whether and how the nature of the state is changing specifically for the millions 
of poor citizens of an aspiring world-class Delhi situated in a liberalized Indian 
economy. This dissertation explores the tensions, contradictions, and confusions as they 
unwrap in the field among the project’s different stakeholders (slum residents, 
government officials, NGO staff, and elected politicians) during the course of my 
ethnographic fieldwork between 2008 and 2010. Below, I briefly examine the co-
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existence of development and disparity in the context of how projects like Mission come 
to be seen as innovative solutions for bridging the gap.  
1.2  Between development and disparity 
 In search of answers to the economic crisis in 1991, the Indian economy used a 
complex mix of regulation and de-regulation to integrate with the international economy. 
The emphasis was on changing policies around trade barriers, taxation, and investment 
for the opening up of markets to foreign investments and trade (Ahmed, 2011; Gupta and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2010; p.19-20). The liberalization of the Indian economy is seen as 
the beginning of the neoliberal era in India. In line with Ferguson (2009; Peck and 
Tickell, 2002), I agree that neoliebralism is a complex term that has gained multiple 
overlapping meanings over the years. I use the term ‘neoliberalism’ rather carefully in 
my dissertation to note that in the context of India, it is a macroeconomic doctrine that 
favors: 1) reduced but important government intervention in the economy; 2) 
competitive markets; 3) private enterprise over public enterprises, and; 4) an emphasis 
on running the state like an efficient enterprise (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). 
Mission as an innovative institutional arrangement is a reflection of the state’s effort to 
work efficiently in partnership with non-state actors. And yet, the working of Mission 
leaves unanswered questions that arise out of the impact of certain neoliberal policies in 
the city-state of Delhi.  
In deviation from the standard claim that neoliberalism emphasizes reducing 
public funds by an efficient and cost-cutting government, we see that India has a 
different story to tell.  Scholars have argued that neoliberalism takes different avatars in 
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alliance with the political and economic environment of a nation-state (Ahmed, 2011; 
Ferguson, 2009; Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010, p. 22). In India, higher voter 
participation from the poorer sections of the population keeps a check on decrease in 
public expenditure. As a result, the functioning of the democracy allows for market 
liberalization to take root alongside greater public expenditure. 
 Twenty years after the liberalization of the Indian economy, mixed results 
continue to surface. The economy has created a stable middle-class and managed to pull 
out of poverty several million people. However, despite increased investments in social 
policy expenditures at the national and state level, there is an increase in the percentage 
of poor people living in poverty across India (Chatterjee, 2008; Gupta and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). Economic disparity and economic growth have occurred 
simultaneously in the post-liberalization India – while 42 percent of Indians live on 
$1.25 a day6, glorious estimates of India’s economy predict that India is an emerging 
superpower with an 8 percent growth rate. According to the NCUES Report (2006) that 
evaluated poverty based on indicators beyond basic income and caloric intake, even 
though the percentage of income-poor in India living on $1 a day has reduced over the 
years (from 274 million in 1993-94 to 237 million in 2004-05), the number of people 
living in social, spatial, occupational and income vulnerabilities has increased by a 
staggering 100 million over the past decade. The NCEUS Report (2006) argues that 
approximately 77 percent of Indians live in some form of poverty, i.e., a sub-standard 
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http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,c
ontentMDK:21880804~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295584,00.html 
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life with lack of basic amenities and social security.  The current population of India is 
1.21 billion, with approximately 337 million living in urban areas (Census of India, 
2011). This means that 27.8 percent of the total population currently lives in urban areas 
compared with 25.5 percent in 1991. This percentage is expected to increase to 41 
percent by 2030, with over 575 million people living in cities and towns by then (India 
Urban Poverty Report, 20097).  According to the Report of the Committee on Slum 
Statistics/Census (2010), 61.80 million people were living in slums in India as of 2001 
and the UN Population Report (2001) estimated that this number will spiral up to un 
unprecedented 158.42 million by 20118. Cities in India are viewed as the engines of 
economic growth, but they are also experiencing unprecedented population growth and 
lack of basic resources to adequately match this growth. 
 In the light of the growing urban poverty and greater opportunities for attracting 
global capital, the burden has fallen on cities to reinvent themselves and compete with 
each-other for attracting national and global capital investments (Bannerjee-Guha, 2009; 
Bhan, 2009). Delhi, the capital of an economically booming India, began transforming 
itself into a ‘world-class’ city to join this competition and benefit from the inflow of 
global capital (Batra, 2010). Over the past decade, Delhi improved its civic infrastructure 
to attract global capital, but in the process, it marginalized millions of poor residents by 
demolishing slums and restricting informal economies (Batra, 2010; Baviskar, 2006, 
2010; Bhan, 2009; Dupont, 2011). Despite several programs and policies for the welfare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 http://data.undp.org.in/poverty_reduction/IUPR_Summary.pdf 
 
8 http://mhupa.gov.in/W_new/Slum_Report_NBO.pdf 
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of its poor citizens, the Delhi government has been heavily criticized for their weak 
implementation and poor results. Further, mass scale slum demolitions, their 
resettlement in peripheral wastelands, and poor provision of basic amenities are some 
indicators that have convinced scholars of the government’s intentional exclusion of the 
urban poor from its development agenda (Batra, 2008, 2010; Batra and Mehra, 2008; 
Baviskar, 2004, 2006, 2010; Dupont and Ramanathan, 2005; Menon Sen and Bhan, 
2008). As a result, Delhi is ripe with contradictions – with 14 million people, it is one of 
the fastest growing metropolitan cities in the world – but one where nearly 45 percent of 
its population resides in sub-human conditions in slums or slum-like environments 
(Delhi Human Development Report, 2006).  
 Overwhelmed by the growing wealth disparity, visible poverty, and its possible 
ill-effects on attracting global business and tourism into the city, the government was 
frantically trying to seek a balance between economic growth and alleviating poverty. 
The intersection of both these critical agendas alongside the welfare state’s obligations 
to serve its citizens occur through such government programs as Mission Convergence 
that focus on making Delhi an “inclusive city” for its poor with the intention of also 
fueling its world-class image. Mission Convergence, as covered throughout this 
dissertation, is a “good governance” project of government-NGO partnership. It was 
established in 2008 and continues till date, despite multiple alterations, to transform 
government relations with its poor citizens. The core objectives of Mission were to 
enumerate the poor, take stock of the levels and types of poverties, and guide the 
government in managing poverty through equitable distribution of social welfare funds 
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and resources while also training poor people’s labor (specifically women’s) to lift their 
families out of poverty. In essence, Mission was bringing together supposedly 
paradoxical ideas such as pro-poor (defined by Ferguson (2009) as unconditional 
provision of cash and services to the poor), redistribution (use of Delhi’s wealth 
generated through global and local businesses to fund welfare of the poor), and 
neoliberal (use of NGOs to efficiently and economically to serve government’s agenda 
of making Delhi fit for attracting global capital) (Ferguson, 2009, p. 178). Delhi 
therefore was trying to create an impression that it was competent in managing its 
poverty while also preparing itself to attract global capital.  
1.3  Research focus 
My research examines how Mission’s mass-scale government-NGO partnership 
is introducing a new paradigm for the exclusive governance of the poor in Delhi. I 
explore the workings of Mission’s programs within the overarching paradigm of Delhi 
as an aspiring world-class city. I do not start with an assumption that the aspirations for a 
world-class Delhi are at odds with or in opposition to the aspirations of an inclusive 
Delhi. On the contrary, I argue throughout my dissertation that the two are inseparable. 
To be more precise, the politics of transforming Delhi into a modern hub for global 
capital hinges strongly upon the politics of governing the poor in Delhi through 
programs that aim to include them with the intention of acquiring their political consent 
and economic labor for the transformation of Delhi.  
My research on Mission Convergence contributes a new area of inquiry to the 
field of urban governance and state-NGO-poor relations through an ethnographic 
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examination of the everyday practices and experiences of actors impacted by and 
engaged in the making of a world-class and inclusive Delhi. I aim to show that the 
welfare and empowerment of the poor in Delhi as envisaged by Mission is located 
between the political economy of a city aspiring to become ‘world-class’ and ‘inclusive’. 
The two paradigms might seem exclusionary in their approach towards the poor – the 
world-class Delhi is widely criticized as being built on the backs of the poor while the 
inclusive Delhi is hopeful of mainstreaming the rights of the poor by efficiently 
providing government services to them. While the former is guided by the neoliberal 
principles of global capital accumulation, the latter is grounded in the Delhi 
government’s welfare obligations towards its poor citizens (c.f. Ferguson, 2009). I argue 
that Mission’s practices and programs attempt to bridge the gap between both aspirations 
by creating an exclusive system for the governance of the poor. Mission’s practices 
highlight that the development trajectory of countries like India often takes an in-
between path wherein neoliberal calls for liberalized trade policies (lesser but important 
state intervention) favoring global economic networks and demanding modern 
infrastructure, safe and clean spaces, and flexible labor must be achieved alongside 
reforming and expanding the welfare programs of the government for its poor citizens. 
1.4  The question of development 
 The programs for inspiring, empowering, including, disciplining, and nurturing 
the poor represent the classic developmental trends highlighted by scholars like 
Ferguson (1990), Scott (1998), Cruikshank (1999), Mosse (2005), and Li (2005, 2007). 
Many scholars, including anthropologists, adopt a neo-Marxist approach to the study of 
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development projects and institutions (Chatterjee, 2008; Escobar, 1995; Kaviraj, 1984; 
Li, 2007). They see development projects9 as an apparatus suspicious of spreading 
government control, or elite power, or neo-imperialistic capitalism – all of which are 
criticized for shunning radical social change in favor of maintaining their respective 
hegemonic strongholds (Bardhan, 1984; Chatterjee, 2008; Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 
1990; Kaviraj, 1991). As a result, scholars have highlighted that several development 
projects have failed in achieving their intended/ideal objectives in most parts of the 
world and as Ferguson (1990) reminds us; their failure has become the norm. Following 
Ferguson, Li (2005) calls for a critical engagement with development that looks beyond 
asking why certain schemes fail, choosing to ask more plainly, in her own words, “What 
do these schemes do? What are their messy contradictory, multilayered, and conjectural 
effects?” (Li, 2005, p. 384). 
In line with the above discussion, Roy (2011) and Ferguson (1994) provide two 
different answers to this question. Roy (2011) suggests that the continuous production of 
development solutions is a requirement for the flow of capital from financial and 
development institutions that boost such projects alongside introducing reforms and 
conditions that indirectly benefit them or help expand their ideals. Development 
solutions therefore emerge out of the material and ideological circuits of global 
capitalism. But Ferguson had noted many years prior to Roy’s current claims that to 
interpret development projects as “part of the historical expansion of capitalism or as 
elements in a global strategy for controlling or capitalizing peasant production”, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Especially those development projects funded by international donor banks to seek greater market 
flexibility and introduction of new financial regulations (Harvey, 2005) 
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provides a weak analysis of why development projects are initiated or continued despite 
weak results (1994, p. 180). Ferguson’s ethnographic study of the Canadian government-
funded Thaba Tseka development project in Lesotho shows that the global capitalist 
agenda finds no space for articulation through such projects.  But what finds space is the 
ability of the government to expand its bureaucratic control over spaces and people 
previously unreached. Ferguson (1990) argues that poverty alleviation is nothing more 
than a justification through which the government is able to enter uncharted territory and 
reinforce the power of the bureaucratic state. On an entirely opposite note, Corbridge et 
al.’s (2005) multi-sited ethnographic study of state-citizen relations in India critiques 
over-simplistic neo-marxist interpretations of state’s development interventions, and in 
fact points out that the government is concerned with the poverty of its citizens and in 
devising participatory and inclusive solutions for their benefit. What outcomes these 
interventions produce are dependent upon the complexity of the social and political 
relations on the ground, but poor outcomes should not be judged as poor intentions. 
 I argue that the question of why development projects like Mission are 
implemented despite recurrent failures does not have a single right answer. In 
contemporary India, it is difficult to differentiate between the welfare state and the 
neoliberal state (c.f. Sharma, 2006). I argue that the state’s genuine interest in the 
development of its poor, in the expansion of its bureaucratic control and political 
legitimacy over their lives, and in enabling the circulation of neoliberal capital and 
ideas– these are all closely tied and overlapping objectives. Mission’s welfare and 
empowerment programs delivered free of cost at the doorsteps of the poor were expected 
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to legitimize the authority of the state and showcase the caring and inclusive nature of 
the government; such programs were simultaneously expected to extend the state’s 
bureaucratic control (through NGOs) on the messy terrains of poverty to produce 
countable and governable subjects that contribute their labor and political consent 
towards the making of a world-class Delhi as the hub for global trade and tourism (c.f. 
Gupta and Sharma, 2006, p. 281). The Delhi government’s partnership with NGOs, the 
establishment of community-based GRCs, the expansive surveys of the poor, the 
extension of welfare services to more poor added to government registers, and the 
systematic implementation of a conventional set of women’s empowerment programs 
across all slums in Delhi – all these practices being implemented alongside the frenzy for 
making Delhi world-class highlight only too clearly that the welfare of the poor in 
contemporary India remains a significant concern of the post-liberalization Indian. Why 
this entrenched concern has taken the shape of Mission Convergence in Delhi, and how 
this concern is being managed or solved by its programs – these are questions my 
dissertation aims to answer. 
 Further, I draw attention to Li’s analysis that we must look beyond “the state” to 
other non-state actors –  like NGOs, politicians, and local leaders – acting on multiple 
spatial scales to improve the target population. As Li argues, ““the state” has seldom had 
a monopoly on improvement.” (2005, p. 384). Li (2005) suggests aptly that development 
projects or ‘improvement schemes’ are never one coherent plan emerging out of the 
authority of one coherent source. Instead, they maintain a journey through fragmented 
objectives, techniques, and knowledge that emerge as an ‘assemblage’ always in the 
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process of change. Li (2005, p. 386) states that an assemblage is “…always subject to 
contestation and reformulation by a range of pressures and forces it cannot contain.” I 
suggest that Mission as an assemblage of development is constituted and disturbed by 
the multiple state and non-state actors that carry conflicting agendas for the poor in 
particular, and, for the city in general.  
The development theories examined above highlight that in order to study a 
specific urban policy, it is important to look at the intentions behind the policy as it 
evolves from political and economic motivations and forces across the global, national, 
and local scales (Brenner, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Robinson, 2002; Roy 2011, 2011a). 
Large scale development projects like Mission are formulated with certain intentions – 
make the government responsive to the poor, alleviate poverty, and empower the poor to 
break through the cycle of poverty. Such project ideals, when implemented, activate 
several expected as well as unexpected changes not only on the target population that 
they intend to develop but also on prominent actors sharing political and economic 
relations with these populations. An ethnographic examination of the intentions that 
introduce Mission as a solution to Delhi’s growing poverty and the changes that they 
unleash in the slums of Delhi reveal multiple things to us: the political and economic 
logics behind the intention; the gaps between the intended and the implemented, and 
most importantly, the political, economic and social relationships sustained or strained in 
the process of the working of the intention. 
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1.5 Anthropology of the state and the government 
 Anthropologists have provided a new meaning to the concept of state. Unlike 
philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists who studied the state as a system 
distinct from the society, an autonomous actor, an instrument of capitalist class, or an 
object not worthy studying, anthropologists examine the state as a product of cultural 
processes and social relations (Fuller and Benei, 2000; Gupta and Sharma, 2006). 
Contrary to neo-Marxist and Weberian theories of the state that saw culture as a product 
of the state, certain prominent anthropologists (Corbridge et al., 2005; Gupta, 1995, 
2005; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; Ong, 1999) conceptualize 
the state within the context of the family, civil society and the economy, and global 
capitalism, thus rejecting the state-civil society binary which has been at the core of 
several prominent theories of state (c.f. Skocpol, 1979).  
 Ethnographers explore the mundane minutiae – the microscopic relationship 
between different people and the mechanisms of the state at the level of the everyday.  
Anthropological studies of the state are mostly known as ethnographies of the “profane, 
mundane, and banal bureaucratic working of the state at the local level” (Fuller and 
Benei, 2000, p. 16). Anthropologists look to understand the micropolitics of state at 
work and how the citizens engage in a constant process of imagining, encountering and 
re-imagining the state through their daily direct or indirect (through intermediaries) 
interactions with state machinery, and through their discussions, rumors, narratives about 
the state (Jeffrey and Lerche, 2000; Gupta and Sharma, 2006). Gupta (2005, p. 28, also 
Tarlo, 2000; Corbridge et al., 2005) points out that the most mundane practices and 
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representations of the state along with the materiality of the state’s practices are located 
in statistics, reports, surveys, offices, transfers, inspections, and bureaucratic processes. 
For many poor people, such practices and materials have life-changing repercussions, 
and therefore allocate great power in the hands of specific state actors (Tarlo, 2000). For 
the poor in Delhi, their ability to receive welfare services was dependent on the files, 
reports, and offices of the welfare departments and elected politicians. These materials 
defined the state rather unpleasantly for the poor and highlighted a lop-sided relationship 
between the poor as beneficiaries and the state as benefactors.  
Beyond the local, anthropologists have examined the increase in the supra-
national and non-state actors that constitute the state (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002), also 
indicating how state practices at the level of the everyday are changed through the state’s 
policies emerging out of circuits of global neoliberal ideology and capital (Dolhinow, 
2005; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; Roy, 2011; Sharma, 2008). Drawing on Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality and a Marxist emphasis on political economy, Ong (1999) 
proposes that special attention be given to the regulatory effects that particular 
institutions like the state and the economy have in making particular kinds of subjects 
and also how these subjects respond to the changing political-economic conditions 
induced by globalization. The general assumption is that states in the neoliberal era are 
eroding and minimizing, shunning welfare, thinning the apparatus, and being economics-
centric. However, Ong (1999; also Brenner, 2002; Ferguson, 2009; Gupta and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2010; Sinha, 2010) asserts that the state is anything but shrinking in 
today’s neoliberal global era. Instead, the state is only taking more flexible forms.  
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Ferguson and Gupta (2002) show how the state is emboldened through 
neoliberalism – the state extends its tactics of governance through diverse actors which 
are either taking over or sharing states’ responsibilities (these actors include - 
international NGOs, community NGOs, government NGOs, transnational agencies, local 
struggling groups). Ferguson and Gupta (2002) show that state has tactics to claim 
hierarchy (verticality) and encompassment (localization) among its population even 
when its functions are displaced on to other actors. Anthropology of the state has 
therefore been largely successful in dismantling the logic of a material, centralized, and 
coherent state, and instead produces a fragmented, multiple, and discourse-dependent 
idea and effect of the state that exists above and beyond its visible and assumed 
materiality and national boundaries.  
The postcolonial state in India has been predominantly understood as a system 
separated from the common citizen by the passive revolution of the elites enabled 
through their bureaucratic controls (Kaviraj, 1984; Chatterjee, 1986). More recently, the 
passive revolution theory has been extended to show the utilization of development 
projects as a technique to pacify the poor and avoid violence by those suffering from the 
nexus of industrial capital, elites, and state bureaucracy (Chatterjee, 2008). Despite this 
Gramscian outlook on the state as being managed by the dominant class, scholars have 
also pointed out that this does not make the state a cohesive unit. Most Indian scholars 
have argued that the state-society boundary is porous and unclear and that social forces 
play a significant role in influencing the working of the state in the everyday lives of its 
citizens (Edelman and Mitra, 2006; Harriss, 2010; Harriss-White, 2002; Jeffrey, 2001). 
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As a result, people who come together to constitute the state at different levels do not 
share a common vision, purpose, or interest. In fact, they are often in competition or 
conflict with one another –– as we see in Section 3.  
My dissertation on Mission suggests that the state, through its networks across 
multiple government departments and partnering nongovernmental organizations that 
intersect within this Delhi government project, decides what Mission should do on an 
everyday basis, how it must access the poor, and what results it must produce on the 
ground. Attending to the state’s welfare obligations through an efficiency based inter-
sectoral model of governance enables the state to spread its ideology (of ‘reaching the 
unreached’), agenda (managing poverty), and material presence (through GRC 
infrastructure and its welfare services). This initiative of the Delhi government was 
understood by several slum residents as the initiative of local NGOs, several of which 
already run centers on the same model as the GRCs, and are known as “silaii kadhaii 
centers” (tailoring-embroidery centers). Few slum residents also noted that the “Sheila 
Dixit government” (Sheila Dixit is the Chief Minister of Delhi) was simplifying welfare 
procedures for their benefit – as if the government were one specific entity or actor 
operating from a single site and through a single agenda. Most partnering NGO viewed 
Mission as a political strategy of the government, and a much required one at that. 
Despite being a significant cog of this political strategy, NGOs continued to see 
themselves as different from the government, often complaining that their “partnership” 
was a farce, and that they worked more like paid contractors than as equal partners of the 
government. Politicians, however, vented over the “outsourcing of democracy” and 
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“privatization” of the government once NGOs started provision of welfare services. For 
all politicians I interviewed, government and NGOs were separate entities and the two 
had no business in working as partners for serving the poor. These ethnographic 
considerations give me the impression that the state and the government do succeed at 
some level to produce an effect of unity and rationality. And yet, at the level of the 
everyday, the unity and the rationality take on complex, fragmented, conflicting, and 
competing logics of government.  
In my dissertation, I examine the state as a symbolic and material entity which is 
multifaceted and internally fractured. Following Ferguson (1990), I view the state not as 
a unitary actor or material reality, but a way in which multiple power relations come 
together in a coordinated manner to assert control over the population. In agreement with 
several scholars, my research dispels the idea that the state is distinct from civil society 
and in fact asserts that dispersed networks of social actors and non-state institutions 
assist the state with its processes of governance and especially with expanding and 
consolidating its control over populations (Foucault, 1991; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; 
Gupta and Sharma, 2006; Mitchell, 1991; Rose, 1996).  
In the sections below, I first introduce the core stakeholders that impact and are 
impacted by Mission’s practices and then move on to discuss in detail the concerns that 
activated the government’s attention towards making a world-class as well as an 
inclusive city.  
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1.6 A description of the stakeholders 
1.6.1 The Delhi government 
 Delhi is a federally managed union territory but has the political structure of a state 
with its own government constituted by seventy members of the legislative assembly 
(MLAs) that represent the seventy constituencies in Delhi. There are two prominent 
political parties that have presided over the legislature over the past twenty years – 
Indian National Congress (INC, also popularly known as ‘Congress’) and Bharatiya 
Junta Party (BJP).10 The Congress Party has been in majority in the legislature since 
1998 and the head of the legislature is the Chief Minister (governor) of Delhi, Sheila 
Dixit.  
 The MLAs play a major role in the infrastructural development11 of their 
constituency for which each receives Rs. 20 Million ($445,000 approx.12) under the 
Local Area Development Scheme (LADS) for a period of five years from the Delhi 
government (Delhi Citizen Forum, 2003).13 However, almost 50 percent of these funds 
are returned unused to the Delhi government due to the tedious coordination required 
across departments, long delays, and the lack of such projects to generate immediate 
political goodwill within the constituency. The MLAs therefore had come to rely heavily 
on identifying and approving the needy for 42 different welfare schemes provided by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As of 2011, 24 MLAs are from BJP, 5 from other smaller parties, while the majority is from Congress. 
 
11 Infrastructural development under LADS includes: construction of school buildings, community halls, 
hostels for working women or school girls, public toilets, public libraries, water tanks, roads and 
drainages, parks and street lights, etc. 
 
12 Throughout the dissertation, I have used the Rupees (Rs.) to US Dollar ($) conversion rate of Rs. 45 for 
$1. As of March 18, 2011, the conversion rate is at Rs. 45.1 for $1. 
 
13 Center for Civil Society: http://www.ccsindia.org/ccsindia/dh_pdf/ch_25mlalocalarea.pdf 
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eight different government departments. The MLAs act as authorized middle-men 
between the department bureaucrats and the welfare-requiring citizens. This authority 
enables several of them to create political goodwill and also to engage in corrupt 
practices in partnership with welfare staff and local leaders (pradhans). 
  In the context of Mission, I define the Delhi government as constituting the 
following actors: elected politicians (MLAs and Chief Minister) and, bureaucrats and 
lower level staff that manage different departments of the government. As will become 
evident through ethnographic details in Section 3, even though Mission is a Delhi 
government initiative led by the Chief Minister and is planned and managed by 
government bureaucrats (with inputs from international and national development 
consultants), it meets with stiff resistance from MLAs and bureaucrats that constitute the 
same government. Collusion as well as conflicts between different Delhi government 
actors shows that the concept of “government” is a fragmented reality (despite having 
material and manual presence) that operates through multiple logics of multiple actors. 
1.6.2 Mission Convergence 
 Mission was established in August 2008 as an autonomous body registered under 
the Societies Registration Act 1860. But my research shows that there is nothing 
“autonomous” about Mission as it operates within the institutional and ideological 
domain of the state. It was conceptualized, designed and funded by the Delhi 
government in consultation with academics and local and international development 
consultants. The government bureaucrats working in Mission continue to manage and 
monitor it on an everyday basis and its partnering NGOs run its programs on the ground. 
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These characteristics make Mission a Government-organized NGO, or a GONGO. I 
view Mission as a “government project” whose programs are implemented on the 
ground through partnering NGOs. Sharma (2006) does an excellent job defining the 
power dynamics and everyday field practices of a GONGO. In her case, she argues that 
the government cannot entirely wash its hands off welfare duties and therefore uses 
collaborative institutional arrangements like GONGOs to expand its work and reach. 
Similarly, in the case of Mission, the Delhi government recognized that it could not 
serve the growing poor in ways that NGOs were trying to do with their established 
networks, services and infrastructure in the slums. NGOs worked as government’s 
“partners” to survey the poor and deliver its programs at their doorsteps– not to replace 
the government’s intervention in the same. The GONGO arrangement did enable the 
government to extract more information about the nature and number of poor in the 
slums of Delhi as the government tried to popularize itself as “caring” of the poor. 
 Mission’s institutional structure is broadly divided into two parts: headquarter 
and field. There are three kinds of staff working at the Mission headquarter, also known 
as the Project Management Unit (PMU): 1) government bureaucrats; 2) development 
specialists hired on contract; and, 3) development consultants from the World Bank and 
the United Nations (UN). Mission’s director is a high-ranking government bureaucrat. 
She is the highest authority in the project and reports directly to the Chief Secretary 
(highest ranking bureaucrat in the Delhi government) and the Chief Minister of Delhi. 
Consultants from the World Bank and the United Nations assist Mission’s director with 
policy formulation and provide advice on how to implement different programs. The 
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development specialists hired by Mission assist with the implementation of Mission’s 
programs. Figure 1.2 illustrates the institutional structure of Mission Convergence. 
1.6.3 Gender Resource Centers (GRCs) and other partnering NGOs 
 At the level of the field, there are 104 NGOs that have partnered with Mission 
and are implementing programs through Gender Resource Centers (GRCs) in low 
income areas across Delhi. These NGOs are selected by the project management unit 
based on their past development record and reputation in the community. Most NGOs 
are small scale secular organizations established and run by middle-class people. These 
NGOs have been working in poor areas through large and small funded projects on 
issues like water and sanitation, women’s rights, health, vocational trainings, non formal 
education, etc. Two out of the four NGOs in my catchment areas worked primarily on 
women’s empowerment and were headed by middle class feminist women. Each GRC 
hires eight individuals who run different programs for service delivery and women’s 
empowerment there. One female and one male community mobilizers are hired from 
within the community and serve as the main contact between the GRC and the 
community. 
 The GRCs are supervised by two different kinds of NGOs – two “Mother NGOs” 
(MNGOs) each of which supervises the overall work progress of approximately fifty 
NGOs, and; nine District Resource Centers (DRCs), one located in each of the nine 
districts in Delhi. DRCs specifically supervise the welfare delivery component of all the 
GRCs working within their district and they also collaborate with the Deputy 
Commissioner in their district to take the welfare approval forward. The GRCs therefore 
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are supervised and supported by a network of other NGOs placed into a hierarchy by the 
Project Management Unit. Figure 1.3 illustrates the GRC staff hierarchy. 
 The GRCs are funded by the department of Women and Child Development 
(WCD) of the Delhi government. It is one of the eight welfare-providing departments 
and provides Rs. 72,800,000 ($1.6 Million approx.) per year for the construction and 
everyday operations of the 104 GRCs. Each GRC receives a monthly funding of 
Rs.145,000 ($3,333) for staff salaries, rent, and for running women’s empowerment 
programs. This is excluding the Rs.80,000 ($1,740) for the GRC’s initial set up cost and 
an additional Rs.80,000 for the set-up costs involving vocational training equipments 
and materials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1.2. Institutional structure of Mission Convergence 
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Fig.1.3. GRC staff hierarchy 
 
 
 
1.6.4 Slum residents 
 Recent figures indicate the at least 65 percent of the total population of Delhi or 
approximately 9 million out of 14 million people reside in different variations of slums 
and resettlement colonies (Bhan, 2009). These areas are categorized based on their poor 
basic infrastructure and lack of basic amenities like potable water, sanitation, functional 
clinics and schools, safe housing, drains, sewers, and roads. Table 1 below indicates the 
different kinds of housing options available in Delhi and the percentages of people 
residing in them. The columns in bold indicate the areas where Mission’s GRCs are 
established to serve the residents there.  
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Table 1.1. 
Housing types in Delhi (blue indicates the housing types where Mission works). 
Source: Government of Delhi (2004), Economic Survey of Delhi 2002–2003, 
Government of Delhi, New Delhi. (Bhan, 2009, p. 132). 
 
Type of settlement Percentage of total 
population 
JJ cluster (shanties) 14.8 
Slum-designated areas 19.1 
Unauthorized colonies  5.3 
Resettlement colonies 12.7 
Regularized-unauthorized 
colonies 
12.7 
Rural villages  5.3 
Urban villages  6.4 
Planned colonies 23.7 
Total 100.0 
  
 It must be made clear that not all people residing in these areas are income-poor. 
And neither do all slum residents associate with the word “poor”. I use the term “poor” 
and “slum resident” interchangeably but carefully while discussing the policies of the 
government for the people residing in spatial vulnerability – one of the vulnerability 
criteria’s of the Delhi government. When discussing individuals and families. I provide 
details of the basic income and living condition of each slum resident or family in order 
to show the different vulnerabilities faced by them. The basic average income earned by 
most of my informants across four slum colonies was between Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 10,000 
per month ($45 to $220). Though each family’s standard of living is dependent upon the 
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number of wage-earning members, almost all of my informants (with the exception of 
those residing in specific sections of Sethu slum) have basic amenities like electricity 
connection, cooking gas, refrigerator, television, and ability to have three square meals a 
day (by buying subsidized food grains and fuel from the government-authorized public 
distribution system). Some families have to decide between sending their children to 
college, or arranging for the marriage of their daughters, or receiving treatment for an 
illness. Considering these other parameters of poverty, the Delhi government formulated 
proxy indicators based on the social, spatial, and occupational vulnerabilities faced by 
the income-poor as well as non-income poor. I explain this further in a later section on 
Mission’s programs. I also examine the changing nature of slums in India in a later 
section. Below, I examine the urban boom in India to show why exactly the Delhi 
government found it necessary to implement Mission.  
1.7 The urban boom and slums in India 
 The postcolonial Indian state has primarily focused its policies and resources on 
the development and welfare of its rural areas because until recently, about 70 percent of 
the Indian population resided in rural India. Urban policies mainly focused on 
infrastructure development, not on creating sound institutional responses to the growing 
population and poverty in urban India. Policy makers assumed that urban poverty was a 
temporary phenomenon which would be solved with the gradual modernization of the 
cities (Beall, 2000; p. 846). But policy makers are now realizing that the growth of urban 
India requires a radical policy shift.14 According to McKinsey’s report on India’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 http://www.livemint.com/2011/07/16000221/Fresh-thrust-to-urbanization.html?h=E 
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urbanization, urban India will witness a growth by 250 million people over the next 20 
years and the urban population will rise to 590 Million by 2030. This will mean that 
almost double of current US population will reside in urban centers alone in India, a 
country one-third the size of the US.  
 In Delhi, the urban population is estimated to rise from 14 million in 2011 to 25.5 
million by 2030. According to McKinsey economists this kind of urban population 
growth is unprecedented in human history and will require certain immediate 
infrastructural and governance reforms to brace for such inflow of population.15 These 
reforms would have to focus on a 70 percent increase in work creation to meet the 
economic demands of the increasing urban populations. Work creation requires 
increased investment in infrastructural expansion and modernization for attracting 
investments from Indian and global corporations. Governmental intervention in 
preparing these cities as urban economic centers for global trade, and tourism are 
therefore considered imperative for the successful growth of Indian cities. The idea of 
making Delhi into a world-class city is justified by the government in the light of 
expanding urban population and their economic needs. But what remains unjustified is 
the suffering of the poor as the city expands and modernizes its infrastructure to become 
an economic hub. Below, I provide a brief history of slums in Delhi to prove that the 
idea of slums has changed with the onset of neoliberal urbanization, thus further 
marginalizing the poor.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  
(https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Economic_Studies/Country_Reports/Indias_high_stakes_urban_chal
lenge_2571)	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 Slums are illegal and informal spaces where the poor reside for lack of better 
options. Slums are known as an off-shoot of rapid urbanization and weak development 
policies of the state16 (c.f. Davis, 2006). Only about 25 percent of Delhi’s population 
currently lives in planned colonies while the majority lives in slums or slum-like 
conditions (Bhan, 2009). Attention from media (especially with movies like Slumdog 
Millionaire, Salaam Bombay, City of God), development sector (hundreds of NGOs 
work in slums and receive government and international funding for their work here), 
government programs and services (free schools, hospitals, community centers, welfare 
services), and from civil society (either middle class residential associations favoring its 
eradication or middle-class activists fighting for its permanence - both on the grounds of 
human rights), have in fact situated slums at the center-stage of mainstream development 
intervention. Like in India’s other metropolitans, slums are a prominent fixture on 
Delhi’s landscape, but the idea of the slum has taken various meanings in the post-
independent India.  
 Prior to independence from the British colonial rule, India became the capital of 
the British Empire in 1911, exactly a century ago. Between 1911 and 1937, the British 
developed a new area away from the old Walled City area of Delhi that was built during 
the earlier centuries of Mughal rule.  This new area came to be known as New Delhi. 
While New Delhi became known for its architectural design and planning as the hub of 
British administration and residence, the Walled City lay neglected, filthy and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
16 Weak policies for the agricultural, educational, and economic development in rural areas cause mass-
scale migration from rural to urban India, and, weak policies for affordable housing that are unable to meet 
the basic demands for shelter of the increasing city population lead to the creation of slums.  
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overcrowded with ‘natives’ and a rush of migrants who came to work in the booming 
mercantile markets of the city (Batra, 2010; Sharan, 2006). In essence, the Walled City 
was transformed from a bustling city into a slum with the onset of the development of 
the “New Delhi”. Batra (2010) points out that the workers who built New Delhi and the 
people who were evicted for its development were confined to the crumbling Walled 
City – quite like the current mass of poor who build and run the aspiring world-class 
Delhi but are shunned into its peripheries. 
As early as the 1950’s, the newly-independent Indian government considered 
housing a basic right of all citizens and slums a disgrace to the nation. Delhi being the 
capital of India formulated policies to meet the housing need of the growing populations 
(that increased with the flow of post-partition migrants from Pakistan in 1947) through 
federal government’s Five-Year Plans and the Delhi government’s Master Plans (Beall, 
2000, p. 846; Dupont, 2008). Dupont (2008) notes that despite a good start, the Delhi 
government’s prime department for land acquisition and development – the Delhi 
Development Authority (DDA) – failed to meet the housing needs of low-income people 
and that led to the creation of informal settlements on public land (Dupont and 
Ramanathan, 2007 examine in detail how the DDA plans went awry). As a result, the 
slum population increased from 4 percent of Delhi’s population in 1951 to 27 percent in 
1998, i.e. an increase in the slum population from 63,000 to 3,000,000 (Dupont, 2008, p. 
81). The emergency period (1975-77) however temporarily halted the growth of slum. 
During the emergency, apart from several other undemocratic programs like the 
sterilization drive (Tarlo, 1995, 2000), a city beautification drive in major cities 
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demolished thousands of slums and forced millions of people into peripheral 
resettlement colonies with no roads, clinics, or schools.17  
 In general, between the 1960’s and 1990’s, the federal and Delhi government 
considered affordable housing the right of the poor and therefore made efforts to meet 
this growing need. Approximately 40 resettlement colonies were built between 1965 and 
1985 with the logic of decongesting the city and providing better housing to the poor 
(Puri and Bhatia, 2009). However, with more than 3 million people living in 1,000 slum 
clusters across Delhi as of 1998, and at least 50,000 people migrating into Delhi slums 
every year, the problems of slums had become too big to manage.18 Further, middle-
class judicial activism against slums in their neighborhoods gained strength in the 1990’s 
to emphasize on the illegal nature of slum residency and the right of the legal tax payer 
to live in clean environments (Baviskar, 2002, 2003; Ramanathan, 2005, 2006). The 
concern for creating decent housing for the poor was replaced by the growing elite and 
middle-class’s emphasis on ridding Delhi of all slums to make it an aesthetically 
appealing city. Ghertner (2008) notes that slums now began to be seen as nuisance 
created by the poor taking over spaces and making them illegal as well as unaesthetic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Some residents of Surja resettlement colony have narrated stories about their eviction from the center of 
the city and forceful resettlement in the then peripheries of Delhi. Dadu is an 80 year old Hindu man. He 
was evicted from Majnu Tila in North Delhi (near the Delhi University campus) in 1975 under the city 
beautification plan. He said, “We were ten of us – me, my wife and children, and three relatives. The 
government truck came one day, rounded us all up, pushed us in, and came to this place. We were told this 
would be our new home. We were given a plot of land and we were supposed to make our own house 
there. There were fields on all sides. No ration shops, no roads to the city, nothing. All of that came after 
about 10 years. Until then, we just lived, somehow.” 
 
18 It is estimated by the Slum and Jugghi Jhonpri department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(MCD) that at least 200,000 people migrate to Delhi every year, out of which 50,000 make slums their 
new home (Puri and Bhatia, 2009).  
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not as spaces where people resided due to lack of other options. The government that 
previously emphasized replacing slums with decent housing for the poor now focused on 
getting rid of slums with restricted options of resettlement.  
 The economic liberalization starting with 1991 was also the time when 
neoliberalism had begun impacting governmental development policies and economy in 
India (Dupont, 2011). In the 2000’s, mass slum demolitions became common as Delhi 
prepared itself for its entry into the global economic circuit (Baviskar, 2006; Dupont, 
2011; Ramanathan, 2005). The emphasis was on converting slum-occupied “dead land” 
into profit-bearing land that can be sold off to private corporations while transferring 
select slum residents into subsidized plots in resettlement colonies. For example, 35,000 
families were evicted from the Yamuna Pushta slums located on the banks of river 
Yamuna on the claims that it polluted the river (Menon-Sen, 2010). A part of the cleared 
area is currently being developed as a recreational site on the theme of River Thames in 
London. Further, the $20 Billion federal scheme known as National Urban Renewal 
Mission19 was established in 2005 to disburse conditional funds to sixty-three cities 
across India for their modernization (Mahadevia, 2011). Also, $13 Billion were spent on 
modernizing Delhi for the Commonwealth Games of 2010 while an estimated three 
million poor were displaced in the process – this only further confirmed that Delhi was 
prioritizing material modernization that often limited the fundamental rights of its poor 
citizens. Batra (2010) notes that the Delhi government’s policies are exclusionary of the 
poor such that they create a superficially modern city with no space for the poor who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I provide more details on this project in Section 2 
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construct this modern city and make it work. He uses the term ‘apartheid city’ to define 
the spatial and economic disparities arising out of the government’s exclusionary 
policies. Even though apartheid connotes racial or social segregation, Batra aptly applies 
it to highlight the spatial dimension of economic exclusion taking place in Delhi.  
1.8 Beyond slumdog megacity and subaltern urbanism 
 Above, I have summarized that the idea of the slum has changed over the past 
sixty years in post-colonial India. Rapid neoliberal development is making the 
government focus on eradicating slums such that India should no longer be defined by 
its sprawling poverty and deprivation in the public discourse. However, there is a stark 
contrast between the fast-paced urbanism that is uprooting slums in favor of creating 
modern cities in India and the scholarly discourses being circulated about the “slumdog” 
and subaltern nature of Indian slums. Roy (2011) argues that cities in the global South 
have been popularly defined as “slumdog megacities” and characterized by their 
informal, unstructured, and filthy spaces energized by sparks of entrepreneurial energy 
of the poor. Such definitions emerge in stark contrast to the global or world-class cities 
of the North. The megacities of the South are seen as aspiring but struggling to emerge 
from the shadows of the standards of the western world-class cities. The chaotic energy 
and desperation to succeed in the megacities is further defined through public media 
experiments like Slumdog Millionaire. Roy notes that while cities like Mumbai and 
Delhi come to be known as slumdog megacities, little attention is paid to who claims 
them to be so, and why. 
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 Challenging the interpretation of the cities of the South as struggling slumdog 
megacities, certain scholars have elaborated on the subaltern nature of the megacity 
which thrives economically and politically, despite many odds – one of them being lack 
of governmental support (Chatterjee, 2004; Benjamin, 2008). These scholars provide 
terms like occupancy urbanism, political society, subaltern cosmopolitanism, alternative 
enterpreunerialism, and jugaar mentality (make-do with whatever you get) to create a 
new yet equally homogeneous interpretation of the cities of the South as organic grounds 
of subaltern urban survivalism and politics that does not care to fit into the mould of 
development defined by the west. Roy (2011, p. 226) calls this ‘subaltern urbanism’, a 
concept that tries to resurrect slums as spaces of desperation and instead focus on its 
local vibrant entrepreneurial energy.  
 Roy argues that both interpretations of the city, the slumdog megacity and 
subaltern urbanism, are important but offer a biased, partial, and synecdochic version of 
the city in which the slum is the center or the backbone of the city. Poverty, desperation, 
raw energy, and unique survival strategies have come to define both interpretations to an 
extent that the slum has become synecdochic with the city of the developing South. 
 Roy is correct in her analysis of the synecdochic nature of Southern urbanism 
which also explains why governments are making efforts at redefining the city through 
policy interventions such as Mission. The idea is to replace the synecdoche of the 
Southern city as the slum with the synecdoche of the Southern city as a world-class city. 
This re-formation of the synecdoche is considered crucial for the governments in 
attracting global capital. Mission was implemented to soothe the blow of neoliberal 
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forces that work to alter the synecdoche of Delhi and make it a world-class city, and also 
to channelize the entrepreneurial energy of the slums towards the economy of an 
aspiring city. In the sections below, I first provide an overview of literatures on the 
concepts of world-class city and inclusive city and then show how urbanism links the 
two concepts into a cohesive unit of synecdochic development.  
1.9 Making a world-class and inclusive Delhi  
 The idea of a world-class city emerged around the 1970’s when global and 
transnational businesses began booming in the west. A world-class city, also commonly 
known as world city or global city, is a concept that was first coined by Peter Hall in his 
seminal 1966 book titled ‘The World City’. The term world-class city or global city 
(Freidmann, 1986; Sassen, 2006) is used by urban scholars to explain a certain kind of 
urban explosion across the world that caters to economic elites and corporations through 
set characteristics like clean and modern infrastructure, safe and well-connected spaces, 
skilled labor, political stability, and a government encouraging of economic 
opportunities. To make a city world-class means to make its zones of poverty invisible 
or to make them compatible with the world-class city image. In Delhi, “world-class” is 
the term actually used by the Delhi Development Authority in its official documents on 
city plan (Delhi Development Authority, 2007; Dupont, 2008). This term is commonly 
used by scholars and activists to explain the growing frenzy among policy makers and 
the middle-class for converting Delhi into a city that meets the standards of popular 
business and tourist destinations like Shanghai, Dubai, New York, London, and Tokyo.  
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 According to Freidmann and Wolff (1982, p. 310) world cities share a dialectical 
relationship with the world systems. They suggest that open trade between the core, 
semi-periphery, and periphery – with core operating as the node – leads to the creation 
of world cities as “key basing points” and “command and control nodes” for 
corporations (Robinson, 2002). Global or world-cities are major sites for majority of the 
production of innovation emerges while the periphery is where cities of the third world 
provide to the core their cheap and flexible labor in their sweatshops and back 
processing offices (and these distinct zones exist even within each city). The world 
system is reproduced and strengthened by the forces of neoliberal capitalism as cities 
across the world compete to become world-class at the cost of marginalization of its own 
citizens (c.f. Ahmed, 2011 for discussion on Delhi’s leap from manufacturing to service 
industry to attract global capital, and its impact on the economic exclusion of the urban 
poor). Olds and Yeung (2004, p. 495) state that “global cities are represented as the 
visible manifestation of the global economy” as they showcase the “relationship between 
globalization, urban change, and uneven development” (2004, p. 495). Brenner (2004) 
reminds us that despite a seemingly free-market neoliberally-driven enterprise of making 
world-class cities, the state plays the most significant role because global cities are not 
only expected to attract global capital but also validate nationalist territorial 
developmental claims of the state.  
 Robinson (2002, 2006) is a strong critic of state policies that make “calculated 
attempts” at making world-class cities. She argues that such policies do not take into 
consideration the geopolitical, historical and economic contexts that differentiate the 
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cities of the developed and developing countries. Despite high percentage of citizens 
living in poverty, such policies prioritize prominent sectors of the global economy for 
development and investment while neglecting the state’s welfare duties towards the poor 
(Robinson, 2006, p. 111). States like India are diverting disproportionate amounts of 
public resources and funds to construct ‘show-case’ infrastructure or to host international 
sports or trade events at the cost of marginalizing its own citizens in dire needs of these 
resources (Batra, 2010; Olds and Yeung, 2004, p. 505-507). Such events and 
infrastructures have been growing fast in Delhi and are publicized as glorious national 
assets to the common person to justify its costs (Dupont, 2008). These represent what 
Olds and Yeung (2004, p. 507) claims is a “reterritorialization of state power from the 
national scale towards the urban scale” to create ‘glocal’ territories that serve global 
economy and therefore act as hubs of economic growth for the entire nation (c.f. Bhan, 
2009; Brenner, 1998, 2004; Srivastava, 2009). Such vivid intersections of the local with 
the global and of economic growth with political territorial developmental claims are 
driving many governments, including Delhi’s, to devise policies for fast-tracking their 
evolution into a world-class city.    
 In contemporary post-liberal India, physical restructuring of the city is seen as 
the prime indicator of economic growth as well as a political indicator of a responsive 
state willing to invest into a fast-growing economy. But in cities like Delhi and Mumbai, 
where poverty is visible and growing, material restructuring alone cannot serve the 
purpose. Further, as cities modernize to attract global capital, the social and economic 
disparities come to the surface. Tall buildings and shanties stand in stark contrast with 
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one another. Slums as illegal and disorganized spaces become the prime target of such 
modernization projects and the slum residents its prime victims. The mass displacement 
of the poor, rising homelessness, and the ensuing loss of their livelihoods hinders the 
modernizing city’s economic and social fabric. Social policy interventions are planned to 
manage poverty and to assimilate the poor into the making of a world-class city.  
 For urban centers like Delhi, it is imperative to include the poor into its agendas 
for economic development because the poor are the backbone of the city’s economy. 
The number of poor in urban centers is so huge (and growing) that they can neither be 
ignored nor banished out of the city in any sustainable manner without negatively 
impacting the economy of the city. The poor provide cheap and flexible labor to all 
kinds of businesses and therefore help the city keep production costs under check. 
Further, the high economic stakes of the poor in cities like Delhi ensures that the 
struggles for right to the city become even more intense and can also have profound 
ramifications on the government’s ability to maintain political consent that can further 
spill over and affect the city’s ability to attract global capital (Freidmann and Wolff, 
1982, p. 330).  
 Recognizing their marginalization in the process of making a world-class city, 
the poor in the city criticize urban policies. Their struggles are evident in large and small 
protests organized around slum demolitions, peripheral resettlement, homelessness, and 
ban on informal economies as direct violation of their basic human rights to shelter and 
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livelihood (Hazard Center, 2007; Holston, 2009; Menon-Sen and Bhan, 2008).20 
Through his long-term ethnographic research with autoconstruction (slum) residents in 
Brazil, Holston (2009, p. 245) shows that residents organize action against the 
“entrenched regimes of citizen inequality that the urban centers use to segregate them”. 
He confronts Chatterjee’s (2004) claims that the Indian society is divided into civil 
society and political society and that the latter are lesser citizens with tenuous rights due 
to the illegality of their residence and livelihood. Using examples of successful urban 
rights movements and alliances among slum residents in Brazil, India (specifically 
Mumbai), and elsewhere, Holston claims that the poor are aware of their rights and use 
their peripheral location as a site for a movement to demand their right to the city, i.e., a 
right to property ownership, basic amenities, and decent life. In the slums of Delhi, an 
organized call for the right to the city has originated predominantly from sympathetic 
middle-class civil society organizations than from the slum residents themselves (I talk 
in greater detail about NGO-middle class interests in Section 2). NGOs like Hazard 
Center work both as organizations and as movements to engage the slum residents to 
make demands of the state. Unlike Holston’s claims, I assert that the slum residents in 
Delhi have relied upon a mix of support from civil society (NGO) and their own political 
identity as voters to make demands of the state for their right to shelter, livelihood, and 
basic amenities. Residents in my field sites were well aware of their rights as citizens but 
unlike the autoconstruction residents of Brazil, they were not always convinced that their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 One strong resistance group is the Bhalaswa Lok Shakti Manch (Bhalaswa People’s Power Group) 
organized by the women residents of Bhalaswa, a peripheral resettlement colony in Delhi. 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0HqAZxFlnQ). Another strong resistance group was formed by the 
Delhi University students to protest the displacement of the poor and the $13 Billion spent on the 
Commonwealth Games of October 2010. 
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rights could generate the desired results. NGOs’ call for collective action and demands 
were interspersed by local gatekeepers and local elected politicians and often resulted in 
fragmented and temporary movements. Despite more than 45 percent of Delhi’s 
population living in slum-like conditions, there is no common grassroots platform or 
movement that voices their demands. Scholars and academics have highlighted their 
plight, but grassroots action has been small, rare, or temporary – though not entirely 
invisible or ineffective.   
Due to the high economic stakes and the growing resistance of the poor, the 
government is now simultaneously making efforts through large-scale programs like 
Mission to show that it cares for its poor citizens. These programs are expected to 
alleviate or at least manage the poverty in Delhi with the core intention of nurturing 
model citizens through specific programs for their welfare and empowerment (Roy, 
2011). Mission uses the language of “reaching the unreached” as its core slogan. One of 
Mission’s advertisement claims that “Mission Convergence is a movement to bring the 
benefits through 42 schemes of Delhi government to 40 lakh unreached families”. A 
picture on the back cover of Mission’s brochure (Reaching the Unreached, 2009) shows 
that poor women now have “a ray of hope” (Figures 1.4 and 1.5 below). Such materials 
presented the language of a state caring towards its poor citizens.    
 
 
47	  
	  
	  
	  
  
Fig. 1.4. “We strive to change lives.” An advertisement in a national newspaper claiming 
that Mission is a “movement”. Source: The Hindu, August 12, 2009. 
 
 
 
.  
 
Fig. 1.5. “A ray of hope.” Source: Reaching the unreached, project brochure, 2009. 
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The Delhi government claimed that Mission’s programs will make Delhi an ‘inclusive 
city’ – a term that had gained much popularity since the United Nations Center for 
Human Settlement (UNCHS) Global Campaign on Urban Governance in 2001 for 
making cities inclusive across the urbanizing world. The campaign defines ‘inclusive 
city’ as,	  
A place where everyone, regardless of wealth, gender, age, race or religion, is 
enabled to participate productively and positively in the opportunities cities have 
to offer.  Inclusive decision-making processes are an essential means to achieve 
this and are the cornerstone of the campaign.   
                UN report, September 20021  
  
Another section of this UN report on inclusive cities claims that the divide between the 
rich and the poor is taking away the citizenship rights of the poor, along with their sense 
of belonging to the city. According to the UN, the three inter-related ideas that can 
contribute to the realization of the citizenship of the poor are: good urban governance 
(with a focus on decentralization, inter-sectoral partnerships, and participation of the 
poor), equitable growth, and respect for human rights (Inclusive Cities Report, 2001; 
Taylor, 2000). According to the report, there is a direct relation between including the 
poor in the city and ensuring that the city thrives economically. That poverty must be 
alleviated, or at least managed, is recognized by all cities trying to win global capital. 
Some cities do so by demolishing slums and moving the poor to the peripheries (pre-
Mission Delhi, Mumbai, Johannesburg, Jordan, (c.f. Davis, 2006; Parker, 2009)), others 
do so by issuing passports that do not allow rural to urban migration (all cities in China), 
and some use social services and public-private partnerships to clean up zones of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 http://ww2.unhabitat.org/campaigns/governance/docs_pubs.asp#Inclusive Cities 
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poverty, pacify the poor and engage them in the global economy (Rio di Jenario22, post-
Mission Delhi). Recognizing that government’s across the globe are pressurizing cities 
to meet global standards of business (like modern infrastructure, clean and safe spaces, 
versatile labor), the UN reminds the cities that modern and clean spaces should not be 
created by marginalizing or removing the poor because they are crucial to the 
construction of world-class cities.  
  Literature on world-class and inclusive cities suggests that the two concepts 
work together to seize the opportunities of urbanism and to minimize its ill-effects on the 
poor. The neoliberal nexus of industrial global/local capital and the state works to 
promote a homogeneous version of what the city should become – world-class. 
However, the transition is not as smooth as expected as the poor fight for their right to 
the city. I argue that Mission falls short in strengthening the rights of the poor to the city, 
i.e. the right to shelter and livelihood – both of which are violated by exercises in city 
modernization. Extension of welfare services at the doorsteps of the poor does enable the 
poor to avail certain basic rights related to their citizenship. However, these are minimal 
efforts at mainly redistributing the revenues earned by the state through global and 
national markets (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010, p. 23). Fatima’s fear of her slum’s 
demolition does not vanish with her receipt of welfare at her doorsteps or with her 
daughter Munni’s participation in Mission’s women’s empowerment programs. Mission 
tries to fill – but is successful in further highlighting – the gaping hole in the 
government’s efforts to create a truly inclusive city. I argue that the poor citizen’s partial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 http://video.nytimes.com/video/2010/10/10/world/americas/1248069140837/taming-the-city-of-
god.html 
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realization of rights through Mission’s programs does not enable them to effectively 
benefit from these programs to alleviate their poverty or become empowered.  
 Why then is Mission being hailed as successful inter-sectoral experiment in good 
governance and poverty alleviation by international organizations like the 
Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management (CAPAM) and 
the United Nations? I argue that Prasad’s optimism and puzzlement are key to 
understanding the possibility of alterations in previously stagnant and unresponsive 
government-urban poor relations. As hundred-plus NGOs work with the Delhi 
government to bring services at the doorsteps of the poor, the poor are being informed 
about the plethora of welfare services that they can rightfully access as entitlement 
holders, not as beneficiaries of government dole out – this is the progressive language 
used by Mission to describe its novel approach towards the inclusion and empowerment 
of the poor – a step in the right direction towards the realization of citizenship, however 
partial. I am hopeful that in the long run, despite roadblocks and subsequent unexpected 
changes, Mission’s programs could spawn greater awareness and thirst for more rights 
among the poor residents to call for their holistic inclusion in the city. In the sections 
below, I examine the specific programs that the Delhi government implemented for 
including the poor in the aspiring world-class city.  
1.10 Programs for inclusion 
 The Gender Resource Centers established by Mission have symbolic value. 
Located in 104 slums across all nine districts in Delhi, its uniform spread give a 
semblance of inclusiveness and connectivity for the people residing here, trying to assure 
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them that they have not been entirely swept off the modernizing agenda of Delhi. 
Mission’s infrastructure (GRCs) act as systematic material markers of the government’s 
plans to alleviate poverty across Delhi. To do so, Mission worked primarily on three 
components: reforming the Delhi government’s welfare system; empowering poor 
women, and; revising poverty as vulnerability. Below, I briefly discuss the reasons 
behind Mission’s focus on these three components.  
1.10.1 The welfare issue 
 According to the Delhi government, there are multiple reasons to focus on the 
poor.  As mentioned above, nearly 45 percent of Delhi’s 14 million people reside in 
slums. Further, approximately 100,000 people are homeless and nearly 500,000 migrants 
from neighboring states make Delhi their home every year. Despite being one of the 
wealthiest cities in India, the distributive impacts of Delhi’s twice-the-national-average 
per capita income have not reached a large chunk of its population (Delhi Human 
Development Report, 2006; Project documents, 2009). Though the Delhi government 
spent $17 million annually on welfare schemes23, a large number of poor were unable to 
access them because of their poor management and delivery. Mission was established to 
provide a single-window interface to the 42 different welfare services spread across the 
eight welfare-providing departments of Delhi government. The idea was to create a 
smooth process wherein welfare services can reach the poor at their doorsteps through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The total Delhi government budget is Rs 27,067 crore for the 2011-12 fiscal year. The total social 
security and welfare budget of the Delhi government for the fiscal year 2011 is 1040 crore. (Delhi 
government budget: 
http://delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/lib_finance/Finance/Home/Budget/Budget+2011-
12/Budget+at+a+Glance+2011-12) 
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the Gender Resource Centers located within their community. Section 3 examines in 
detail the changes in welfare delivery, the conflict that emerges between new and old 
welfare providers as a result of Mission, and its impact on the poor.  
1.10.2 Untapped resources: Empowering poor women 
 Alongside problems with determining the actual number of welfare-entitled poor, 
the low social and economic status of women in Delhi was also a concern that the Delhi 
government considered in critical need of attention. High infant mortality rate (43 deaths 
in 1000 live births), low sex ratios (821 females to 1000 males), and high gender gap in 
literacy (12%)24, characterizes the social landscape of Delhi (Delhi Human Development 
Report, 2006; Project documents, 2008, 2009). According to Mission documents (2008, 
2009), the lower literacy rate, especially among women living in socially and spatially 
marginalized locations like slums, was leading to women’s minimal participation in the 
formal workforce of the city-state. In view of these depressing figures, Mission 
expanded on a prior women’s empowerment program of the Delhi government known as 
Stree Shakti (women’s power) and used GRCs across all Delhi slums for providing 
services like vocational trainings, free legal and health camps, free medicines, non-
formal education, and self-help group formations. Figure 1.6 below illustrates a 
community mobilizer informing a resident about women’s empowerment programs. 
Sections 4 and 5 focus on the meanings and impacts of women’s empowerment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Delhi has the highest gender gap in literacy in comparison to the other three metropolitan cities – 
Mumbai, Calcutta, Chennai. Even though 85 percent of people in Delhi can read and write, there is a 
difference of 12 percent in the number of male v. female who have achieved basic literacy (Delhi Human 
Development Report, 2006). 
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programs on the beneficiaries as well as GRC staff respectively. Figure 1.7 illustrates the 
women’s empowerment icon used by Mission. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.6. Mobilizing women. At a resettlement colony near Jaan slum community 
mobilizer Farida (in burkha) is informing a woman resident about women’s 
empowerment programs.  
 
 
  
Fig. 1.7. Face of empowerment. This face is used as icon of Mission Convergence. The 
script in Hindi next to the icon says “Stree Shakti Kendra” (Women’s power center), 
known as Gender Resource Center (GRC). 
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1.10.3 Counting and categorizing the poor 
 Apart from the problems with welfare schemes, there was also confusion about 
how many people were really eligible for what kind of welfare. The Delhi government 
used income criteria as a means to ascertain poverty. However, due to an un-revised 
below poverty line criteria (BPL, at $1.25 a day) even in the face of inflation, a majority 
of the population facing social, occupational, and spatial vulnerabilities did not fall 
below the poverty line, thus failing to receive welfare services (Project Report, 2009). 
To solve this problem, Mission used proxy indicators to develop a more inclusive 
definition of poverty based on the social, spatial and occupation vulnerability of people 
along with their income level.25 This is known as the “vulnerability criteria” (Table 1.2) 
and is expected to assist the government in surveying and categorizing the poor 
according to their vulnerabilities for the purpose of targeted disbursement of welfare. 
Figure 1.8 illustrates the survey of a poor household in progress. 
 Further, Mission was in the process of developing a Family Vulnerability Index 
(FVI) during my fieldwork. Interviews with development consultants working on FVI 
revealed that the government planned to measure the family-level vulnerability to 
provide the most effective package of welfare services and to also track the progress of 
the family. FVI was being developed as a technique for ensuring that each and every 
beneficiary family would use the services responsibly for managing their vulnerabilities. 
Such detailed calculation of the poor shows that the government wanted to make a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Throughout the dissertation, I use poverty and vulnerability interchangeably to refer to the condition of 
all those people who might or might not be income-poor but do suffer from the above mentioned 
vulnerabilities. 
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gradual move from a welfare or assistentialist approach to a capabilities approach 
(Molyneux, 2008, p. 783). Under the assistentialist approach, the government as a 
welfare provider is blamed for promoting a “dependency culture” among the passive 
dole-receiving poor. Under the capabilities approach, the emphasis is on making the 
poor active and responsible stakeholders who develop/strengthen their capabilities 
through trainings and education to chart their own exit routes out of poverty, or to at 
least reduce their risks of falling back into poverty (World Bank Report on Attacking 
Poverty, 2001). 
 
 
 
Table 1.2. 
Vulnerability based identification criteria.  
Source: http://www.missionconvergence.org/survey.html 
 
 
 
	  
	   	  
Spatially vulnerable Socially vulnerable Occupationally vulnerable 
Homeless 
JJ Clusters 
Notified/non-
notified colonies 
Resettlement 
Colonies 
F,G, and H 
colonies 
Households with 60+ year old 
people (alone or dependent) 
Households with disabled 
people 
Households with people 
suffering from debilitating & 
stigmatized ailments like TB, 
HIV/AIDS, Leprosy 
Households with single women 
(alone or dependent)  
Households with unprotected 
children 
Ragpicker 
Unskilled construction 
worker 
Porter 
Casual daily wage laborer 
Casual domestic worker 
Street vendor/ hawker 
Cycle rickshaw puller 
Unskilled worker in a 
small household enterprise 
or industry 
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Fig. 1.8. Surveying the poor. Source: Annual Report, Mission Convergence 2009 
  
 
 
 Mission continued to extend welfare services to maintain state legitimacy over 
the poor while also using FVI and women’s empowerment programs like vocational 
trainings and self-help groups to strengthen poor women’s capabilities and make them 
responsible stakeholders in lifting their families out of poverty. All these interventions 
came together to provide both, a safety net as well as a spring board for the poor in Delhi 
(Ferguson, 2009).  However, such programs only superficially train the poor women to 
manage their poverty in a more immediate or short-term basis without first attending to 
the structural issues that cause their poverty and gendered discrimination in the first 
place. I argue that such programs burden the poor women with the responsibility for 
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managing something beyond the technical capabilities they are expected to gain through 
Mission’s programs. The programs through which these capabilities are developed 
become tools for the technical government and management of the poor by the state. I 
examine these programs and criticisms in greater detail in Section 4. In this section I 
have explained Mission’s programs and the outcomes they intend to produce. Below, I 
will move away from project details and related theories to focus more specifically on 
the methodologies and field experiences that constituted my research on Mission.  
1.11 Ethnography of a development project  
 What does an ethnography of a government-led development project mean? It 
means taking a closer look at several aspects of the project: the global and local scenario 
within which the project was established, the objectives of the project, the actors that do 
the ‘developing’, the actors they are trying to ‘develop’, the processes and practices that 
make the project work (or not work), how success is defined by the project, and the 
twists and turns a project witnesses on the ground. Ferguson (1990) suggests that 
anthropological studies of development project must look beyond the intentions of the 
project and into the social realities that it produces on the ground. In my dissertation, I 
examine not only the social realities produced by Mission, but also the global and the 
local economic and political realities that produce Mission. My ethnographic study of 
Mission is the study of the ideas, peoples, techniques, and apparatuses put into place to 
manage the poor in confirmation with the aspirations of Delhi as a world-class city. I 
want to state here that it is not my intention to simply point out the shortcomings of the 
project or to minimize the hard work of its staff. My intention as a critical scholar is to 
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place the working of Mission within the larger context of how development projects are 
planned, implemented, and impacted by the political and economic forces at the local 
and the global scale. Mission does not exist in isolation; my aim is to show the networks, 
forces and pressures at multiple levels that come together to enable as well as alter this 
project on the ground. Below, I provide details about my fieldwork. 
1.11.1 The journey to/in the field 
 For almost a decade now, I have been interested in understanding the relationship 
between the urban poor citizens and their governments. When I started thinking about 
my dissertation project during the early years of my PhD, I decided to examine the 
question I encountered while working with the Right to Information (RTI) movement in 
the slums of Delhi in 2003 and 2004 (Figures 1.9 below illustrates the location of Delhi 
in India): What does the government do for its poor citizens? The RTI movement named 
Parivartan (meaning ‘transformation’) was a call for action to force the Delhi 
government to pass the Right to Information Act.26 We worked especially with the poor 
citizens to show evidence of rampant corruption affecting their everyday life as a means 
to pressurize the government into passing the Act. We worked with slum residents to 
conduct social audits of government works and services impacting their everyday lives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Known as the Freedom of Information Act in the US, the RTI act allows the common citizen to demand 
information about government proceedings, decisions, and works to ensure transparency and 
accountability. The RTI Act was passed by the Delhi government in 2005. Common citizens can now file 
a special application with the information officer in each government department and seek required 
information. Under the Act, it is the duty of the department to provide that information to the applicant 
within a month of the receipt of the application. Since 2005, the RTI has been used by several poor and 
middle-class citizens to know the status of their works with the different departments. The slum residents 
have been especially successful in using the RTI to expose millions of dollars worth of corruption in the 
Public Distribution System that was set up to provide them subsidized foodgrains. As a result of their 
struggle, most slum residents in Delhi now receive good quality subsidized foodgrains on time. The 
federal government is contemplating a new system for delivering this subsidy in a more efficient manner. 
 
59	  
	  
	  
	  
and followed that up with public hearings to publicize the unearthed corruption as a 
means to generate collective action. 
 The main office of Parivartan was located in east Delhi and we worked most 
vigorously with residents of Surja, Sethu, and Wedal slum colonies. As a woman RTI 
activist, most of my interactions in the slums were with women residents like Fatima Bi 
with whom I developed strong collegial bonds. These were women affected on an 
everyday basis by the corrupt practices of local bureaucrats and elected politicians who 
managed various welfare schemes ranging from old age pensions to subsidized food 
grains.  
 While working with the RTI movement, I began to realize that the situation on 
the ground was far more complex than what meets the eye. For the slum residents, apart 
from corruption, there were several other entangled networks between the global and the 
local scale that were actively marginalizing the poor. Delhi’s aspirations to become a 
world-class city were already taking roots and slum demolitions were gaining an even 
faster pace. Many of my acquaintances in the slums lived in the constant fear of eviction 
and homelessness. By the time I left for the US in 2005 to pursue my higher education, I 
was convinced that I had the answer to my question: the government does not do 
anything for its poor citizens because the poor do not fit within its neoliberal 
aspirations. 
 When I returned to the field in 2009, the government had devised a massive 
project to revamp its welfare system and empower poor women in a bid to “reach the 
unreached”. Mission was like a response to the mass-scale corruption causing the malign 
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neglect of the poor by the state. The RTI movement and several other civil society 
efforts highlighted the malign neglect of the poor. But what really made the government 
act was the aspiration to make Delhi world-class. Mission’s uniform spread across Delhi 
somewhat signified an ideological and material shift in the government-poor relations in 
Delhi at a time when breakneck modernization of the city was further marginalizing the 
poor. In view of these changes, I derived inspiration from Prasad’s question – “but why 
now [is the government implementing Mission Convergence for the poor]?” to ask two 
inter-related questions: what does the government do for its poor, and why? And, why 
and how do diverse governmental policies co-exist in a city space? 
1.11.2 Fieldwork sites 
 I conducted fieldwork in four slums – Wedal, Jaan, Surja, and Sethu (Figure 
1.10). All four were located near the border of east and north east districts of Delhi, 
districts with the maximum density of slums. My decision to select these four slums was 
based on the following factors: high levels of vulnerability; specific areas facing high 
probability of demolition; mix of Hindu and Muslim population; proximity to one-
another; and pre-established contacts in the field. Wedal and Jaan were predominantly 
Muslim areas and were located a mile away from each other. Surja and Setu had an 
equal number of Muslim and Hindu residents and were located two miles away from 
one-another. The distance between both sets of field sites was approximately six miles. 
Wedal slum became my primary field site because of my thick networks among the 
women residents and NGOs there that I developed as an RTI activist and later while 
doing preliminary fieldwork in 2008. 
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 All four slums had distinct histories. Wedal was established in 1975 when a 
prominent Congress party leader struck a deal with those displaced from the core of the 
city by the city beautification drive during the Emergency era in 1975-1979. The 
politician asked for votes from the displaced citizens in return for security to squat on a 
marshy piece of public land. For almost a decade, residents of Wedal claim that the 
politician protected them from government bulldozers and land mafia. By 1990, Wedal 
had developed from a cluster of temporary shanties to a pucca slum. Residents built 
brick houses, demanded and received basic amenities like water, electricity, community 
toilets, and drains (though the slum still does not have a sewer connection). The 
Congress leader met his political downfall in the early 1990’s after he was indicted for 
planning the anti-Sikh riots of 1984. Since then, Wedal has been a political stronghold of 
an opposition party. 
 Jaan, Surja, and Sethu were slums that developed as off-shoots of the 
resettlement colonies that were planned and constructed between 1970 – 1980 when 
Delhi was trying to decongest and beautify itself. Similar to the story of Dadu from Surja 
that I have shared above (p. 36), most residents here were displaced from the core of the 
city and given subsidized plots of land in these areas. Fieldwork here revealed that 
several residents in Surja and Jaan were provided free plots of land in the resettlement 
colonies by the government as an incentive for undergoing sterilization through the 
compulsory family planning drive during the Emergency era of 1975-1979. However, 
when all plots filled up, the sterilized citizens decided to squat on empty pieces of land 
around the resettlement colonies which gradually transformed from kuccha shanties to a 
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pucca slum colony (Emma Tralo 1995, 2000 provides great insight into these related 
processes of sterilization and land acquisition). 
 In the 1970’s, the majority of east and north east Delhi along the Uttar Pradesh 
state border was fallow, swampy, or agricultural land with no roads, transportation, or 
basic amenities like electricity and water until late 1980’s. Today, all slums there have 
these basic amenities, however unreliable, (except sewers and fully functional 
community toilets) and are connected to the other parts of Delhi by the metro rail and the 
city bus system. The real estate value of these areas has increased by more than 500 
percent over the past twenty years. As such, demolition of these slums for sale to private 
corporations or for profitable governmental use is expected to generate millions of 
dollars in revenue for the Delhi government. 
 As I entered the field and worked to immerse myself in the field, I tried to rent a 
house near Wedal slum, my primary field site. Throughout the first month of house 
hunting in this area, I heard from real estate agents and residents the same answer – we 
don’t rent houses to single women. Dejected, I sought admission in a working women’s 
hostel located in central Delhi, about ten miles away and across the river from my field 
sites. My daily commute to the field took between 30 to 45 minutes and involved 
changing two metro rails and walking or riding a bicycle rickshaw from the metro 
station to the slum.  
 Next, I started looking for a research assistant. My friend and field assistant 
during preliminary fieldwork put me in touch with Geeta Uniyal. Geeta had been 
working for NGOs over the past ten years and was in the process of applying for 
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admission for a master’s degree in social work. Geeta is a 34 year old married Hindu 
woman. She lives in east Delhi and comes from a middle-class family. Geeta’s friendly 
nature and extensive contacts in my field areas enabled us to create quick and strong 
networks in the field sites. Geeta also assisted me during my follow-up fieldwork in July 
2010. 
1.11.3 Research methodology 
	   	  Over the course of nine months between May 2009 and July 2010, I conducted 
ethnographic fieldwork at three different levels/sites – four slums located in east and 
north east Delhi (Sethu, Jaan, Surja, Wedal) (Figures 1.9 and 1.10), four partnering 
NGOs working here, and Mission headquarter located in the posh ten-story building on 
the banks of river Yamuna. I collected project literature and conducted participant 
observation with the eight staff members (three government bureaucrats and five 
development consultants hired on contract) at the Mission headquarters, forty staff 
working in the four partnering NGOs and two additional partnering NGOs also located 
in east and north east Delhi, three local slum leaders, three members of legislative 
assembly elected from the field area, one cabinet minister of the Delhi government 
including the minister in-charge for social welfare, and approximately fifty residents 
across the four slum colonies.  
 I recorded my interactions, observations, and conversation in the field notes that I 
wrote daily. I gathered information through semi-structured and unstructured/informal 
interviews and interactions. Majority of my interviews (38) are with staff working with 
the four partnering NGOs. All my interviews, with the exception of four interviews with 
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development consultants (working with Mission and the United Nations), were 
conducted in Hindi and were tape recorded, transcribed, and translated by my research 
assistant Geeta Uniyal and myself. Geeta also helped me with my daily field notes. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.9. Map of India showing the location of Delhi. (Made with Natural Earth. Free 
vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com.).  
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Fig. 1.10. Map of Delhi. This map illustrates the four slum colonies and Mission 
headquarters where research was conducted. River Yamuna divides the east and north 
east districts from the rest of Delhi (Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map 
data @ naturalearthdata.com.).  
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 Informal conversations constitute the largest chunk of my information, 
especially with slum residents. Opportunities for gathering information came in the form 
of discussions over chai and during meetings at NGOs attended by women residents. In 
slums and NGO offices especially, planned interviews snowballed into informal 
conversations and ended with group discussions. It was mostly once the digital recorder 
was switched off and stacked away that people started taking more openly, not for the 
fear of providing secret information but because most felt uninhibited when they were 
not being recorded. With the recorder out of sight, passers-by joined our informal 
interactions and entered into discussions about Mission’s work, basic amenities in slums, 
corruption in welfare delivery, and women’s empowerment programs. These fluid 
interactions generated rich data that tied together the various concerns of the slum 
residents and whether they are met by Mission’s programs or not. I wrote all these 
discussions in my field notes by relying on my memory and the sparse notes Geeta and I 
would quickly jot down in the field.   
 Along with field notes and interviews, I also participated in various training 
workshops, planning meetings, and one award ceremony conducted by Mission 
headquarters for partnering NGOs. These venues provided scope to understand the 
relationship between Mission staff and NGO staff. I also attended weekly and monthly 
staff meetings at three out of the four Gender Resource Centers in my field area. One 
GRC did not allow me to participate in their staff meetings. I accompanied each GRC’s 
women community mobilizer into the field to observe their interaction with the slum 
residents. I paid special attention to which areas of the slums each mobilizer chose to 
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visit and why, and the language they used to explain Mission’s work to the residents. I 
also took note of the questions and behavior of the residents towards the mobilizers.  
 In the interest of anonymity, I have used pseudonyms for my field sites, 
informants, and partnering NGOs, using Hindu and Muslim pseudonyms of names to 
convey the religious identity of each informant. However, I want to clarify that my 
statement on their religious identity does not automatically mean that all of them were 
practicing their religion. Some did practice their religion while others were affiliated to it 
by simple virtue of being born into a Hindu and Muslim family and therefore having 
religion-specific names. 
 The use of pseudonyms for the slums where I conducted fieldwork allows me 
to maintain confidentiality of the partnering NGOs and their staff working in each slum. 
Only one NGO worked as a GRC in each of these slums; their identity would be 
revealed without the use of pseudonym for the name of slums. My choice of photographs 
throughout the dissertation was again based on ensuring the confidentiality of the NGO 
staff; this concern reduced the number of photographs I could use without divulging 
information about the area or the staff. I provide details about each informant to the limit 
where it does not compromise her/his confidentiality. I have tweaked certain minor 
details about informants that could have otherwise revealed their identity. For some 
informants, I have either provided no or minimal details in a conscious effort to ensure 
their confidentiality because even minimal details could have revealed their identity due 
to their position in Mission’s hierarchy. 
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 On a typical fieldwork day (Figure 1.11 below), I would reach one of the four 
slums around 10 am when women would have sent their children to school and had some 
time to talk while assembling toys or binding books, or making artificial jewelry, or 
tailoring clothes – some common economic activities taken over by most women 
residents in the field area. During this time I would also visit the various NGOs (non-
partnering) working in that area, catch up with NGO staff (mostly women who also 
reside in the same area), and gather information about any events or meetings planned 
for the coming days before heading out to spend time at the GRC in that area. At the 
GRC, I would spend hours observing staff practices, attending small staff meetings, 
talking with women attending the vocational training classes held at the GRC, and 
assisting the GRC staff with filling up welfare forms and informing slum residents about 
their eligibility for different schemes. Later in the day, I would accompany GRC 
mobilizers to the field and observe their work.  Most fieldwork days ended with almost 
an hour-long discussion and preliminary field notes writing with my research assistant 
Geeta. She accompanied me throughout the day, with the exception of times when I 
would conduct semi-structured interviews with women informants.27 While I would 
conduct interviews, Geeta would observe a vocational training class or interact with the 
staff. Geeta also helped the staff with the basic working of the GRC. Every evening, we 
would sit at a cafeteria at one of the metro stations adjoining our field area to exchange 
field notes and ideas and take stock of the day. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In compliance with the local culture, Geeta and I always stayed together when interacting with or 
interviewing a male informant. 
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Fig. 1.11: A typical day in the field. Research assistant Geeta Uniyal (in red shawl) 
talking with community members as a community mobilizer disseminates information in 
the background. 
 
 Typical days in the field were often interspersed by visits to the Mission 
headquarters located across the river Yamuna, approximately ten miles away from the 
field sites. At Mission headquarters, I had little scope for observing staff activities or 
sitting in on meetings. The environment there was formal and restrictive. My 
headquarters visits were sporadic because each visit required gaining prior appointment 
from a Mission staff, which in itself was difficult as the staff always seemed busy. 
Nonetheless, apart from attending several meetings and workshops between Mission 
staff and partnering NGOs, I also attended few planning meetings held between Mission 
staff, the World Bank consultants, and the United Nations consultant on developing the 
Family Vulnerability Index (FVI), on creating sound survey methodologies, and on 
creating the technological database for the Suvidha Cards. Mostly, my informants at the 
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four GRCs/ partnering NGOs helped me connect with the staff at the headquarters and to 
set up interview appointments with them. Apart from observations and interviews, I also 
photographically documented my fieldwork across the different sites. To my informants, 
I identified myself as a student researcher interested in the work of Mission, women’s 
empowerment, and urban poverty.  
 While in the field, I often found myself jumping scales in the way I represented 
myself at different locations – for example, the way I dressed while going to the slum vs. 
going to Mission headquarter, the language I chose to speak (Hindi or English) in 
different locations, the affiliations I found myself revealing (PhD student in a US 
university vs. research student) to certain informants. All my choices were guided by a 
political understanding of what part of my identity worked best in which situation. If I 
wore formal salwaar-kameez (Indian dress) and communicated in English in Mission 
headquarters, it was to gain a sense of authority among those who judged me and how 
much time and information they should spare for me based on these identity markers. 
My decision to speak only in Hindi and wear simpler Indian clothes in NGOs and slums 
was to ensure that despite being a middle-class and educated woman, I would fit into the 
environment I aimed to study. However, changing identities often became difficult when 
I met all informants on one platform, for example, the workshops and award functions 
organized by Mission. I don’t know what impression such interactions gave to my 
informants but these situations helped me recognize the class politics a researcher finds 
herself immersed in, in order to fit into diverse environments and gather maximum 
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information while trying to become one with her immediate environment (c.f. Lal, 
1996).  
 I returned from the field in January 2010, but Mission continued to undergo 
drastic changes in its objectives as politicians and bureaucrats resisted its work through 
varied strategies. Being away from the field, I knew that I was missing out on significant 
ethnographic details even as I continued to be in touch with a select group of internet-
savvy informants, most of whom work in the offices of partnering NGOs. My advisor 
recommended that I return to the field and update my research. Upon returning to the 
field in July 2010, I disseminated preliminary research findings to policy makers and 
NGOs, and also received crucial feedback from them. July 2010 also proved to be the 
best time to take stock of a number of recent major changes Mission had faced and to 
learn about its new trajectories in the light of these recent changes. 
1.12 Core issues and structure of dissertation 
  My dissertation is structured around three core issues: 1) the global and local 
pressure faced by the Delhi government to turn India’s capital into a ‘world-class’ city 
(Section 2); 2) the friction between partnering NGOs and local elected politicians over 
control of the welfare system (Section 3); and 3) the effort to empower poor women 
through conventional set of programs that provide temporary technical solutions to the 
problem of poverty and gendered discrimination (Sections 4 and 5). Section 6 provides a 
concluding discussion.  
  The first issue attends to the Delhi government’s global aspirations, which 
contradict Mission’s objectives. Section 2 examines literatures on urban neoliberal 
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development and governance to assert that development trajectories take the middle-path 
between neoliberal development and welfare obligations to create a hybrid “roll out” 
neoliberal paradigm that simultaneously includes and excludes the poor in an aspiring 
world-class city. This Section lays the global and local economic and political context 
within which Mission emerged to establish a kind of new paternalism exclusively over 
the low income areas of Delhi. 
  The second issue involves conflict between local politicians and partnering 
NGOs. In Section 3, I show that as the government tries to multiply sites of regulation 
and supervision of the poor through partnering NGOs, state-NGO partnership, and 
especially NGO-led welfare delivery creates tension and power struggles between 
different actors. The new authority allocated by the Delhi government on partnering 
NGOs is contested by elected politicians to indicate that the shift from government to 
governance does not automatically follow the Indian state’s neoliberal aspirations, but in 
fact alters it.  
  The third issue concerns diluted programs for empowerment of poor women. 
Mission adopts the classic development myth that poor women are best agents to lift their 
families and communities out of poverty. Section 4 examines women’s empowerment as 
a strategy of governance to prove that these programs work, in expected and unexpected 
ways, to enable neoliberal governmentality and patriarchal status quo. My criticism of 
women’s empowerment programs shows that if things are staying the same, but for a few 
tokens, then how in complex ways, the status quo is maintained.	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  Section 5 examines the subject-agent diffusion of identity for the women 
community members who work as community mobilizers at Mission’s NGOs. Using 
feminist economic theories on care work and emotional labor, and development literature 
on development workers, I trace the meanings and practices that come to re/define 
empowerment as “poor women” work to empower other poor women like themselves. I 
argue that empowerment is given new meanings as shallow institutional expectations and 
women mobilizers’ internalized subjectivities as “poor women” come together to 
circulate the weak relations between the state and the poor.  
 Section 6 revisits the core issues discussed across all Sections to argue that 
inclusive and world-class city aspirations, welfare delivery reforms, and women’s 
empowerment programs – are disparate but connected issues that come together through 
Mission to challenge conventional understanding of how welfare and neoliberal forms of 
development both converge to take hybrid shapes in zones of poverty in the megacities 
of the developing South. The dissertation consults an interdisciplinary body of literature 
on neoliberal development, state-citizen relations, and feminist economics to argue that 
Mission is trying to introduce techniques of “new paternalism” for poverty management 
in India. My dissertation shows that pro-poor government projects like Mission are 
carriers of powerful neoliberal agendas that are constantly modified through encounters 
with local power plays and unimpressed and over-served development subjects on the 
ground.  
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1.13 Epilogue: Cosmetic treatments 
 During my follow-up fieldwork to Delhi in July 2010, I went to meet Fatima Bi 
at Wedal colony. The long open sewer in front of her home was still overflowing and the 
broken wall remained unrepaired. But construction workers were placing cement planks 
over the sewer. I could smell the refuse escaping from under the planks. The government 
had decided to cover up the sewer but not to clean it up. This cosmetic development 
received a mixed reaction from Fatima. She said, “voh tou bas isko chupanein mein 
lagein hain, usko saaf karna tou koii nahin chahtaa. Par chalo shukr haii kuchh tou 
kiya” [They28 are just busy hiding it, they don’t really care to clean it up. But thank god 
they are doing something at least]. The Commonwealth Games were less than three 
months away and the Delhi government was frantically covering up the spaces it could 
not develop or clean up. 
  This cosmetic treatment of the sewer also analogized the cosmetic treatment of 
the poor through Mission’s programs – both being somehow managed to confirm with the 
aspirations of a world-class city.  Both showed that the government was doing 
“something” to ease the problem at hand. The fact that the government was doing 
“something”  at a time when Delhi had to shine itself on the global platform shows that 
the problems of the poor and the poor as a problem are acted upon when they pose an 
impediment to the government’s other aspirations. 
  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 By “they” she was referring to the construction workers and the government. 
75	  
	  
	  
	  
2. WHY NOW AND NOW WHAT? 
 
2.1  But why now? 
“But why now is the government even doing this?” – said Prasad, a 65 year-old resident 
of Wedal slum, while stacking up newspaper cuttings spread across his desk. Having 
lived in Wedal slum for the past 30 years, Prasad has been at the receiving end of several 
projects for development or reform of the slum. One such project entailed the looming 
demolition of his slum colony. Unexpectedly, his fears were put to rest by 2009 when 
the Delhi government not only devised a new plan for the on-site resettlement29 of select 
slums, including Wedal, but also initiated Mission Convergence in several slums across 
Delhi. That hot afternoon in May 2009, when his newspaper collection was unrolled to 
show me articles on the changes in government’s plans for on-site resettlement and 
efficient welfare delivery through Mission, according to Prasad, “sarkaar ne apna mann 
badal liya.” (the government had a change of mind), and then he asked: “but why 
now…?” 
The fear of demolition, peripheral resettlement, homelessness, and loss of social 
and economic networks loom large among most slum residents across this rapidly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Prasad is one of the few remaining original residents of the slum that can show proof of their residence 
dating before 1998 to be eligible for an on-site resettlement under the Delhi government’s new public-
private partnership for transforming slums into economically lucrative spaces. Under this PPP housing 
scheme, those who have been residing in Delhi slums before 1998 and those who can pay a subsidized 
amount would be selected for upgraded housing to be built on the site of the slum by a private corporation 
in exchange of using the left-over land for profitable businesses. Since slums have fluid populations due to 
rural-urban migration, less than 25 percent of the residents qualify for such housing and the rest could 
eventually be rendered homeless when the private builders begin construction. 
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modernizing city-state.30 But Prasad’s question still demands attention. It was not often 
that a slum resident felt assured that the sarkaar had changed its mind. I take Prasad’s 
question as the starting point to investigate the context within which the Delhi 
government initiated Mission Convergence. Pro-poor policies of the government are not 
new or sudden. However, the Indian state has failed in its past policies for poverty 
alleviation and extending basic services to the poor. And Prasad had been a witness to 
these past failures. What was surprising for Prasad was not that the Delhi government 
was introducing yet another project in his slum, but the serious enthusiasm with which 
the Delhi government had focused its gaze towards the poor. As an avid news reader and 
news collector, Prasad had been following Mission’s work up-close and he was 
convinced that Mission’s objectives and the fast pace with which its work was taking 
shape on the ground were unusual of any governmental project. As of May 2009, he was 
also convinced that Mission wanted to bring about some necessary transformations in 
the working of the government. He listed out to me Mission’s objectives – community 
based Gender Resource Centers (GRCs) run by local NGOs were expected to provide 
welfare services at the doorsteps of the poor in ways never heard of in Delhi; poor 
women were being provided free and certified vocational trainings at these GRCs; the 
very definition of poverty had been expanded to include at least a million more welfare 
recipients in the government registers. What Prasad didn’t say was that all this was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This threat was especially prominent for those who, unlike Prasad, had no documentation to prove that 
they had been residing in their slum since 1998, the cut-off date set by the Delhi Development Authority’s 
Jhuggi-Jhonpri Resettlement Scheme (Dupont, 2004; Dupont and Ramanathan, 2005). 
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occurring alongside the continuous marginalization of the majority of urban poor as 
Delhi prepared itself to become a world-class city.  
The question Prasad asks envelopes within it one of the core questions of my 
dissertation – why and how do diverse governmental policies co-exist in a city space? 
With visible economic and governance shifts towards hybrid forms of neoliberalisms, 
the Indian state is carving its own developmental path while maintaining a strong image 
of a welfare state. As the development debates move from dependence on state to 
dependence on self, i.e., from welfare to empowerment and efficiency, the Indian state is 
not entirely transforming its relationship with the citizens. The relationship continues as 
state-as-benefactor and citizen-as-beneficiary. But projects like Mission aptly highlight 
the strategies through which governments are now focusing towards welfare and 
empowerment of the poor while their other policies continue to displace and marginalize 
the poor further. It is within this context that I attend to Prasad’s question: but why now? 
 This Section pays attention to why the Delhi government initiated Mission 
Convergence and how Mission emerges from an intersection of neoliberal urban 
governance and development. The plans for modernizing of city spaces to attract global 
capital are intolerant of poor people and the marginal spaces they occupy. Solutions 
come in the form of projects like Mission that introduce new techniques for governing 
the poor in an attempt “to mediate between the rights of the citizens and the interest of 
global forces” (Haque, 2008, p. 11). More than mediation, I argue that such techniques 
enable the government to “reach the unreached” (Mission motto) through non-state 
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actors that enable the state to better access, supervise and manage the poor through its 
partnering community-based NGOs, thus producing technologies of new paternalism. 
 This Section starts with details about Mission Convergence. Next, it elaborates 
on the literature of urban reform with special emphasis on neoliberalism. It moves on to 
describe the interconnected global-local political and economic environments that 
justified the establishment of Mission. Further, the Section examines the effects of 
Mission’s NGO-oriented representation of the urban poor. After an extensive discussion 
on good governance mechanisms and its impact on the politics of the poor, the Section 
ends by asking how pro-poor urban governance and city modernization exercises go 
together in the context of making a ‘world-class city’ and ‘inclusive city’ through a mix 
of welfare and neoliberal governance.  
2.2 Mission Convergence and the inclusive Delhi 
 Hailing Mission as a unique combination of social security measures for families 
with an empowerment framework dedicated for women for sustainable growth, 
Chief Secretary said that it was also an initiative of citizen-government 
partnership to bring more inclusive development. It reinforces that Delhi cares 
for its poor, vulnerable, and underprivileged. (emphasis added) 
-               The Hindu, June 3, 2009 
  
 The Delhi government is trying very hard to show that it cares for its poor as 
global economic forces and local disparity overlap in the aspiring world-class city. 
Mission is its new mantra for extending care to the poor. Emerging as a convergence of 
two previous initiatives of the Delhi government – Bhagidari31and Stree Shakti 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Bhagidari is a community participation approach to urban governance. It is discussed in detail in the 
later section. 
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program32 – Mission’s objective was to efficiently extend the Delhi government’s 
existing social safety net worth Rs. 700 crores (153 Million USD) (divided in 42 
different welfare services) across all vulnerable residents of Delhi and to empower poor 
women.33 The aim was to include every poor or vulnerable individual within the welfare 
(and regulatory) ambit of the government. To meet these objectives, Mission had 
established 104 “Gender Resource Centers” run by partnering NGOs in several slums 
across Delhi that serve as one-stop facilitation points for the government’s social welfare 
schemes.  They consist of two parts: 1) Stree Shakti Kendras (women’s empowerment 
centers) where women’s empowerment trainings and legal and health counseling were 
provided34, and; 2) Suvidha Kendras (convenience centers) where the poor were assisted 
in receiving their welfare benefits. The slum residents popularly called GRCs the 
‘sarkaari center’ (government center) as a way to differentiate it from the numerous 
NGO centers that provide similar services, especially for women’s empowerment. 
“Mission Convergence” therefore seems like an apt name for an initiative that brings 
together pre-existing schemes and services for the welfare and empowerment of the poor 
on a single community-based platform.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32Stree Shakti means women’s power. This program was initiated by Delhi government in 2002 in 
collaboration with 40 NGOs. NGOs held monthly camps for poor women to receive health and legal 
counseling.  
 
33 The women’s empowerment component of this initiative initially seems out of place. But poverty 
alleviation projects for decades haves included gender for a variety of reasons (c.f. Boserup, 1970; 
Cleaver, 2001; O’Reilly, 2006). I dedicate Sections 4 and 5 to this component. 
 
34 According to the Chief Minister’s statement in a news report, five million women have already 
benefited from these programs (The Hindu, June 3, 2009) 
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Two policies combine to increase the number of welfare-entitled poor in the 
registers of the Delhi government. The first policy expands the definition of poverty by 
including within it non-income based criteria like social, occupational, and spatial 
vulnerabilities. This stretches the welfare net across approximately four to five million 
vulnerable people in Delhi in comparison to the previous estimate of three million 
residing in slums as of 2000 (Kundu, 2004, p. 267), not all of whom were enrolled in the 
welfare system.35 There is no data publicly available on the exact number of welfare 
recipients pre-Mission. Governmental structures for serving this swelling number are 
also expanding due to Mission. The government has established in Delhi’s slums what it 
previously lacked: the GRC as an administrative unit for serving the poor and, most 
importantly, for including them within the government records and bureaucratic 
channels.  
The second policy change involves eliminating welfare bureaucracy. Prior to 
Mission, the poor had to run between different welfare department bureaucrats and local 
politicians to receive welfare. This system took months, often years, before the poor 
could start receiving welfare. Welfare services vary – some are cash transfers (pension, 
stipend, scholarship), others provide materials like free medicines, subsidized food, 
health insurance, low interest business loans, etc, ranging from $10 to $20 per month. 
With the establishment of Mission, GRCs acted as a single window interface between 
slum residents and the government and provided welfare services at the doorsteps of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  Delhi planning commission estimates that in 2005-06, 14.2% of Delhi population was below the 
poverty line of Rs.621 monthly per capita income 
(http://delhiplanning.nic.in/Economic%20Survey/ES2007-08/C21.PDF) 
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poor. Through Mission, the Delhi government undertook the challenge of restructuring 
the bureaucratic and political channels of welfare delivery by engaging NGOs for the 
same. However, as of May 2010, the authority to identify and enroll eligible entitlement 
holders for six most popular financial assistance schemes36 of the social welfare 
department was withdrawn from Mission and returned to the previous system involving 
Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs). The impact of these changes on Mission’s 
objectives will be discussed in detail in the next Section. Below, I discuss the two prime 
policy initiatives of Mission in greater detail –expanding the social security net to all 
vulnerable people, and, simplifying procedures for welfare delivery. 
2.2.1 Expanding social security 
 Delhi is a city-state with deep contrasts. Delhi’s per capital state domestic 
product (SDP) at Rs. 29,231 as of 2004-05 indicates that its economic performance has 
been the best in comparison to other states in India. Further, even though the percentage 
of persons below poverty line has declined significantly from 52 percent in 1973-74 to 
15 percent in 2004-05, the number of persons living below poverty in Delhi is at its all-
time high at 2,200,000 (above 2 million) as of 2004-05. Delhi’s rate of poverty reduction 
at 0.08 percent as of 2004-05 is one of the lowest among all states, only behind 
Maharashtra and Rajasthan. These are the recent-most numbers available from the 
Planning Commission, a nodal agency in the Government of India that estimates the 
number and percentage of poor at national and state levels (Urban Poverty Report, 2009, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 These schemes are known as Financial Assistance Schemes (FAS). They include the following six 
popular schemes: 1) old age pension; 2) widow pension; 3) financial assistance to disabled persons; 4) 
Ladli Yojna; 5) Financial Assistance to Poor Widows for performing marriage of their daughter, and; 6) 
national family benefit scheme 
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p.9). There are certain evident flaws in the Planning Commission’s calculations of 
poverty that have been criticized by several scholars and activists (Deaton, 2003; Deaton 
and Dreze, 2002) for its unmodified poverty line based only on income and that too 
based on consumer behaviors for the year of 1973-74. This was the main driving force 
for the revision of the below poverty line (BPL) criterion to include a range of non-
income factors impacting lives of people in contemporary times.  
 Due to its good economic performance, the Delhi government has money in its 
public coffers to spend towards the welfare and development of its residents. The Delhi 
state currently spends Rs. 700 crore (153 million USD) each year on various social 
welfare schemes (Outlook Sept. 2008). However, less than 50 percent of this amount 
reaches the needy (Project Documents, 2009). In order to address the growing disparity 
and the abysmal state of poverty reduction in Delhi37, the Delhi government decided to 
revamp its approach and systems towards poverty reduction. Poverty reduction was to be 
achieved through enumeration of all the vulnerable people residing in Delhi for the 
efficient and expansive provision of welfare services and women’s empowerment 
programs to them. 
 In partnership with NGOs, Mission conducted a massive enumeration exercise 
(mapping and surveys) in 3 phases starting August 2008 to identify all poor people in 
Delhi on the basis of their social, spatial and occupational vulnerability (and not based 
on income, as the conventional BPL approach does) and then assigned partnering NGOs 
the task to ensure that each identified individual/ household is assisted with availing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Examined in detail in the Delhi Human Development Report 2006 
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welfare service they were eligible for. The idea behind using “proxy indicators” such as 
social, spatial, and occupational vulnerabilities to accurately calculate the poor came 
from a joint study conducted by the Supreme Court and Planning Commission in order 
to take an actual count of the urban poor (Outlook, Sept. 2008). Based on these 
suggestions, Mission undertook the first survey in India in order to expand the Delhi 
government’s welfare net across all vulnerable citizens that were previously 
unaccounted for in the government records – this making a significant effort towards  
shifting the image of Delhi’s from an ‘apartheid city’ (Batra, 2010) to an ‘inclusive city’ 
(Project Documents, 2009). 
During the first phase around 538,000 households were surveyed by the GRC 
staff. In the second phase additional 390,000 households were covered. From the 
900,000 families surveyed in both phases, around 515,085 families and 1,094,710 
persons were found to be vulnerable and therefore eligible for different welfare services 
(Project Documents, 2009). This increased the number of welfare entitled individuals in 
the books of Delhi government. The survey also gave the Delhi government near-
accurate data on the number of poor residing in Delhi, the diverse nature of their 
vulnerabilities, and the exact location and condition of their residence. The surveys 
specifically paid attention to poor and/or single women, and therefore had clear gendered 
implications which I explain in Sections 4 and 5.  
2.2.2 Simplifying welfare 
Through this enumeration exercise based on vulnerability indicators, Mission 
tried to make the delivery of welfare services efficient in two ways: 1) enumeration 
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helped the Delhi government create a centralized database of vulnerable individuals and 
the specific kinds of welfare services they needed, and; 2) enumeration enabled Mission 
to create a new set of guidelines that required minimal documentation proof for claiming 
welfare from vulnerable people because their vulnerability has been identified and 
recorded during surveys.38 Both points have extended welfare services to those who 
were previously excluded from the same. Through these initiatives, Mission aimed to 
relieve the needy from the grueling process of accessing welfare. I explain these 
processes in greater detail in the next Section.  
 Above, I have highlighted the Delhi government’s intentions of making Delhi 
inclusive through Mission. Mission conveys only partially the changes in government’s 
plans towards the poor. I repeat Prasad’s question “but why now?” in order to illuminate 
the larger changes happening in a neoliberalizing India which is aiming to turn Delhi 
from an ‘apartheid city’ into an ‘inclusive and world-class city’. In the next section, I 
trace the recent upsurge of urban reform connected at the local and global scale. I argue 
that the agenda of making Delhi world-class is what pushed the Delhi government to 
also make Delhi an inclusive city because visible disparity is not a favorable 
characteristic for an aspiring world-class city. More importantly, as Haque (2008, p. 31) 
points out, even though developing countries like India are emerging into neoliberal 
states that tend to diminish democratic citizenship and fundamental rights, the state must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The procedures to prove ones welfare eligibility were simplified mainly by allowing two neighbors to 
testify the years of residency and other such crucial information. The absolute dependence on government 
issued documents such as ration cards and voter identification cards was discarded because most 
vulnerable people are not aware about the often confusing procedures of getting them made which often 
involves long hours of waiting away from work and bribing government staff – most vulnerable people 
cannot afford either.  
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make efforts to convince the citizens that the state cares for their welfare and 
development in order to maintain its legitimacy especially at a time when that legitimacy 
can be challenged by those being rapidly marginalized through neoliberal urban reforms 
(c.f. Chatterjee, 2008; Sharma, 2006).  
2.3 The literature on urban reform  
The vision of a city that promotes rapid global integration of the country is a city 
which creates environment that attracts foreign investment. For this, the city 
should be able to provide good living standards, which means cities with 
adequate infrastructure and low incidence of crime and poverty; should have 
good governance and be able to mobilize domestic resources to improve physical 
and human capital base; should offer an environment that reduces the cost of 
doing business; should have some comparative advantage in producing tradable 
goods and should have diversified economic base to reduce vulnerabilities. 
           World Bank, 1999 in Mahadevia 200, p. 14-15  
The urge to transform is not unique to Delhi. Cities worldwide have emerged as 
the prime hubs of economic development and international connectivity where the global 
and local meet (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Cities represent the financial stability and 
investment capabilities of a country and are therefore expected to reinvent themselves in 
order to meet the new global demands of flexible capitalism (Chatterjee, 2009, p. 144). 
There is extensive literature on cities in competition with each other for foreign capital 
investment which argues that capital expansion endeavors further the interest of the 
elites and comes at a heavy cost to the poor. (Banerjee-Guha, 2009; Batra, 2010, 
Brenner, 2004; Choudhary, 2007; Harvey, 1990, 2005; Mahadevia, 2008, 2011). In 
India, cities are seen as growth engines for the entire economy and are expected to 
provide 65 percent of the total GDP (Mahadevia, 2006, p. 3399). But slum dwellers like 
Prasad and Fatima and the spaces they occupy have become the staple explanation for 
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why foreign investment eludes India (Batra and Mehra, 2008). Visible rampant poverty 
stands in stark contrast to Delhi’s growing clean and modern infrastructure catering to 
global trade and investments. Slums give the impression that the government’s 
lackadaisical policies and practices could possibly also impact the investment a 
corporation makes in Delhi’s economy. Further, fear of crime and pollution and lack of 
modern basic amenities are linked to the visible manifestation of poverty – both 
indicating the shortcomings of the local government. So how can these poor people and 
their spaces be reinvented or transformed? Urban reform projects make an entry to pave 
way not only for neoliberal development but also for neoliberal governance of the poor 
(Choudhary, 2007; Batra, 2008). Projects like Mission try to count and categorize the 
poor and efficiently manage the rising levels of poverty by providing welfare and 
empowerment services as a safety net and a spring board for the poor in Delhi.  
2.3.1. Neoliberal urban development: creative destruction of the poor 
Neoliberalism is a form of political economy that advocates free trade, flexible 
labor, active individualism, and extension of competitive markets that should be 
achieved by downsizing and reforming the state into a trim yet efficient actor (Harvey, 
2007). Neoliberalism assumes that states are inefficient and corrupt institutions that must 
shrink, while also realizing that a stable and supportive state is a prerequisite for 
economic development (Corbridge et.al., 2005, p. 41). Neoliberalism has been adopted 
as an almost universal economic paradigm that will enable developing countries like 
India to benefit from their alliance with global trade and its ensuing politics. 
Neoliberalism may be hegemonic at the global scale, but it is customized according to 
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the national and local political economy. Further, neoliberalism often emerges as a 
hybrid of complementary and contradictory policies like increase in state support for 
pro-poor policies, individual self-reliance, and efficient governance through NGOs 
(Ferguson, 2009; O’Reilly, 2010; O’Reilly and Dhanju, Forthcoming).  
Megacities of the global South like Delhi are at the forefront of neoliberalism as 
spaces that are under-developed but have great potential to polish up and attract global 
capital through competitive markets, flexible labor, free trade policies, safe political 
environments, and, clean modern spaces. To meet these expectations, Chatterjee (2009, 
p. 146) notes that “the neoliberalizing state is compelled to release land, resources and 
labor from the formal sector of national into the free market sectors of privatization”. 
Mahadevia (2008, p. 19, 2009, p. 210) points out that such efforts of the neoliberalizing 
state dispossess the poor of their shelter and livelihood opportunities, thus making the 
welfare of the poor and neoliberal development exclusive of one-another. One such 
example of dispossession is the ‘public-private partnership’ (PPP) in land development’, 
a policy approach for selling ‘dead land’ (ex. slums located on prime government land 
that generate lower than expected revenues for the government) to private corporations. 
The government allows, in fact assists, private corporations to buy such dead lands, 
convert them into profitable housing units (among other kinds of profitable 
infrastructures), and reserve some of the houses for the economically-weaker population. 
This PPP policy approach has been widely used in Mumbai and Delhi to convert large 
slum colonies illegally built on public land into profitable and legal housing colonies, 
recreation parks, and shopping malls – none of which can be conveniently accessible to 
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the poor. The small quota of reserved housing for the poor further means the on-site 
resettlement of less than 25 percent of the “original” residents who have been residing in 
Delhi before 1998; the rest face displacement without resettlement options. Banerjee-
Guha (2009) notes that similar processes are underway in Mumbai as the city’s housing 
market is restructured to allow privatization of public lands, leading to unlocking of 
speculative accumulation and also the gentrification of the city. 
Harvey (2003, 2005) would agree that such restructurings of land enables global 
elites to accumulate economic gains by dispossessing communities – thus creating place 
and class specific accumulation by dispossession (also, Batra, 2008). On the surface, 
previously unattractive spaces become attractive and begin to accumulate investments 
while poor get further dispossessed of their basic rights to shelter and livelihood. This 
process of urban renewal symbolizes ‘creative destruction’ – it is creating development 
by destroying the spaces, livelihoods, social and economic networks, and lifestyles that 
are believed to be under-developed (Chatterjee, 2009, p.147). Urban renewal projects 
expect the city to meet a global standard of capital-attracting modernization while local 
struggles for shelter, food, and livelihood of the poor are swept under the carpet. 
2.3.2. Neoliberal urban governance: from ‘government’ to ‘(good) governance’ 
An emphasis on the infrastructural renewal of cities comes along with an 
emphasis on restructuring urban governance. Because the support of the state is 
important for markets to function efficiently in a stable social and political environment, 
neoliberal economic shifts and urban development are expected to succeed only if the 
governments operate on the principles of “good governance” to become efficient, lean, 
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and entrepreneurial structure of support for the markets. I situate good governance 
within the framework of neoliberal governmentality – a combination of techniques of 
domination and discipline with technologies of self-government such that citizens 
conduct themselves in a manner acquiescent to the state’s wishes (Foucault, 1991; Gupta 
and Sharma, 2006).  
 With the onset of urban reform, ‘government’ is transformed into ‘governance’. 
Governance extends the idea of government to encompass state as well as non-state 
actors such as communities, NGOs and private corporations. The shift “from 
government to governance” emphasizes greater role to non-state actors to manage 
institutional arrangements. Due to this shift, hierarchical state power is decoupled from 
the government and reproduced through multiple horizontal sites and partnerships that 
operate at a distance from the state (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 1992). The state takes on a 
supervisory role while multi level participatory governance techniques devolve decision 
making and implementation right down to the level of the community. Governance 
therefore suggests new sets of relationships between citizens, policy-makers and 
agencies responsible for service delivery (Raco and Flint, 2001). That the fluid nature of 
the government emerges from its entanglement with non-state or non-governmental 
social and political actors in a society is a well-established fact (Corbridge et al., 2005; 
Gupta, 2005; Jeffrey and Lerche, 2000). But the evident shift from ‘government to 
governance’ legitimizes and institutionalizes this fluidity as a powerful component of 
neoliberal governmentality.  
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 The original debate about good governance was cast as the antithesis of state-
dominated economic and social development. But now, the debate is less about 
jettisoning state institutions and more about improving and reforming the functioning of 
democratic institutions, including the “deepening of democracy” by engaging non-state 
actors to share government responsibilities (Appadurai, 2001; Weiss, 2000, p. 803). The 
aim is to ‘re-regulate’ the government such that the government expands itself by 
inviting NGO partnerships in strong regulatory and service delivery positions while also 
internally restructuring its own departments to work more efficiently in alliance with 
NGOs.  
 Decentralization by transfer of duties from central to local governments (and then 
from local to non-governmental associations) along with privatization of urban service 
delivery are the two main components of good governance through which the state can 
be re-regulated (Swyngedouw, 2005). Decentralization is publicized by international 
donor organizations as a preferred model for the cities struggling to provide basic 
services in the face of rapid urbanization (Silver, 2003, p. 421 in Mahadevia, 2008). The 
World Bank (1992, p. 2) assures that decentralization allows local policy makers to have 
more effective control over the key processes for successful integration of cities with the 
global economy. Since the early 1990’s, the state in India has made strong efforts to 
decentralize its decision making and service delivery through the participation of local 
bodies. Decentralization of service delivery has become a prominent component of all 
major government projects and primarily involves partnership with civil society 
organizations. Good governance strategies of decentralization and privatization are 
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criticized as distancing the state from its citizens, absolving state’s welfare duties, and 
depoliticizing the struggles of the poor as a technical problem that can be fixed through 
the efficient intervention of non-state actors (Rose, 1999). I deal with all these criticisms 
in a later section while examining the relationship between NGOs and the urban poor. 
But before that, I hold on to the recent interpretation of good governance to show how 
Mission is partnering with NGOs to “re-regulate” the government and expand (not 
contract) its welfare services to the poor. 
2.3.3 Steering and rowing the boat 
 Contrary to popular criticisms of neoliberal governmentality, Gupta and Sharma 
(2006) argue that it is not easy to claim that the contemporary governance in India is 
neoliberal in nature and has therefore absolved its basic welfare duties. Because the 
developmentalist state’s identity is so closely tied with being a welfare provider, it can 
decentralize its duties but not back away entirely from its welfare obligations with the 
onset of neoliberal reforms (Chatterjee, 2008; Sharma, 2006, p. 64,).  Gupta and Sharma 
(2006, p. 277) define the working of Indian neoliberalism as the “multiplying [of] sites 
of regulation and domination through the creation of autonomous entities of government 
that are not part of the formal state apparatus and are guided by enterprise logic”. These 
multiple sites might allow the government to spread its domination but it does not 
automatically exclude the state from its welfare rights towards its citizens. Within the 
neoliberal context, the government is now expected to steer the boat while non-state 
actors managing the multiple sites of state’s domination and regulation row it (Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992). However, my research suggests that through Mission, the 
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government wants to definitely steer but also row the boat in “partnership” with non-
state actors. The one-sided flow of information and orders along with the heavy 
supervision over the NGOs proves that NGOs are themselves regulated and disciplined 
by the government (Discussed in detail in Section 3). The Delhi government’s 
partnership with NGOs was not created to contract out the responsibilities of a shrinking 
government but to expand government control over the NGOs and the urban poor. The 
Delhi government is doing so by spending more money to enroll more urban poor in its 
welfare net and by widening its bureaucratic control over vulnerable spaces through 
Mission. I will demonstrate this ethnographically in the next three Sections.  
 I argue that the government is steering and rowing because NGOs are working to 
make the government’s functioning efficient, not unnecessary. In line with the second 
wave of neoliberalism (Smith, 2004), the government is ‘re-regulating’, not ‘de-
regulating’ itself through internal restructurings of the welfare system and through 
regulated engagement with NGOs that assist the government in rolling itself out through 
a mix of welfare and neoliberal techniques. I use Peck and Tickell’s theory on roll-back 
and roll-out neoliberalism to examine the hybrid nature of the Indian state. According to 
Peck and Tickell (2002), roll back neoliberalism enabled some Western states to shrink 
in favor of robust markets. The states ‘rolled back’ as markets rolled out to justify that 
free and open markets can take care of disparities in the long run through a trickle-down 
effect. However, with the failure of roll-back in Western states evident in the recession 
of the late 1980’s, roll-out neoliberalism was introduced to balance out the disparities 
introduced by markets by bringing the state back in. But this time, the state came back 
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forcefully creating new forms of institutions and governmental regulations with the 
intention of re-regulating, disciplining and containing those who were marginalized by 
roll-back neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 389) 
 Though roll-back does not apply in the context of India, the concept of roll-out 
provides a fresh perspective on the new forms of institutions and regulations that are 
being floated through programs like Mission that extend welfare services over the 
marginalized and in the process, to also disciple and manage them as pacified subjects. 
Through these new institutional arrangements, the government is able to re-regulate and 
actively engage in governing the poor through as well as with Mission’s partnering 
NGOs.  
Below, I investigate the two core urban reform projects – Bhagidari and National 
Urban Renewal Mission (NURM) – that have significant impact on the implementation 
of Mission. Bhagidari is a good governance project of the Delhi government for 
enhancing civil society participation in local governance for making Delhi an inclusive 
city. NURM is an urban reform project of the federal government for modernizing the 
cityscape of sixty-three cities across India, including making Delhi a world-class city. In 
both projects, it is evident to me that the government tried to establish control over the 
urban poor through different tactics. Mission is trying to assist the government by 
extending Bhagidari in the slums while also cushioning the blow of NURM on the urban 
poor through the expansion of welfare services.  
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2.4 Projects for urban reform: from Bhagidari to Mission Convergence 
 Mission Convergence is an extension of an earlier project based on state-civil 
society partnership known as Bhagidari which means ‘collaborative partnership’. 
Bhagidari started as a good governance program by the Delhi government in 2000 for 
establishing a working collaboration between different government agencies39 and 
registered associations like resident welfare associations and trade associations. The 
main aim of Bhagiadri was to empower citizens to have a voice in the development of 
their area. Bhagidari won several international and national awards as a model of good 
governance, the most prominent one being the United Nations Public Service Award in 
2005. Scholars who have studied Bhagidari assert that it was launched to publicize 
government achievements, to exert authority, and to introduce a participatory system of 
governance that makes the citizens believe that they have a voice (Chakrabarti, 2008, p. 
98; Harriss, 2005). 
 In spite of recognition and accolades, Bhagidari met with criticism for its 
intentional exclusion of the poor residing in resettlement colonies and slums 
(Chakrabarti, 2008; Ghertner, 2011; Harriss, 2005; Mawdsley, 2009). Apart from the 
claim that slums lack formal resident associations, the government’s logic for this 
exclusion was that any collaboration with the occupants of illegal land would involve 
negotiations on the issue of land tenure, which could upset its political base with the 
non-poor residents living in legal residential areas (Chakrabarti, 2008). Although 
government agencies continued to provide basic services like water and sanitation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 like municipal corporation, water and power companies, Delhi Development Authority 
95	  
	  
	  
	  
illegal squatter settlements, they wanted to avoid negotiations that may result in 
provision of land titles. Chatterjee (2004, p. 136) summarizes this rationale well by 
suggesting that if squatters were given any kind of occupational legitimacy by 
government, then the whole structure of legally-held property and the connected benefit 
of formal citizenship would be threatened. Through a contradictory/ circular logic, it was 
assumed that the extension of a participatory mode of governance to slums would: 1) be 
impossible due to lack of formal associations that represent the residents; and, b) enable 
the illegal settlers to make formal demands of government for land title and ownership.  
 Bhagidari did not reach the poor until 2008, but in the meantime, it did create a 
politically conscious middle class in Delhi that successfully challenged government 
decisions40 and initiated juridical action against the unaesthetic and filthy spaces 
occupied illegally by the urban poor (Ghertner, 2008, 2011; McGranahan and 
Satterthwaite, 2000 (Green vs. Brown agenda)). The recent political interest of the 
middle class is viewed as a reaction to the rapid economic growth of India which has 
benefited them the most (Fernandes, 2006). Chakrabarty (2007) claims that Bhagidari 
gave the political voice to the middle class to mimic life of global city and displace the 
subaltern in the process (c.f. Baviskar, 2003; Mawdsley, 2009). Resident Welfare 
Associations (RWAs) became hegemonic institutions that sought to redefine the use of 
public space by dislocating the urban poor from their visual proximity (Fernandes, 2006; 
Chatterjee, 2004). Educated and well-connected middle-class residents used their 
knowledge of the judiciary for filing public interest litigations against slums, street 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 regarding water privatization and electricity tariffs; Chakrabarty, 2007, p. 97 
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vendors, and informal small industries (Baviskar, 2003; Batra, 2010; Mawdsley, 2009). 
This new political power of the middle class that was enabled by Bhagidari eventually 
became overbearing for the Delhi government.  
 While tensions between RWAs and government became pronounced, tensions 
were also on the rise between the government and the slum residents as a new wave of 
city modernization between 1997 and 2004 swept away thousands of poor from the core 
to the peripheries of the city (Menon-Sen and Bhan, 2008). Slum demolitions also 
gained pace between 2004 and 2006 due to middle class juridical actions demanding the 
right to pollution-free living (Ghertner, 2008). Between 2004 and 2007, 45,000 homes 
were demolished in three years, a staggering number in comparison to the fact that 
51,461 houses were demolished in the eight years between 1993 and 2001(Bhan, 2009). 
The fast pace of urban renewal accompanied by middle class juridical action against 
informal settlements and economies – both came together to uproot and render homeless 
the maximum number of poor in the shortest time span in the history of Delhi.  The mass 
of displaced poor were unhappy with the Delhi government, so were the middle-class 
residents who expected more action and accountability from the government. This led to 
the defeat of the ruling Congress government in the 2006 municipal elections for ward 
counselors.  
 This was also a time when the government began preparations for the 2008 
legislative assembly elections.41 Due to the rising anxiety among the middle-class about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Representatives elected every five years through Municipal ward elections and the legislative assembly 
elections work in alliance with local leaders and provide the political connections between the poor and 
the state (Harriss, 2005; Edelman and Mitra, 2006) 
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the sprawling slums around their neighborhoods and the anger among the poor against 
the government’s continuing demolition drives, the Congress government decided to 
extend Bhagidari to the urban poor as an innovative form of governance aimed at 
alleviating poverty and empowering the poor. I argue that extension of Bhagidari was 
also a strategy of the Delhi government to reduce the growing collective political power 
of the middle-class, and also to convey to them that the government was taking steps to 
manage poverty. Thus began the policy formulation for Mission Convergence. Contrary 
to its prior concerns about establishing partnership with residents in unauthorized or 
illegal settlements, as of August 2010, the government has extended itself through NGO 
run GRCs across 104 slums and resettlement colonies in Delhi. Partnering NGOs played 
a crucial role in extending government services to the poor through Mission but did not 
represent the interests of the poor. I elaborate on the role of NGOs in a later section after 
discussing below the other factors that highlight the union of pro-poor initiatives like 
Mission with massive urban infrastructural development policies like NURM. 
2.5 NURM, the excluded poor, and Mission 
 With more and more people moving into city slums42 and interconnected global 
markets seeking more economic hubs in the developing world, urban renewal has 
become a necessity of sorts. Substantial investment in this area is seen as key to 
maintaining India’s high economic growth.43 The first major push for urban renewal in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 An estimated 50,000 people out of the 200,000 who migrate to Delhi ever year  live in slums (Vinayak 
2009) 
 
43 Commonwealth Games in Delhi in October 2010 are seen as one such major urban renewal exercise 
impacting the material as well as human landscape of Delhi. It is expected to cost the Indian government 
$15Billion, seven times its expected cost. 120,000 beggars, 60,000 pavement squatters and 8,00,000 slum 
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India came with the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM, or 
NURM as it is popularly known), a $20 Billion seven year project of the federal ministry 
of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation. Based on policy recommendations that Asian 
Development Bank came up with in 1990’s for Asian mega cities (Mahadevia, 2008, p. 
15), NURM started in 2005 across 63 select cities for: 1) expanding urban infrastructure; 
2) reforming urban governance; and, 3) providing basic services to urban poor, (or, 
providing BSUP). The first two received higher funds from the federal government 
while BSUP was poorly funded (Mahadevia, 2006, p. 340). In order to tackle urban 
poverty and proliferation of slums, BSUP’s core mandate was to provide land at 
subsidized rate to the poor. So logically, BSUP funding should have been higher 
considering the current shortage of 26 million housing units, 98 percent of which are for 
economically weaker groups (Mahadevia, 2006). However, the government prioritized 
infrastructural developments (like flyovers, sports villages for Commonwealth Games, 
airport renovations, recreation parks) over housing for the poor. Mahadevia (2006, 2011) 
asserts that greater emphasis is given to the expansion of urban infrastructure for the 
creation of capital-worthy spaces in cities. This in turn means that the poor are only 
going to be further displaced, not included, through the urban reform exercise proposed 
by NURM.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dwellers have been banished from the city in preparation for the games 
(http://www.tehelka.com/story_main46.asp?filename=hub110910Gameon.asp). Besides, government 
funds for social welfare diverted in preparation for these games. For example: “A total of Rs. 744.35 crore 
(157 Million USD approx.) originally meant to improve the standard of living of poor sections of the 
community through various government schemes and programs was diverted to the 2010 Commonwealth 
Games projects.” (http://www.bbc.co.uk, July 21, 2010) 
99	  
	  
	  
	  
 Critics view NURM as a neoliberal agenda for the making of world-class cities 
across India to attract global business and also to set market driven urban development 
in motion (Banerjee-Guha, 2009; Batra, 2008; Mahadevia, 2011). Batra (2008) describes 
NURM as bait because the Indian federal government applies pressure on cities to 
follow specific orders to create more and more capital-worthy spaces in return for funds 
from the federal pool of money. “The huge money made available under the scheme has 
forced unwilling state governments to toe this agenda” (Times of India, July 7, 2009, 
Budget announcement day). Delhi, being a city-state, is also competing for the NURM 
funds. This means that Delhi government has to convince the federal government that it 
is following all its mandatory reforms – discarding certain regulations like the Urban 
Land Ceiling Act 1974 which will allow sale of bulk land to private investors for 
expanding world-class infrastructure in Delhi; and, applying good governance 
techniques of decentralization and privatization to improve service provision to the 
urban poor.   
 The Delhi government chose Mission Convergence as the nodal agency for 
BSUP (basic services to urban poor) component of NURM. In order for Delhi 
government to receive NURM funding for building world class infrastructure, Mission 
adopted the NURM guidelines for good governance and introduced decentralized, 
economic, and efficient actors like NGOs to provide basic services to the poor.  The 
faster and better Mission performs the sooner Delhi is sanctioned federal money to make 
itself a world-class city. Critics like Banerjee-Guha (2009) argue that this entrepreneurial 
turn in urban governance was a result of the spill-over of the largely neoliberal nature of 
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NURM (Batra, 2008; Mahadevia, 2008), wherein ‘government’ was to be replaced by 
‘governance’ and slow bureaucratic systems would give way to competitive and 
corporation-like efficient systems run by non-state actors working at the grassroots 
(Swyngedouw, 2005). The shift from government to governance in the slums of Delhi 
suggested the “functional impotence” of democratically-elected actors and government 
bureaucrats that were replaced by Mission’s partnering NGOs (c.f. Banerjee-Guha, 
2009, p. 98). The tensions created through these shifts are elaborated upon in the next 
Section as Mission’s plans to converge all services on a single platform are eventually 
thwarted by political forces.  
 The decisions of the Delhi government to modernize Delhi and to initiate 
Mission are both key to understanding the new strategies used to govern the poor – the 
removal of the poor is crucial for making space for a world-class city, but the select poor 
that are to stay in place (in accordance with the government’s slum resettlement policies) 
must become governable and economically resourceful citizens. The demolition of slums 
coupled with selective resettlement of slum residents tried to serve two purposes – 
convert slums from supposedly “dead capital” into lucrative spaces, and; displace a 
majority of the poor out of the city which could also reduce creation of new slums.44 
Those who qualify to live within the city could be managed through Mission’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The general logic floating in the corridors of the Delhi government is that if all illegal slums are 
demolished and only “original” slum residents (those living in slum since 1998) are given resettlement, 
then the poor will be discouraged to set-up new slums with the expectation that the government will 
resettle them too once their slum is demolished. This logic does not take into consideration the desperation 
of the poor due to lack of other alternatives that forces them to live in slums. Further, this logic does not 
correspond with the expectations of the elected and petty local politicians who thrive politically on the 
votes of slum residents in return for security against demolition, and on their bribes in return for welfare 
services 
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partnering NGOs that use welfare services and empowerment programs to impart ideas 
about the kind of citizen the poor should be in order to find acceptance in an aspiring 
world-class Delhi. In summary, such contradictory policies create a mirage of change in 
governmental intentions and give hope to people like Prasad to believe that “the 
government has changed its mind” (c.f. Mahadevia, 2011).  
 Above, I have discussed the reasons that prompted the implementation of 
Mission. These reasons are situated between reforming urban infrastructure and 
reforming urban governance –changes in both come together to alter relations between 
the government and the urban poor. One such alteration occurs as NGOs become 
representatives and service-providers of the poor through good governance tactics of 
Mission. Below I examine the relation of Mission’s partnering NGOs with the urban 
poor and the uneasy debate this opens up about civil society vs. political society.  
2.6 NGOs as representatives of the poor? 
 As an extension of Bhagidari, Mission is based on the principles of partnership 
between government and citizens. In the absence of any formal associations to represent 
the slum residents, the Delhi government assigned NGOs as representatives the poor. I 
argue that instead of conveying the demands of the poor and representing them to the 
government, NGOs performed only one function – make the government’s welfare 
services and empowerment programs accessible at the doorsteps of the poor. In order to 
understand why NGOs fail to represent the urban poor, we must move our attention to 
the works of Chatterjee (2004), Harriss (2005, 2006, 2007, 2010), and, Mawdsley 
(2009). These scholars examine the different patterns of politics and governance 
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emerging from different groups within the city. Elaborating on Chatterjee’s (2004) 
distinction between civil and political society, Harriss (2005) notes that the class of the 
citizen defines her/his political participation and degrees of successful interaction with 
the government in India. While the upper and middle class citizens interact with the 
government through “civil society” organizations, the poor interact through political 
society.  
 According to Chatterjee (2004), civil society comprises of educated and well-
connected individuals capable of maneuvering the bureaucracy and seeking efficient 
government services through associational pressures. Political society emerges out of 
socially and economically marginal areas like slums. It thrives on the language of rights, 
using agitations and demonstrations as tools in their limited armory, have weak cultural 
capital but stronger ties to political parties, and struggle to secure basic rights for poorer 
people (Chatterjee, 2004; Harriss, 2006 in Mawdsley, 2009, p. 244). While the urban 
poor rely more on political parties to secure basic rights and services (like shelter, health, 
education), the middle-class have increasingly turned to, and even formed their own 
“civil society organizations”. These organizations work in partnership with the state and 
even approach the judiciary for securing consumer-oriented services and for maintaining 
their social and physical boundaries of privilege (Baviskar, 2003; Mawdsley, 2009, p. 
244). This is clearly evident in our discussion above on Bhagidari and the rising middle 
class power. Harriss (2006, p. 455) argues that associational activities of a rising middle 
class enable them to be more involved in tangible political participation, thus dismissing 
the popular notion that vote-based participation of the poor is what determines city 
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politics.45 Based on the logic of good governance, Mission is promoting a civil society 
model of governance for the urban poor which could weaken their political networks that 
have been enabling them so far to make demands of the state as political subjects. The 
problem with promoting an associational form of governance over political governance 
is that not only are civil society associations like NGOs run by middle-class people who 
do not represent the voice of the poor, such associations are more accountable to their 
donors than to the poor (Crewe and Harrison, 1998).  
2.6.1. Mission’s NGOs: service providers or representatives?  
 In the case of Mission, we see that lack of formal associations in slums (like the 
resident associations) did not push the government to elicit any direct partnership with 
the poor but instead assigned NGOs as their representative. Mission emphasizes that its 
partnering NGOs are embedded grassroots organizations that understand the pulse of the 
community, work for their welfare, and are therefore their best representatives 
(Interview with Mission staff, January 2010). However, majority of the NGOs operating 
in slums are not organic to the landscape but transplanted by donor driven middle-class 
run organizations that provide piecemeal services to its residents. NGOs’ provide 
services in order to sustain funding and to fill a service gap in the slums left by the 
government. Some NGOs also work with slum residents to advocate for basic amenities 
like clean water, health, sanitation, and functional schools. But for most NGOs, a 
package of services based on donor interests defines their work with the slum residents 
even if these services are not the top priority of the residents. Further, competition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The recent upsurge of the middle class support for the anti-corruption campaign headed by Gandhian 
activist Anna Hazare is an example of this. 
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between different NGOs in the slums to increase their “catchment areas” and beneficiary 
count for attracting big donors only convinces the slum residents that NGOs have sharp 
economic motives behind serving the poor. These NGOs are not elected by the poor to 
“represent” their interest or to serve them. Therefore, Mission’s partnership with such 
NGO’s as “representatives” of the poor to help the government “reach the unreached” is 
viewed with mild enthusiasm by the poor.  
 Not all NGOs are working to fill gaps in everyday amenities and services. Some 
NGOs also help citizens understand their rights and make demands of the state. For 
example, Action India is a feminist NGO that works in several slums across Delhi, 
including all my field sites, to educate and mobilize woman towards their right to a 
violence-free life but also advocates on right to health, water and sanitation. Center for 
Advocacy and Research (CFAR) is another such NGO that works with slum residents on 
a plethora of issues that arise as problems of the community, not as demands of the 
donors. Another NGO is Hazard Center that works as a think tank and advocacy unit to 
mobilize action against slum demolition and to demand right to livelihood, affordable 
and accessible transportation, and property ownership rights. I argue that slum residents 
make demands of the state for basic amenities and other rights through the works of 
certain NGOs46 and, as has already been discussed by several scholars, also through 
local leaders and elected politicians (MLAs and municipal counselors). While Mission 
has partnered with some such powerful advocacy NGOs, most of its other partners are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The three NGOs mentioned here are founded and operated by concerned educated upper/middle-class 
citizens and therefore present a deviation from the usually homogeneous claim that middle-class activism 
and civil society engagement is centered towards securing their own rights and privileges at the cost of 
marginalizing the poor. 
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small, donor-dependent organizations that work as contractors or project managers. The 
nature of the partnering NGOs was such that for several slum residents like Fatima the 
GRC located in their community remained a “center” that provided services like every 
other NGO working there. The welfare delivery aspect did help differentiate the GRC as 
a “government center” from other NGOs as “centers”, but this aspect did not convey to 
the residents that the government viewed the poor as direct participants in their 
development. Further, with the withdrawal of Mission from welfare delivery in May 
2010, slum residents’ enthusiasm only weakened more and GRCs came to be known as 
“silaii-kadhaii centers” (tailoring-embroidery centers). 
 Recognizing the weak connection between partnering NGOs and the slum 
residents, Mission emphasizes on community participation to promote the idea of 
creating an inclusive city that cares for the voices of its poor. Also, participation of the 
poor is a core objective of Mission through which it has been defining its success so far. 
Partnering NGOs work hard to mobilize the poor to participate in its various programs. 
Owing to its undisputed popularity among donor institutions (especially World Bank, 
c.f. Cleaver, 2001), participation emerged as a “new ideology” almost two decades ago 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Community members are viewed as ‘participants’ who are 
not only beneficiaries but also a decision-making “partners” within a project. Mission 
project reports claim that poor are partners of the government but do not explain how 
this partnership is created or what it entails. During the everyday workings of Mission, 
this partnership takes various forms. Mission’s NGOs seek participation of the poor by 
engaging them as volunteers to publicize Mission’s activities in slums, by conducting 
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mohalla mapping exercises with local leaders (locally known as ‘pradhans’) in order to 
determine the socio-economic status of slums residents, and, most importantly, by 
employing community members as staff at the GRCs. Partnering NGOs hire community 
residents as surveyors, community mobilizers, vocational trainers, and office staff. Paid 
labor provided by slum residents is often translated as “community participation” in 
Mission documents. But this participation is seen as a job by community members, not 
as a democratic and direct engagement with the government (Section 5 elaborates on 
paid labor of community members). In summary, slum residents as partners of the Delhi 
government are no more than passive recipients of Mission’s various programs. These 
programs are neither chosen nor run in consultation with the poor, and neither do they 
produce the expected benefits for the poor in the long run, as I examine in Sections 3 and 
4. 
2.6.2 A critique of participation and NGO representation 
  Contrary to popular development belief that participation in Mission’s programs 
will lead to empowerment and poverty alleviation, an expansive literature argues 
forcefully that participatory approaches are Janus faced. Blaikie (2000, p. 1044) asserts 
that participatory approaches are simply a cloak on the development business as usual 
and do not change any power relations (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Mosse (2001, p. 32) 
suggests that participation “remains a way of talking about rather than doing things”. 
Participatory approaches are also criticized for promoting a naïve and homogeneous 
understanding of the community sans the relations of social and economic powers that 
shape it. Cleaver (2001, p. 46) notes wryly that communities are expected to possess 
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certain latent powers that development practitioners can unleash only through 
participatory approaches. Participation is expected to transform the community into a 
cohesive and responsible entity that can develop itself independently while the state 
enjoys a shrinking of its responsibilities (Paley, 2002). Zerah (2009) argues that 
community participation is embedded in local politics. It reshapes forms of power 
relations within communities such that the influential members are empowered while 
reinforcing poorer members’ reliance on middlemen (Zerah, 2009, p. 872). Corbridge et 
al. (2005) argue that participatory approaches make it appear as if the poor have the 
social or economic power to assert themselves in ways a development scheme imagines, 
when in reality, they do not. Although participatory approaches may be called a success, 
the poor are left dissatisfied because schemes do not function as needed or promised, and 
previously negotiated checks and balances between the state and citizens are also 
disabled by participatory approaches. The result is that citizens’ relationship to the 
Indian state does not change due to participatory approaches—the state remains distant, 
episodic, and seen through intermediaries (Corbridge et al., 2005, p. 150). 
 Good governance projects like Mission seek citizen participation through 
established NGOs which follow formal work practices as regulated partners of the 
government (c.f. Mosse, 2005). Such partnerships tread over pre-embedded political 
networks of slum communities with the purpose of replacing its chaos of everyday 
complex politics with simplified, associational memberships of a technical nature. Based 
on extensive empirical data, Harriss (2006) argues that working poor people are 
progressively denied the possibility of engaging in politics as self-realization as NGOs 
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take over governmental roles. The spaces invented by the poor to practice their 
democratic citizenship with the state are taken over by associational spaces where the 
poor are invited to participate (Miraftab, 2009). Partnerships between civil society 
organizations and the government has been criticized as dangerous for the poor as it 
empowers the middle-classes and elites to promote their agendas, to pose as experts with 
solutions to the problems of the urban poor while closing down the spaces of urban 
politics occupied by the poor. NGOs become intermediaries between government and 
the poor, another layer that further distances the poor from their governments even when 
the idea is to bring government services closer to the people. Mahadevia (2008, p. 49) 
and Benjamin (2004, 2008) criticize innovative governance techniques based on 
decentralization as leading to elite capture of urban governance and politics, which 
further causes a “democratic deficit” (Swyngedouw, 2005). Corbridge et al. (2005) find 
that because NGOs control access to state resources, they develop the regulating powers 
of the state; they too produce governmentality (Gupta and Sharma, 2006).  
However, these good governance techniques are not absolute failures. Corbridge 
et al. (2005) suggest that good governance be critically analyzed. They agree that good 
governance could deflect attention from real issues of social inequality but cannot be 
entirely dismissed as a depoliticizing practice. According to Corbridge et al (2005, p. 
186), the movement from politics to making public administration efficient is itself a 
political agenda which wants to broaden the scope of common person’s empowerment 
rather than take away their political agency. Good governance works especially well in 
creating counter spaces for interaction between the government and the poor in places 
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where none previously existed. Especially in the context of community participation, 
Kesby (2005) is in agreement with Corbridge et al. He states that critics have failed to 
appreciate participation for its ability to provide an alternative space, new ideas, and life 
changing information to counter everyday power struggles to those who have larger 
pressing issues in life other than how best they should resist the villainous powers 
residing in participatory practices (Kesby, 2005, p. 2044). Based on his work with 
SPARC NGO in Mumbai, Appadurai (2001, p. 37) claims that participatory practices 
can disable power relations, reduce patronage relationships, and open up opportunities 
for empowerment of the poor, thus deepening democracy through invited spaces. 
Appadurai’s claims of deepening of democracy through participation of the poor in 
community-based institutions have been criticized (Zerah, 2009) but still give hope, 
along with Kesby and Corbridge’s assertion that good governance is not an entirely 
hollow endeavor.  
 In the context of Mission, we see that decentralization of government welfare 
service delivery to partnering NGOs emphasized on treating the poor as entitlement 
holders and partners of the Delhi government – this has enabled a reinterpretation of the 
traditional nature of government and its relationship with the urban poor. As the 
government extended its control over the poor through enumeration and welfare-
empowerment services provided through NGOs, NGOs temporarily replaced local 
elected politicians, and became intermediaries between the government and the poor (c.f. 
O’Reilly, 2010). Whether these intermediaries actually depoliticize or repoliticize the 
urban poor – that will be the focus of our next section.  
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2.7 Depoliticizing or re-politicizing the poor?  
 The above discussion on good governance as a neoliberal governance technique 
allows us to ask how good governance impacts the poor. The main question here is 
whether Mission is empowering slum residents by introducing a more efficient system of 
governance, or, whether Mission is depoliticizing the relationship between the poor and 
the government by introducing NGOs as an additional layer of bureaucracy? Mission 
uses the language of good governance to shift the political framework within which the 
poor have been accessing government services. By decentralizing welfare delivery to 
NGOs, Mission is trying to establish a stronger sense of citizenship among the poor. The 
urban poor are informed of their welfare eligibility as their right, not as their dependence 
on the government. However, in spite of these positive changes, what demands 
examination is whether Mission’s programs implemented through partnering NGOs 
empowers the poor to voice their demands of the government, or, does Mission’s good 
governance strategies limit them to accessing welfare benefits?  
 I argue that through good governance projects like Mission, the Delhi 
government extends its authority and control over its urban poor and partnering NGOs 
through Mission. The Delhi government uses Mission to engulf the urban poor within its 
administrative and ideological reach through enumerations, empowerment programs and 
welfare service deliveries. The aim, I argue, is to manage poverty and create governable 
subjects of an aspiring world-class Delhi. I suggest that through Mission, the Delhi 
government is trying to reposition the politics of the poor in ways that would wean their 
supposed dependence away from political actors like democratically elected members of 
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legislative assembly and municipal counselors. The intention is to redirect governmental 
responsibilities to non-governmental institutions so that the government can be lean yet 
efficient. Demands made through political systems usually emanate from a political 
expectation of the government as the main welfare provider or maai-baap (mother-
father, i.e. primary caregiver). Politicians come together to form the government and 
sustain their votes by promising to fulfill constituents’ demands. Some such demands, 
like the protection from slum demolition in return for votes, are in direct contradiction to 
the government’s aspirations for making Delhi world-class. However, in order for the 
government to be lean yet efficient supporter of larger neoliberal development ambitions 
of the city, their political influence over constituents must be redefined and in fact shared 
with non-governmental actors.  This occurs by promoting a good governance agenda that 
promises efficient service delivery, minimal bureaucratic hassles, and citizen 
participation in decision making. These promises make government services accessible 
to the poor but offer short-sighted technical solutions to complex political issues. 
Beyond welfare and vocational trainings, I argue that the government remains episodic 
and inaccessible for these urban poor as partnering NGOs become embroiled in 
everyday logistics of service delivery and successful number crunching that weakens 
their focus on the holistic empowerment of the poor as entitled citizens of the city.  
 Good governance projects like Mission re-position marginalized people as 
entitled citizens who have the right to receive government services. However, such 
projects also indirectly depoliticize the poor by further distancing them from making 
demands to their elected politicians for other pressing issues like sanitation, water, 
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education, and housing. Because Mission concerns itself with only a section of services 
for the poor which are provided through partnering NGOs, when the poor need other 
services they must still turn to their elected politicians and their local political networks 
with the slum leaders. With the shift of significant and powerful welfare services from 
politicians to NGOs, and the introduction of NGOs as an extension or intermediary of 
the government to access these welfare services, the political and economic authority of 
the local and elected politicians over the slums was threatened and the political link 
between poor-as-citizens and politicians-as-democratically elected representative stood 
tmporarily disturbed, thus weakening ability of slum residents to make forceful demands 
across the hierarchy of local and elected representatives (Benjamin, 2004, 2008). Also, 
growing tension and conflict between politicians and partnering NGOs over the 
legitimate authority to serve the poor only further marginalized the poor and shunted 
them aimlessly from one actor to the other (discussed in greater detail in Section 3).  
 One might argue that Mission effectively disabled the undemocratic and shallow 
patron-client relations that depend upon the vote bank politics between the politicians 
and the urban poor. In agreement with Benjamin (2004, p. 183), I argue that these 
relationships are not simply a matter of vote in lieu of favors (security and amenities). 
The slum residents practice a ‘politics of stealth’ (which I would also call “political 
jugaar” in colloquial Hinglish) to establish a constructive relationship that produces 
democratic outcomes for the poor and other slum residents living on illegal land. In 
essence, even though patron-client relation might overtly seem undemocratic and 
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opportunistic, they are utilized by the urban poor to practice their rights through 
democratic channels to seek tangible outcomes (Benjamin, 2004, 2008; Ghertner, 2011) 
 Welfare delivery is a prime component through which patron-client relations are 
established in most slums across Delhi. With the transfer of welfare delivery authority 
from elected politicians to Mission’s NGOs, the dense network of patronage ranging 
from local leaders, middlemen, welfare department staff and elected politicians was 
weakened. Mission’s efforts in bringing order to the messy politics of the poor and in 
motivating their associational partnership with the government through partnering NGOs 
therefore also held the possibility of severing the messy but democratic ties of the poor 
that have been putting forth their rights and demands for a decent life in the city. The 
efficient inter-sectoral institutional arrangements emplaced in the slums of Delhi for the 
(neoliberal) “good governance” of the poor therefore hold the possibility of limiting the 
rights of the poor to the city to welfare and empowerment programs that could have little 
if any impact on those living in constant fear of displacement, homelessness, lost 
livelihoods, and circuitous poverty. 
2.8 Discussion and conclusions 
 For over two decades, a ‘holistic’ approach to development was promoted by 
international institutions. This approach expects governments to become more ‘socially 
interventionist’ as well as ‘globally competitive’ in an internationally connected 
economic system that promotes privatization and deregulation (Smith, 2004, p. 170). A 
marriage between social welfare responsibilities and globally-tied economic growth 
means that the government must create innovative institutional arrangements. In Delhi, 
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such arrangements have been implemented in the form of Bhagidari, National Urban 
Renewal Mission, slum redevelopment, and Mission Convergence. These arrangements 
are expected to come together to provide a combined framework for the welfare of its 
people and for the simultaneous neoliberal expansion of its economy.  
 Following Castree (2006) and Ferguson (2009), I do not assume that Mission 
falls within some kind of a generic neoliberal framework. Instead, I pay particular 
attention to the nuance and hybridity that scholars like Harvey (2005), Jessop (2002), 
Peck and Tickell (2002), and O’Reilly (2010) expect researchers to seek in their 
understanding of different forms of neoliberalisms, or the absence of its key criteria (also 
O’Reilly and Dhanju, Forthcoming)47. It is important to view Mission from a critical 
neoliberal lens because Mission was established to balance-out the impacts of neoliberal 
policies on the urban poor, and Mission also holds certain mixed characteristics of 
neoliberalism and traditional welfare governance which together allow us to show the 
hybridity involved in contemporary development policies. By examining Mission’s 
objectives and practices within a neoliberal framework, we can see that the Delhi 
government’s long-term aim is to turn the poor citizen-subjects into self-empowered 
neoliberal consumers who remain within the control of the state and yet do not depend 
upon it for their development and welfare in the long run. Table 2.1 below compares the 
common characteristic of urban neoliberalism with Mission’s core objectives.  
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 key criteria include privatization, marketization, deregulation, commodification of basic amenities, lean 
government structure, reduced welfare funding (Haque, 2008). 
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Table: 2.1. 
Urban neoliberalism vs. Mission Convergence 
 
Common characteristics of 
urban neoliberalism  
(Leitner et al. (2007, p. 4) 
Common characteristics of Mission 
Convergence 
Public services are 
decentralized  
 
Decisions are driven by cost-
benefit calculations instead of 
social welfare and equity 
Mission enables the Delhi government to 
decentralize public service delivery to NGOs 
 
Decision to initiate Mission not entirely driven 
by cost benefit calculations to reduce welfare. 
 
Decision driven by the recognition for 
improving and extending social welfare 
services, not for reducing them.  
 
Some cost benefit calculations come into play 
to replace old channels of welfare delivery in 
favor of NGOs as community-based providers  
Government bureaucracies are 
replaced by quasi-public 
agencies 
 
 
 
Quasi-public agencies are given 
the responsibility of economic 
development 
Mission partners with quasi-public agencies 
like NGOs but these NGOs are not roped in for 
replacing government bureaucracies, only for 
strengthening and expanding them. 
 
 
On the contrary, NGOs assist government 
agencies like welfare providing departments to 
make their services efficiently accessible to a 
larger mass of urban poor.  
 
Mission’s stated goal is not just economic 
development of urban poor but also the 
strengthening of poor people’s citizenship 
rights to government services and 
empowerment of poor women. 
All residents are expected to be 
entrepreneurial and prudent 
Mission aims to make the urban poor 
entrepreneurial economic actors through 
vocational trainings alongside enrolling them 
into government’s extended welfare coverage. 
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 A quick glance at these characteristics and one would assume that Mission is the 
formal carrier of urban neoliberalism for Delhi. However, as can be seen through the 
comparison, Mission is far more nuanced and contradictory in its political economy. On 
the surface, it meets certain characteristics like – decentralization of public services, cost 
benefit calculations, entrepreneurial expectations of urban poor. But it adopts these 
characteristics in order to efficiently extend government funding and channels for 
welfare and empowerment of the urban poor, not to shrink governmental responsibilities. 
 I locate Mission as an exclusive hybrid of neoliberal-welfare arrangement 
designed and managed by the state and implemented by partnering NGOs for the social 
and economic reform of the urban poor and of their politics (from 
messy/multiple/democratic/patron-client to organized/ associational). Mission as a pro-
poor policy is not unique to Delhi or India, nor is partnership with NGOs and devolution 
of government services specific to Mission. But there are specificities of how the global 
and local political economy of development come together and meet with the realities in 
the slums of Delhi, the offices of the Delhi government, and the practices of partnering 
NGOs – these specificities deserve attention to understand the objectives and outcomes 
of good governance pro-poor projects like Mission in an era where neoliberal economic 
aspirations are contradicting their objectives. 
As several scholars (Ahmed, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Molyneux, 
2008) suggest, neoliberalism may be hegemonic at the global scale, but it is further 
nuanced and fragmented by national and local politics. Context is significant for the 
forms and outcomes of neoliberalism (Bebbington, 2004; Leitner et al., 2007). Molyneux 
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(2008) observes that social policies provide us rich grounds for recognizing that there is 
no such thing as actually existing neoliberalism and that variation of the same oscillating 
between thick and thin liberalisms only confirm that local political, economic and social 
pressures shape each policy. Molyneux (2008) asserts that the terrain of policy – social 
or economic – is influenced by competing politics, existing institutional structures, and 
governing parties in ways that do not allow for actually existing neoliberalisms to ever 
take shape through the policy.  
 In this Section, I have examined the different institutional arrangements 
(Bhagidari, NURM, slum re-development) of the Delhi government in juxtaposition 
with Mission to show that urban reform in Delhi is taking certain unexpected forms that 
can be located between welfarism and a new form of “roll out” neoliberalism (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). Even though roll-out neoliberalism emerged as a response to roll-back 
neoliberalism of the 1970’s in Western Europe and the US, it has much to offer for our 
understanding of the kind of neoliberalism we are witnessing in Delhi today. By 
extending government services and empowering the citizenship claims of the urban 
poor, the practices of Mission expect the Delhi government to be seen as an effective 
welfare state. But is Mission only concerned with enhancing the welfare capabilities of 
the Delhi government for its urban poor? How does Mission situate itself alongside other 
institutional arrangements? Are these arrangement connected? Are they assisting one 
another in a larger project? As mentioned above, I adopt Peck and Tickell’s 
conceptualization of West-centric ‘roll out’ neoliberalism (2002) to explain Delhi 
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government as a welfare state practicing ‘roll out’ neoliberalism.48 Peck and Tickell 
(2002, p. 389) assert that contrary to the generic understanding of neoliberalism, roll out 
neoliberalism expects the government to extend itself out as socially interventionist for 
reforming and expanding welfare reforms, urban order, and community regeneration. 
Through this interventionist agenda, new institutions and mode of delivery are created 
and new technologies of government designed, leading to the co-management of poverty 
in partnership with NGOs and poor communities (Molyneux, 2008). However, the 
socially interventionist rolling out of the government is expected to serve one ultimate 
function - “extend the neoliberal project, to manage its contradictions, and to secure its 
ongoing legitimacy.” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 396) 
 I employ Mead’s influential discourse of ‘new paternalism’ to explain Mission’s 
role in the extension of the ‘neoliberal project’ mentioned above. Mead describes “new 
paternalism” as the “close supervision of the poor” (Mead, 1997 cited in Green, 2002, 
p.23). Extension of welfare services are used not simply for helping the needy but 
mainly for controlling the patterns of behavior of the poor (Green, 2002, p.23). As the 
responsibility for delivery and quality of services is decentralized to NGOs, new 
paternalism also spreads itself over service providers. By sustaining, and in fact 
spreading their control further, new paternalism operates within a “neo‑liberal, 
contractual framework” wherein the government continues to be positioned as 
paternalistic rather than as laissez‑faire (Everingham, 2001, p. 112; Keevers et al., 
2008). Government becomes a disciplining father figure for the NGOs and the poor. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Without ever experiencing ‘roll back’ neoliberalism as was the case in US and Great Britain of 1970s 
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requires NGOs to enumerate the poor for the purpose of enrolling them “into a network 
of administrative surveillance procedures” (Ingamells, 2007, p. 244) and to “instill the 
appropriate motivations and social habits” (Everingham, 2001, p. 118) in welfare 
recipients. I argue that that through Mission’s grassroots engagement with the urban 
poor, the Delhi government tries to establish a new paternalism that could enable it to 
function as a welfare state operating on the principles of ‘roll out’ neoliberalism.  
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3. POWER PLAYS 
	  
3.1 Introduction 
 In the previous Section, I use theories on neoliberal development and good 
governance to show how global and local political economies came together in Delhi to 
justify new institutional arrangements that simultaneously exclude and include the poor 
in an aspiring world-class city. In this Section I ask, what happens when these new 
arrangements come to life? To answer this question, I will attend to the impact of 
Mission’s policies and practices on two core stakeholders, both of which have been 
serving the poor in varying capacities even before Mission: 1) the Delhi government 
constituted by elected politicians and government officials; and, 2) 104 Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) selected by Mission as partners for delivering 
governmental services to the poor. Mission started in August 2008 with the objective of 
implementing two programs in the slums of Delhi – welfare delivery49 and women’s 
empowerment. In this Section, I will focus exclusively on the impact of Mission’s 
delivery of the welfare services on the abovementioned two stakeholders. I examine 
Mission’s women’s empowerment component in Sections 4 and 5. 
 I present ethnographic evidence to explain the processes through which 
Mission’s policies tried to alter the power dynamics of state and non-state actors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 There were a total of 42 welfare schemes provided by 8 different Delhi government departments. Apart 
from the six controversial Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS) from within these 42 schemes, Mission also 
gradually focused on certain federal governmental schemes like Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY, 
‘National Health Insurance Scheme’), Swarn Jayanti Swarozgar Yojna (SJSRY, ‘Golden Jubilee Self-
Employment Scheme’) and Suvidha Cards (‘Convenience Cards’ that are now being linked up with the 
national-level Unique Identification Number, known as UID or ‘Aadhaar Card’, Aadhaar means ‘Basis’). 
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engaged with the welfare of the poor in Delhi. I show that government-NGO partnership 
and especially NGO-led welfare delivery creates tension and power struggles between 
different actors. The “good governance” practices of Mission put in place for managing 
the poor through non-state actors are challenged and eventually weakened by the 
traditional networks of political and bureaucratic state power pre-existing in the slums of 
Delhi. Such disturbances in Mission’s working also prove that welfare of the poor is a 
contentious issue that is not mainly concerned with the poor but with the authority over 
the political and economic power that accompanies serving the poor.  
 Within the larger framework of making Delhi a world-class city, I ask what 
influence these conflicts and disturbances have on Mission’s neoliberal technologies of 
pacifying and governing the poor?  In this Section I show two things: 1) how an 
unhealthy competition between partnering NGOs and politicians emerged due to 
Mission’s entry into welfare delivery; 2) how changes in Mission’s policies impacted the 
Delhi government’s ability to manage its poor citizens and its partnering NGOs.  
 This Section is divided into seven sections. The first section delves into theories 
of NGO-state partnerships and ‘governance-beyond-the state’ to explain the politics of 
such partnerships entrenched in tactics of governmentality. The next three sections 
provide ethnographic details about changes and challenges faced by both stakeholders 
due to the shift in welfare delivery. The fifth and sixth section elaborates on the changes 
in the NGO sector due to Mission. The last section discusses how new institutional 
arrangements enable the Delhi government to manage the poor and the NGOs, and ends 
with a brief conclusion. 
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3.2 State, NGOs and neoliberal restructuring 
 According to a recent study by the Government of India, there are more than 3.3 
million NGOs in India, i.e., one NGO for every 400 people in India with more than Rs. 
18,000 crore ($4 billion USD) in funding coming from the Indian government (Indian 
Express, July 7, 2010). Roychowdhury (2008) asserts that the NGO sector has gained 
priority as a domain for welfare and redistribution over the years in India, especially 
since the 1980’s. Roychowdhury states (2008, p. 603-604), 
The market is indifferent towards welfare, the state views welfare and 
redistribution as political issues and yet is either disinterested or disinclined 
towards these issues. It is here that the civil society steps in to fill a gap.  
 
 Roychowdhury’s usage of the term ‘civil society’ to refer to NGOs seems 
limited. But Kamat (2004, p. 157) asserts that NGOs have transformed the concept of 
civil society from a space where competing private interest and individual desires co-
existed alongside market forces, to a space where organizations are created to fill the 
service and welfare gaps left by the state. Kamat (2004) also reminds us that NGOs do 
not exist in a vacuum in the civil society and that they are situated in a nexus with the 
private property relations, the capitalist market, and the changing nature of the state in 
the contemporary neoliberal era.  Following a Foucaultian notion of governmentality, I 
understand civil society not just as the voluntary sector (Tocqueville) or the third sector 
other than state and market from where social struggles and hegemony originate 
(Gramsci), but as “an arena for state intervention and a collection of actors engaging 
with and relating to the state” (Lemke, 2001 in Swyngedouw 2005, p. 1996; Sending and 
Neumann, 2006).  
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 Neoliberal restructurings of the government have made NGOs an integral part of 
the welfare state’s apparatuses in the developed as well as developing nations (Kamat, 
2004; Kodras, 1997; Salamon, 1987). Fisher (1997) notes that developing countries are 
especially viewed as undergoing a quiet associational revolution as NGOs expand in 
numbers and functions, and introduce wide-ranging formal and informal linkages with 
other NGOs, state, private corporations, and international organizations. In India, NGOs 
have become a predominant solution to the development ills of the state to such an 
extent that, as Nagar and Raju (2003, p.3) point out, “NGOs have become an arm of the 
government [but also] the government has become the biggest NGO”.  
 To note the rise of NGOs as new governance institutions, we must first 
understand that services for the welfare and development of the citizens have been 
conventionally understood as the prerogative of the state. In fact, the state derives its 
legitimacy from its citizens by concerning itself with the development and welfare of its 
citizens (Corbridge et al., 2005; Foucault’s notion of biopower, 1991). But 
‘development’ is a not just a machine for eliminating poverty and empowering citizens. 
“It is a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power” 
(Ferguson, 2006, p. 273). Scholars assert that dispersed networks of social actors and 
non-state institutions assist the state with its processes of governance and especially with 
expanding and consolidating its control over populations (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; 
Foucault, 1991; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; Mitchell, 1991; Rose, 1996). NGOs are one of 
the most popular non-state actors that have been assisting the state in the expansion of its 
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bureaucratic control and in its simultaneous alignment with the ideals of neoliberal 
governance (Dolhinow, 2010; Sharma, 2006).  
 This trend of devolving service delivery to non-state actors has been described by 
Swyngedouw (2005) as ‘governance-beyond-the state’— a neoliberal governance 
technique that creates new institutional arrangements of ‘governing’. These new 
arrangements include the private economic actors as well as civil society in policy 
making, administration, and implementation of public services that were previously 
provided by the national or local state (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 1992). Most of the 
scholarship on state-NGO relations asserts that the state is materially/ infrastructurally/ 
economically/ manpower-wise shrinking from its welfare responsibilities and leading to 
the increase of NGO-led service delivery (Kamat, 2004; Miraftab, 2004; Roychowdhury, 
2007). Expansion of the latter has automatically come to mean the shrinking of the 
former. However, new institutional arrangements of governance do not mean that non-
state actors have taken control and the state has shrunk into an entirely passive object 
(Sending and Neumann, 2006). Because the state itself devolves service delivery to 
NGOs in the first place, it is therefore the state that enables new power relations to 
emerge from informal and distanced channels of governance. Government therefore 
authorizes the shift towards governance to produce diffused and multilayered political 
power relations between the state and the citizens.  
 In her ethnographic study of a women’s empowerment project run through a 
Government-organized NGO (GONGO) in rural north India, Sharma (2006, p. 78) 
shows that even though such structures indicate the shifting of government 
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responsibilities to non-state actors, these actors are not independent of the state but 
actually work as instruments of extending governmental rule over larger sections of the 
previously unreached populations. Sharma rightly suggests that such structures of 
governance involving non-state actors allow for “reconciliation between the 
developmentalist and neoliberalizing facets of the Indian state, enabling the state to 
continue to perform its legitimizing development duties by building the capacities of 
various actors to ensure their own basic needs” (2006, p. 78). This is also what we see 
happening in Delhi wherein the Delhi government promotes Mission as a “government” 
project which expects partnering non-state actors to expand government’s services and 
bureaucratic control and ongoing political consent over the poor (I discuss these below). 
For the efficient expansion of the government ideology and infrastructure in the slums of 
Delhi, the Delhi government trained NGOs and authorized them to run community-
based GRCs in exchange for regular funding. Thus, large sections of the civil society 
were now working on the orders, guidelines, and expectations of the government to 
count and serve the mass of urban poverty in Delhi. 
 A shift in the delivery channels of welfare services have given rise to two radical 
debates: first, the role that state-NGO partnerships play in restructuring the welfare state 
(Trudeau and Veronis, 2009, p. 1120), and; second, the role that state-NGO partnerships 
play in creating a “democratic deficit” or lack of democratic accountability 
(Swyngedouw, 2005). Since NGOs originated to fill the service gap left by the state 
(Robinson and White, 1997), and also to advocate for the democratic rights of the 
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citizens (Edwards and Sen, 2000), both these debates are relevant in understanding the 
changes in the NGO sector and in the nature of the state.  
 Kamat (2004, p. 156) suggests that the debate on NGOs is always pitched within 
an atheoretical framework of state versus civil society wherein the left think that NGOs 
will erode the state and the neoliberals think that NGOs will help create a more 
democratic state (Cammett and MacLean, 2011). Some scholars view NGOs as solutions 
to inefficient welfare delivery, non-participatory and hierarchical government programs, 
and therefore facilitating democratization (Fowler, 2000; World Bank, 1991, 2004). 
Others believe that NGOs are promoting the ‘new policy agenda’ through programs and 
partnerships that focus on neoliberal economics and providing depoliticized solutions to 
deep political problems that could be better addressed by seeking alternatives to 
development (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Fisher, 1997, p. 442-444).  
 Urging scholarship to look beyond the two paradigms, Kamat (2004, p. 157) 
insists that NGOs should not only be theorized in the context of their relationship with 
the state but also “in relation to the global economic and political process that involves 
an overall restructuring of public good and private interest”. She argues that the rise of 
NGOs and particularly the strong funding flow from state and international actors should 
raise alarm bells – why is the state diminishing its welfare responsibilities while also 
paying non-state actors to take on the same responsibilities? Kamat senses that the state-
NGO debate should focus on the under-theorized nexus between NGOs, transnational 
capital, and global circulation of neoliberal governance (c.f. Roy, 2011). Like Kamat 
(2004), Swyngedouw (2005, p. 1993) suggests that the “empowering gestalt of such new 
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governance arrangements” should be situated within the powerful global neoliberal 
political-economic order (also, Escobar, 1995; Harvey, 2005; Kamat, 2004; Mayer, 
2007; Sharma, 2006; Townsend et al., 2004).  
 Mayer shows how this works out in the specific context of urban poverty. Mayer 
(2007, p. 99) points out that under conditions of neoliberal urbanism, zones of urban 
poverty are seen as potential hubs of investment; development programs are floated by 
the state with the entrepreneurial logic of transforming these zones through a cost-
effective partnership with civil society actors like NGOs (also, Mahadevia, 2008; Zerah, 
2009). As community-based NGOs are pulled in to manage poverty, their funders 
control their agendas and everyday practices so that they perform one task – manage the 
poor through a plethora of services that eventually help them manage their own selves. 
NGOs therefore provide multiple (redistributive and empowerment-oriented) services 
that are expected to come together to ensure that the poor take the responsibility for 
creating their own exit routes out of their poverty. 
 I agree with Kamat and Swyngedouw that new institutional arrangements should 
be located within the global neoliberal political economy to know their intended impact 
on state-citizen relations. As I already examined in Section 2, new institutional 
arrangements like Mission emerge out of the nexus of global and local capitalist interests 
to redefine the Indian state as a neoliberal “roll-out” state. I reassert here that such 
arrangements do not shrink the manpower, funds, or material visibility of the state but 
further expand through NGOs to better manage and govern its poor citizens. In this 
Section I show how such arrangements meet with roadblocks and alterations and yet 
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come to serve and govern the poor in expected and unexpected ways in the backdrop of 
neoliberal urban governance. The reason for roadblocks and alterations this lies in the 
local political economy of traditional state actors and institutions that have been serving 
the poor in the post colonial democratic India. The traditional state actors constitute two 
sets of actors that work together: 1) the members of legislative assembly (MLAs) that 
are democratically elected by the citizens once every five years, the non-elected but 
powerful local leaders that serve as links between the MLAs and the citizens (mostly in 
illegal or unauthorized settlements), the middle-men that act as a common link between 
the MLAs and the welfare-providing departments, and; 2) the upper-level bureaucrats as 
heads of the eight welfare-providing departments of the Delhi government, and the 
lower-level officials and clerical staff that operate the welfare department’s files and 
forms.  
 I argue that it is important to locate new institutional arrangements within the 
context of global neoliberal political economy50 as well as the local political economy of 
the traditional state actors and institutions to understand more clearly the un/changing 
state-poor relations in the slums of Delhi. It is at the level of the slums that we see how 
old and new institutional arrangements for serving and governing the poor challenge one 
another and truncate the state’s aspirations of reaching the unreached through its new 
and exclusive arrangements for governing the poor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 I use the term ‘political economy’ in an anthropological sense to refer to the relationship between the 
global and local decisions of economic development and their impacts on the political and economic 
networks that serve or administer the citizens.  
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 It is important to ask here: how exactly would the poor be managed through these 
exclusive arrangements if Mission were to be successful? Mission’s success would mean 
a complex coming together of bureaucratic control and political consent over the vast 
and messy terrains of poverty. By ‘bureaucratic control’ I specifically mean the power 
that the extensive enumeration of the poor and their subsequent entry into the registers of 
the government can have on targeted welfare delivery and on their continuing micro-
supervision through technologies that are currently being developed – like the Family 
Vulnerability Index and the Suvidha Card (UID, Aadhaar card). Such technologies 
assign greater power of information in the hands of the state and can have negative 
repercussions for those living illegally on public lands in the era of fast paced urban 
neoliberal development. Such technologies can also have positive impact on the ability 
of the poor to efficiently access their entitled services and to make demands of the 
government. In agreement with Cruikshank’s theory on liberal governance (1999), I 
argue that welfare and empowerment programs work to produce self-interested citizens 
who are willing to regulate their actions as per the will of the state (Cruikshank, 1999). 
The success of Mission would mean that efficient NGO-run programs would continue to 
maintain the government’s bureaucratic gaze and political consent over the zones of 
poverty – counting the poor through recurrent surveys to update its records (as already 
planned by Mission), serving and training the poor to rise above poverty, and 
continuously reminding them through material and manual presence of GRCs that the 
government cares for them. In light of the above expectations, I now turn to focus on the 
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everyday practices of Mission as they originated and eventually entered into conflict 
with other actors. 
3.3 Ethnography of change and conflict 
 Several development projects in India are funded by the government and 
implemented by NGOs. However, the uniqueness of Mission Convergence lies in the 
processes through which it has evolved. From a women’s empowerment project which 
started in partnership with a handful of NGOs in 2002 as Stree Shakti, it expanded as a 
poor cousin of Bhagidari in 2008 to deliver welfare schemes to vulnerable people 
through 104 NGO partners,. Mission expanded phenomenally in terms of activities 
undertaken and staff employed. In 2002, as Stree Shakti, Mission was operating 40 
temporary monthly camps with a minimal staff. As of 2008, Mission employed 
approximately 1200 people at the level of the Mission headquarters and partnering 
NGOs, has built infrastructure in the form of Gender Resource Centers in 104 slums.  
 Mission’s core objective was to restructure welfare service delivery. Mission 
started by openly challenging the welfare department’s practices on two fronts: 1) 
treating the poor as ‘beneficiaries’ and not as entitled citizens who have the right to 
receive governmental support; and, 2) maintaining a confusing system for determining 
the eligibility of welfare recipients which promoted corruption. There was a lack of 
coordination between eight different welfare providing departments which resulted in 
duplication of schemes and no uniform eligibility criteria. Unclear guidelines, 
overlapping channels of authority, requirement of multiple document proofs, and 
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uncooperative department staff rendered the welfare system inaccessible to the majority 
of the poor, and Mission intended to cleanse this system (Figure 3.1 below).  
 As discussed below, some local leaders, elected politicians, and welfare officials 
(mostly lower level staff) used it as a technique to make money off welfare-seeking 
citizens by taking advantage of the loopholes in the system, and to garner political 
support from welfare-granted citizens. Interviews with slum residents reveal that they 
paid middle men (local leaders and MLA’s chelas) to navigate the confusing welfare 
system, or stood in long lines of the welfare department, bribed its staff, made several 
rounds of the MLA to get their forms attested, and then waited for months or year to get 
welfare services. Most informants mentioned that MLAs played an important role in 
sanctioning their welfare services. Welfare forms submitted through the MLA took less 
time but more money as people had to pay a bribe to the MLAs’ assistants (known as 
chela, meaning ‘devout follower’ in colloquial Hindi) for their forms to be attested by 
the MLA and deposited with the welfare department. Some slum residents revealed 
during interviews that they knew for certain that this money was shared between the 
MLA, his assistant and the colluding welfare department staff. In summary, welfare 
could not be accessed without knowing the ‘right’ people and without paying for it and 
that automatically excluded the poorest people from receiving welfare. A parallel system 
of welfare delivery was being operated through a network of actors in the most 
undemocratic manner. This was the story of welfare delivery prior to Mission 
Convergence (as illustrated in figure 3.1).  
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Fig. 3.1. Situation before and after. Pre-Mission a poor woman is running between 
government departments, meets with grumpy government department staff, and loses her 
daily wage due to time-consuming department rounds. Post-Mission, the woman visits 
only one center and one helpful person at the GRC located near her house where she can 
access all information and receive information with welfare services.  
 
 A revision of this system meant destabilizing the political economy that had 
mushroomed around the welfare system in Delhi. Since 2008, each GRC operated by 
Mission’s partnering NGO served a population between 100,000 to 150,000 in the low-
income areas of Delhi. The role of partnering NGOs was to conduct surveys to identify 
the socially, spatially, and occupationally vulnerable population in their specific 
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catchment areas51 and then to enroll them for the welfare schemes they were eligible for. 
Upon the completion of surveys, GRC community mobilizers were given the task of 
visiting each vulnerable household in the community, informing them about their 
welfare eligibilities, helping them get their required documents and paperwork ready, 
and submitting them to a district level body known as the District Resource Center 
(DRC) that forwarded them to the social welfare department. At this point, the role of 
NGOs ended and the role of government’s welfare departments started. From here, each 
form was further channeled to one of the eight welfare providing departments where the 
final sanction of welfare service (cash or kind) was made. Instead of the poor people, 
NGO staff were now running between the different channels for welfare delivery. The 
pressure for efficiency was maintained through extensive procedures of weekly report 
submissions, monthly surprise field visits, and staff evaluations by the Mother NGOs 
and the Mission director who further reported the progress to the Chief Secretary and the 
Chief Minister of Delhi.  
3.4 Resisting change 
 As is evident here, Mission eradicated the role of politicians from the processes 
of welfare delivery. Partnering NGOs were beginning to eliminate people’s race between 
welfare offices and politicians and made services available at their doorsteps. Politicians 
and welfare staff resisted changes in welfare delivery in ways that deterred and 
subsequently altered Mission’s objectives. In the sections below, I explain each point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 51 A Mission induced term used by NGOs and government alike to describe the geographic area that is 
assigned to one GRC. This area is usually 25,000 households or a total population between 1,00,000 and 
1,50,000. However, many GRCs in north east Delhi have a catchment area with a population of 2,00,000+.   
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resistance in detail and buffer them with voices from the field. MLAs’ and NGOs’ 
responses has been divided here in three phases. Phase I is between August 2008 and 
October 2009 when MLAs were only gradually realizing what Mission’s work on 
welfare delivery meant for the loss of their political and economic powers. Phase II 
between October 2009 and May 2010 when MLAs consolidated political support and 
began openly criticizing Mission for its interference in welfare delivery. This was the 
most crucial phase that changed Mission’s practices and outreach in several ways. Phase 
III is May 2010 onwards when MLAs won back their power to deliver welfare services 
and social welfare departments also reverted to their original work processes. Table 3.1 
below provides a timeline of these changes. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. 
Main events. Three phases of changes in Mission’s policies 
 
Phase 1 
Aug. 2008 – Oct 2009 
Phase 2 
Oct. 2009 – May 2010 
Phase 3 
May 2010 onwards 
Cabinet approves 
Mission.  
 
Mission viewed as an 
extension of Bhagidari to 
the poor. 
 
Mission hires 100 NGOs 
as partners. 
 
Partnering NGOs start 
operating Gender 
Resource Centers in low-
income areas across 
Delhi. 
Partnering NGOs deliver 
welfare services at doorsteps of 
poor, but with minimal results. 
 
Fewer poor go to MLA offices 
for welfare schemes. 
 
MLAs foresee a blow on their 
political patronage. 
 
Politicians and welfare 
departments start criticizing 
NGO work. 
 
 
Political pressure works and 
welfare delivery is reverted back 
to politicians.  
 
NGOs reverted to “silaii-
kadhaii” centers. 
 
NGO staff angry, but does not 
unite to seek change. 
 
NGOs lose goodwill and trust in 
community. 
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Phase 1 
Aug. 2008 – Oct 2009 
Phase 2 
Oct. 2009 – May 2010 
  Phase 3 
May 2010 onwards 
Phase I and II of mapping 
and surveys enumerates 
vulnerable people in 
Delhi. 
 
GRCs use survey data to 
start delivery of welfare 
services to the needy at 
their doorsteps. 
 
Vocational trainings, 
health and legal camps 
are noted as successful in 
Mission reports  
 
 
Department delays sanction of 
Mission’s welfare forms.  
 
Public gets restless and blames 
NGOs for delays. 
 
Delhi government includes all 
three welfare delivery channels 
– politicians, welfare 
department, NGOs. 
 
Politicians resist changes to 
welfare rules 
 
Politicians and NGOs blame 
each other of corrupt and 
undemocratic practices 
 
Politicians unite to pressurize 
the Chief Minister to 
discontinue NGO deliver of 
welfare delivery 
NGOs focus on women’s 
empowerment programs, 
developing family vulnerability 
index (FVI), making federal 
health insurance cards (RSBY) 
for eligible slum residents. 
 
NGOs currently expanding 
programs to include federal 
scheme for self-employment 
loans and training for women to 
enter non-traditional and better-
paying trades/professions. 
 
Mission currently expanding 
GRCs to generate community 
participation in We Can 
campaign, to prepare groups of 
active volunteers for community 
development 
 
3.4.1 Phase I: NGOs replace politicians 
 Mission Convergence was launched on August 14, 2008 after receiving the 
approval of the Delhi’s legislative assembly in March 2008. At that time, MLAs did not 
foresee any power struggles arising out of Mission. They assumed that since Mission 
emerged out of a women’s empowerment project, it will continue to focus primarily on 
women’s empowerment and similar activities, which according to the politicians, were 
politically non-threatening in nature (interview with cabinet minister, December 2009). 
However, tangible evidence of power struggles between politicians and partnering 
NGOs started as soon as NGO community mobilizers began reaching the homes of 
eligible welfare recipients and the crowds of welfare seekers reduced at the MLA offices 
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and increased at the GRCs (Figure 3.2 below). Community mobilizers were publicizing 
in slums and resettlement colonies that welfare eligible families would not have to 
follow any of the old procedures to access welfare services. Instead, welfare services 
would be made available to them at their doorsteps. Forms, approval signatures and 
stamps that were previously required and made available through welfare department or 
MLA’s office were now going to be provided by NGOs.  
 MLAs from Wedal and Sethu complained during our interviews that their 
authority over welfare services that previously helped them maintain contact with their 
constituents was now being “privatized”. Shrinking with these lines was not only the 
political authority of the politicians over their constituents but also the ability of welfare 
department staff to corroborate with local actors and seek bribes. One welfare service 
delivered to one poor person meant a monthly transfer of $20 from the government’s 
treasury to the poor person’s bank. But the networks and processes through which those 
$20 worth of welfare finally reached the poor person were embroiled in relations of 
money, social capital, and political clout. With around three million welfare recipients 
and approximately one to two million more becoming eligible for welfare services after 
the revision of the poverty line and the enumeration exercises undertaken by Mission, 
the economic and political loss of the politicians and department staff was even more. 
The local leaders at slums (Pradhans), politician’s assistants, and several other kinds of 
middle-men also experienced a loss of their income. With so much at loss, monetarily 
and politically, politicians and department staff resisted Mission’s involvement with 
welfare delivery by employing diverse strategies.  
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Fig. 3.2. Long lines at the GRC. Residents from nearby slum and resettlement colony 
waiting for their turn at a GRC (blurred name of GRC on board to maintain 
confidentiality). 
 
Of the 42 different welfare schemes of the Delhi government, MLAs were most 
concerned about six pension schemes that provide between $10 and $30 per month in the 
bank accounts of at least one million eligible individuals. An MLA has several 
developmental tasks to accomplish, including infrastructural development in his/her 
constituency. But control over pension schemes is most critical for MLAs, especially for 
those with slums and resettlement colonies in their constituency. Within six months of 
Mission’s work and publicity on the field, MLAs’ authority to authenticate and approve 
welfare forms had been weakened by partnering NGOs of Mission. 
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Sukhi is a Hindu male NGO coordinator in north east Delhi. He has been 
working in Jaan Colony for over 10 years even before mission established a GRC with 
his NGO in 2008. He noted the changes in welfare delivery and said,  
Earlier, there were too many levels, and that means too many confusions for a 
poor person to maneuver before he could even think about getting 
pension…there was bribing involved at some levels and long waits at others. 
They had to do a lot of running around before, but now we run to their 
houses…we tell them whether they can get old age pension or widow pension 
based on the survey data and then we help them with filling the form, completing 
their paperwork, submitting their form at the department…Mission has 
completely changed the way poor people get welfare now… 
 
Sukhi’s description of changes in welfare delivery does not point towards the 
changes in relations between elected politicians and slum residents. Neither does it 
suggest any tensions between partnering NGOs and politicians (MLAs). But Mahesh, 
who is the MLA from the same area where Sukhi works, is clearly upset. Mahesh was a 
fifty-five year old Hindu male from a middle-class background. He had agitated against 
the emergency era of 1975-1979 imposed by the then prime minister of the Congress 
led-government. Mahesh is an opposition party MLA and had been recently elected from 
the constituency for the third term. I went to seek an interview appointment with him 
when he told me that, 
The government is going private…it is wasting money on NGOs in the name of 
Bhagidari…what are we sitting here for if the [welfare] schemes will be given 
out through NGOs? …I used to personally supervise that the right people get the 
scheme…why would these NGOs take so much pain? They will keep getting 
their money from the government but we won’t get votes if we don’t give people 
what they want. 
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For Mahesh, Mission (which he calls “Bhagidari” here) was “privatizing” the 
government by using NGOs to replace politicians in the welfare delivery process. He 
believed that politicians can better serve the poor because they were politically 
accountable for their performance to them, something that the NGOs lacked. Other 
MLAs that I interviewed similarly criticized NGOs for intervening in their 
responsibilities. One of them was Ramesh, the Congress party MLA from Sethu 
constituency. His office is located near the Sethu slum infamous for its large garbage 
recycling businesses. The levels of poverty and deprivation in this slum were alarming. 
Ramesh was born in a poor Hindu family and became a politician due to his “interest in 
social service” (Interview, Dec. 2009). During interview, Ramesh was empathetic with 
the poor and also told me that he was aware of the rampant corruption in the welfare 
delivery process. He blamed his own assistants and political leaders in the slum for being 
corrupt and also thought that people’s ignorance gave unnecessary power to these local 
actors. But he was not convinced that NGOs were the solution to the rotting welfare 
system. He had a different idea of how NGOs should be used for improving welfare 
delivery. He said, 
 It is the duty of a government to look after the well being of its people. Welfare 
 provision should not be given to NGOs. Their duty should be to identify the 
 needy and tell us. That’s all, the rest we are capable enough to manage. After all, 
 that is why people elect us! 
 
Ramesh was laying down certain clear distinctions between NGO vs. government 
responsibilities by suggesting that ultimately it is the government that works as the 
‘provider’ and ‘implementer’ while NGOs can only give secondary support. Ramesh 
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called himself the ‘government’, a democratically elected provider for his constituency. 
In contrast, he viewed NGOs as informed yet informal mechanisms that could 
peripherally assist him but must not interfere with his welfare responsibilities. Ramesh 
was concerned about the loss of his political authority over the poor that could follow 
excessive NGO intervention in welfare delivery, even if those NGOs were working to 
implement the programs of the Delhi government – the same government that he 
constituted.  
 The director of Mission was a forty year old Hindu woman from a politically 
connected middle-class background. She was a well respected high ranking bureaucrat in 
the Delhi government. She was known for her clean and innovative administration 
practices which had in the past systematized the functioning of other haphazard 
government departments. She painted a radically different picture about the role of 
NGOs in serving the poor. In one of her interviews to One World South Asia52, when 
asked what value NGOs added to the project, she said, 
The government has its strengths and limitations. It can provide regulatory 
mechanisms, funding support, resource support, linkages, technical support, 
oversight mechanism. The civil society organizations, on the other hand have a 
lot of strength in terms of bringing to the government certain areas of flexibility 
and outreach in terms of community participation, engagement, and 
mobilisation…we found that engagement of civil society organizations has been 
far more beneficial than a normal governmental channel. Also these 
organizations have managed to reach out to such areas which were not covered in 
government system. Unlike government, the flexibility in the operation and cost 
effectiveness was what made us engage the NGOs and other community 
organizations. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 http://southasia.oneworld.net/weekend/on-a-mission-to-empower-the-urban-poor 
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 Mission director viewed NGOs as cost effective partners who can do what the 
massive governmental machinery cannot – establish direct contact with vulnerable 
people. Unlike Ramesh who thought that NGOs should only assist the government reach 
the unreached, the director asserted that the government can only assist with funding and 
technical support to NGOs who have the competent mechanisms and networks in place 
to reach the unreached in ways not possible for the government. Her ideas of 
government-NGO partnerships were influenced by her education in public 
administration at a US university where she was exposed to concepts like integrative and 
inter-sectoral systems and to examples of good governance as collaborative and efficient 
relationships between governments and NGOs for delivery of government services to 
marginalized people. What the director perhaps intentionally refused to take into 
consideration was the fact that in India serving the poor was a political exercise that 
enabled different state actors to maintain their political legitimacy and class power over 
the poor.  
Raman was a sixty-five year old Hindu man. He was a powerful ruling party 
MLA and a cabinet minister for welfare in the Delhi government. Raman had been the 
most stubborn critic of Mission since its establishment. He viewed Mission as an insult 
to his authority and a public questioning of his work practices. Raman refused to 
collaborate with Mission for a smooth transition of welfare systems and this slowed 
down Mission’s work significantly. He was convinced that all NGOs are corrupt and 
incompetent and that their sole aim was to make money. He said, 
Now Mission is saying that NGOs will do the work of the government! How can 
that be possible? NGOs are so corrupt. Everyday several NGO people come to 
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my office saying, “sir, please help us get this project…it has a lot of money in it.” 
I tell them that you will get the project if you are worth it, why come and beg to 
me? So this is the situation of NGOs in Delhi! And we expect these NGOs to 
work with the government? To rectify the government? Ha! What a joke!  
  
That some NGOs are corrupt is a known fact. But upon asking him whether the 
government was any less corrupt, Raman and I got into an argument. Raman reluctantly 
accepted that welfare department staff take bribes but he was certain that the poor 
welfare-seeking people were to be blamed for this because they don’t want to stand in 
long lines and want their work done faster (I elaborate on this conversation in a later 
section). He refused to comment further on the poor welfare delivery system that 
actually makes these lines longer and forced the poor to seek faster results through 
bribes. But he was certain that the NGOs were not doing anything to cure this system 
either. He said, “It is wrong to assume that the government is reaching the poor through 
these NGOs. The truth is that NGOs are extending their pockets through these mission-
like projects.” On being asked whether MLAs were willing to follow Mission’s practices 
for reaching vulnerable populations at their doorsteps, Raman said, 
How can an MLA trace each and every vulnerable person in the community? If a 
person is poor and expects welfare benefits then he should go to the MLA. Mujhe 
bataao, kuaan pyase ke paas jata hain kii pyasa kueen ke? [Tell me, does the 
well go to the thirsty person or the thirsty person to the well?] 
  
 Raman’s views were contradictory to Mission’s philosophy of making the 
government reach the doorsteps of the poor. He also likened Mission to an immovable 
and undemocratic object around which the needy must flock for receiving the welfare 
doles. Raman expected the poor, despite their lack of information/ awareness (and time 
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and money required to reach the government and prove ones poverty) to ensure their 
own welfare. Contrary to Raman’s views, Mission was formulated with the vision of 
making government accountable and accessible to the poor. On August 14, 2009, during 
Mission’s one year anniversary and award ceremony, Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, 
Tejindra Khanna noted that,  
Earlier the onus was on beneficiaries to gain access to their benefits. Through 
Mission Convergence, efforts are being made to deliver the knowledge and 
benefits of the schemes directly to the people. 
 
Mission’s slogan of “reaching the unreached” was antithetical to the views of the cabinet 
minister who asserted that the poor were responsible for reaching out to the government 
if they wanted welfare services. His views highlight the rift between the Delhi 
government’s aim to reform welfare for the benefit of the poor (among other not so 
obvious intentions) and, Delhi’s politicians’ opposition to the same. In essence, 
Mission’s efforts to show that the Delhi government cares for its poor translated into the 
fear of loss of political powers for the elected politicians that constituted this 
government. 
3.4.2 Phase II: Politicians, departments and NGOs co-exist 
 In order to appease the agitated MLAs, the Delhi government (mainly the Chief 
Minister) altered Mission’s policies regarding welfare delivery such that it 
accommodated the old and new channels of welfare delivery: 1) MLAs, 2) social welfare 
department, and 3) partnering NGOs. It was left upon the welfare-seeker to decide which 
channel s/he wished to use to avail welfare. However, for any form that was approved 
through the MLA’s office, verification was to be conducted by Mission’s NGO staff to 
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cross-check the legitimacy of the approved welfare recipient. The MLAs questioned the 
authority of the NGOs to conduct verifications and complained to the Chief Minister that 
Mission’s NGOs were intentionally blocking all forms approved through the MLA 
office. The parallel functioning of the three channels of welfare delivery meant that all 
three channels must try even harder to establish their authority as the prime service 
provider for the poor.  
 We could have expected that competition between them would have pressurized 
them to outperform the other such that welfare delivery could have become more 
efficient and free from corruption. However, contrary to these expectations, the 
competition between politicians and partnering NGOs turned unhealthy as they criticized 
the other as corrupt, inefficient, biased, and undemocratic provider. On the one hand, 
partnering NGOs claimed that their lack of interest in vote politics and their roots in the 
community enabled them to serve the poor better that the politicians. NGOs claimed that 
it was the failure of the politicians to serve the poor in an efficient manner that prompted 
the Delhi government to assign that work to the NGOs. On the other hand, politicians 
questioned the legitimacy of NGOs and claimed that NGOs were driven by the sole 
intention of sustaining their flow of funds, and also cannot be directly held accountable 
by the poor because they are not the democratically-elected representatives of the poor. 
Interestingly, the lack of a political voting relationship with the slum residents was 
interpreted either way by both actors, therefore exposing the multiple complex 
interpretations of vote politics in the slums of Delhi through which each actor tried to 
establish its legitimacy in its catchment area or constituency. 
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 Prominent politicians Raman openly claimed that NGOs were nothing but ‘paise 
banae ka dhandha’ (money-making business) that often begged politicians to help them 
get government projects. In retaliation, partnering NGOs adopted ways to challenge 
these accusations. For example, the project coordinator of Sharan GRC located in Wedal 
slum was a young Hindu man named Rajan who had been working in the NGO sector 
for almost a decade. He dug out previous welfare records of their MLA and found that 
90 percent of welfare recipients were actually Hindu, middle-class people who did not 
reside in any slum and either knew the MLA personally or were his ardent supporters. 
The MLA here was a Hindu man from the opposition party and was known for his anti-
Muslim sentiments. Wedal has a 75 percent Muslim population, majority of which was 
eligible for welfare services of different kinds. However, Sharan GRC staff found that 
welfare services were being diverted elsewhere through MLAs’ corrupt practices. Rajan 
was visibly angry when he said, 
Is this disgusting or what? People are dying here for want of 500 or 1000 rupees 
[$10 or $20] a month and this MLA is actually giving away this money to his 
friends! This is not a unique case. This is what you will find in each and every 
constituency. No wonder they [the Delhi government] want NGOs to step in [to 
deliver welfare services] now. We are an NGO…we are not interested in getting 
votes. So we go and help the ones who really need help. And when we do that 
[provide welfare to needy], we are defamed, our faces are colored black by 
accusations that we eat money. We eat money? And who is saying that?! The 
king of all money eaters who has been feeding his middle-class friends for the 
past ten years!  
 
 During later discussions, he mentioned that he was disappointed that in spite of 
such a scandalous find, he was unable to initiate any legal action against the MLA 
because a Mission official at the headquarter refused to publicize this issue fearing that it 
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will further deteriorate their relations with the politicians. Rajan was aware that NGOs 
were encroaching into MLAs’ territories but felt that it was “…high time somebody 
changed this rotten system”. In comparison to other partnering NGOs who knew of 
MLAs’ corruption in their field area but did not highlight them, Rajan had taken the 
MLA head-on and wanted to prove that NGOs were sincere service providers for the 
poor. But Rajan quickly realized that Mission official was concerned with going beyond 
the acceptable zones of intervention or changing a system that had proven itself to be 
detrimental for the social and economic progress of the poor. For Rajan, this was just 
one of the many events that proved that the Delhi government would not allow 
Mission’s NGOs to challenge and override the politicians that constituted the 
government. MLAs had the authority to withdraw their political support to the chief 
minister or to change their party – possibilities that kept Mission at bay from locking 
horns with the politicians.  
 During this phase, as the government tried to accommodate all three actors rather 
unsuccessfully, NGOs and politicians continued to prove each other as corrupt actors. 
These were the complaints that NGOs and MLAs voiced to their clients/ constituents and 
to the Chief Minister of Delhi. But corrupt practices of the politicians and of the NGOs 
were not news for the slum residents. Their multiple past interactions with the politicians 
had proved to them time and again that most works would not be done without paying a 
bribe. The residents did not indicate to me any knowledge of NGO staff seeking bribes 
but some did share that they were aware which NGOs mis-utilized the money that they 
received from the funders. Shantaram, an elderly Hindu resident of Surja slum, believed 
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that there was not much difference between NGOs and government because according to 
him, “janta kii sewa mein karoroon ka munafa hai. Sab haath marte hain jab mauka 
milta hai.” [Serving the poor means profit worth millions. Everyone opens their hand (to 
get some money) when they get a chance]. Interestingly, “jantaa kii sewa” or more 
commonly “samaaj sewa” is a term that is used by both NGOs and politicians to refer to 
their passion for social service. The use of narratives of corruption by NGOs and 
politicians did not shock the poor but only reinforced the fact that corruption was an 
inevitable reality they must deal with in order to access services from either. I must add 
here that because of rampant corruption poor people themselves engaged in corrupt 
practices to get their voter card or similar documents made, to access basic amenities 
like electricity and water, and even to meet the right officer to complain against 
corruption. The cycle of corruption is explained above by Raman. During interview, I 
asked Raman about the rampant corruption in the welfare department. This is how our 
interaction proceeded there onwards, 
Raman: What corruption? What is your proof? 
RD: I have heard from hundreds of slum residents that they have to pay bribe to 
the welfare officer to get any work done. 
Raman: Who are these people? What are their names? I want to meet them 
personally and I want them to tell me the name of each officer they have bribed. 
 
RD: I am sorry but I cannot share with you the names of my informants.  
Raman: [cuts me short, does not really want to know the names, becomes 
impatient] See, you don’t understand this but people are always complaining for 
this and that. And you only tell me, what are the officers to do if the poor people 
go to them and say, “sir ji, mera kaam pehle kar do please, yeh lo sau rupay.” 
[Respected sir, please attend to my work first and here take these 100 rupees 
($2)]. Stop blaming the staff. The poor people are no less. In fact, they are not 
even poor. How else would they pay the bribe and corrupt these officers? If these 
people don’t pay then the officers won’t ask (for bribes). They (people) keep 
paying and they (officers) keep getting! 
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 I agree with Raman because bribery had become a social norm (Gupta, 1995) but 
I criticize Raman’s accusation that poor people are the ones propagating practices of 
bribery. Many people think that bribing the right person will help them bypass tedious 
and inefficient government mechanisms (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991, p. 78-79 in 
Gupta, 2005, p. 7; Parry, 2000, p. 28). In that context, I would agree that people 
encouraged corruption by using bribes to get their work done. But the government 
department staff’s expectations of bribe was exactly what kept those who couldn’t pay 
bribes away from accessing government services, thus further increasing social 
inequality (Gupta, 2005; Heston and Kumar, 2008).  
 Narratives of corruption in the slums of Delhi are so common that they almost 
always accompany any discussion on government, politicians, and government services. 
Gupta (1995, p. 389) asserts that the widespread discourses of corruption help the 
citizens “construct the state symbolically and to define themselves as citizens”. I extend 
Gupta’s argument by suggesting that discourses of corruption help poor citizens 
recognize that they are marginalized citizens in the eyes of the state because their lack of 
money to bribe the officials and access the governmental services makes them invisible 
for the state and the services of the state are distanced from them, layered by the near-
institutionalization of corruption. It is the inability to access government services and the 
entangled relationship between the state (government institutions and politicians) and the 
poor citizens that was used by NGOs to attract the goodwill of the poor. The intention of 
the NGOs to use corruption as a weapon against the politicians was to remind the poor 
that simpler and less expensive solutions awaited them if they supported NGO’s in their 
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service delivery. But people like Shantaram were also aware that if not through seeking 
direct bribes from the poor, NGOs also engaged in corrupt practices by misusing donor 
funds for their personal benefits. As the common proverb in India goes, “yahaan koi bhi 
doodh ka dhula nahin hai” [Here no one is bathed in milk (the whiteness of milk 
signifies purity or sincerity)]. After several months in the field coupled with interactions 
with staff at PMU and MNGO (supervising authorities), I also learned that several 
partnering NGOs siphoned parts of Mission’s funds by paying lower salary to staff, 
organizing sub-standard health and nutrition camps and selling bulk of medicines for the 
health camps into black market. However, Mission was very careful in picking its 
battles. As a Mission staff explained to me,  
 We can’t go after them because then we will not be left with many partners. And 
 it is not easy to select, train and do all that investment in them only to fire them 
 after some time. We must develop their capacity and strengthen our own 
 monitoring systems. 
  
 The staff’s explanation made clear that the new institutional arrangements could 
be relatively better than the old system but were definitely not the ultimate panache to 
serve the poor effectively and efficiently as expected. Nonetheless, Mission was trying 
hard to sustain a steady force of well-trained NGOs that would follow orders and work 
on deadlines without resisting or quitting its partnership. 
 Amongst complaints and accusations, the three actors continued sharing the task 
of welfare delivery. NGOs had the maximum outreach among the poor as they interacted 
with the community members at their homes. NGOs’ work gave poor people hope that 
they will begin receiving welfare services without additional hassles. However, their 
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hopes were mostly short lived. Below, I provide some ethnographic details from poor 
people and partnering NGOs. 
 Sunita was a 40 year old Hindu widow. She had been living in Sethu slum for 
over 10 years. Sunita collected recyclable garbage and sold them in the wholesale 
kabaadi market (kabaadi means ‘one who deals in garbage’). She possessed no official 
documents as proof of her poverty (usually a BPL ration card) or proof of her 5+ years 
of residency in Delhi – two important proofs required to avail welfare services in the 
pre-Mission system. She had never availed any welfare services from the government 
and was unaware that she was eligible for the $20 widow pension. While conducting 
door-to-door surveys, her name was added to the list of women eligible for widow 
pension by Mission staff. Sunita has not started receiving her pension as the documents 
were in the process of being verified but she was hopeful. She said, “Had these people 
not come to do my survey, I would have never known about the 1000 rupees ($20) that I 
could get every month!” 
 Sunita’s neighbor was 30 year old Muslim man named Babar Ali who operates a 
local phone booth from his kuccha house. He overheard our conversation and joined in 
to tell his own story. Babar Ali said,  
I had polio when I was young. I got to know through our pradhan that I can get 
 handicap pension. But the procedure was long and involved bribing many people. 
 So I gave up…but just yesterday the NGO people came home and got a form 
 filled. I paid them nothing! They said I should start getting my pension within 
 three months. 
 
 Both these cases show that partnering NGOs’ work at the grassroots made it 
possible for the welfare-entitled to be added into the welfare system. But this addition 
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did not translate into smooth or quick receipt of welfare for Sunita or Babar Ali as 
partnering NGOs faced obstacles from the welfare department. Mansoor, a 35 year old 
Muslim male community mobilizer with Divya GRC in Jaan slum said,  
We go to people’s homes and convince them that they will start getting their 
 pension soon. But our applications are not being processed by the welfare 
 department. They keep sending them back to us saying that the form has some 
 shortcoming or the other. If this keeps happening then we will lose community’s 
 trust…they will think that we are also as lackadaisical as the government.  
 
 Residents in slums and resettlement colonies do not understand the entire system 
through which welfare is processed under the new system introduced by Mission. During 
informal discussion with slum residents who had been contacted by NGO staff for 
welfare services, the residents said that since NGO staff collected the welfare forms 
from them, they assumed that the NGO, not the department, was responsible for its 
timely processing. For several poor people, NGOs had become the face of welfare 
delivery. By delaying sanction of welfare forms, politicians and welfare departments 
were trying to salvage their power-profit nexus by creating a rift between the community 
and the partnering NGOs. Mansoor’s concerns with delayed services and negative public 
image were shared by staff in all four partnering NGOs in my field sites. NGOs appealed 
to the chief minister and the chief secretary to take action against defaulting welfare 
department staff but that did not yield any results. The NGOs gradually realized that 
despite their “partnership” with the Delhi government, they had few powers to actually 
move its monstrous and rotting welfare machinery. 
 Bipin, a 24 year old Hindu male community mobilizer working with Karya GRC 
in Sethu is a resident of the adjoining resettlement colony (GRC works in his community 
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as well). With the recurrent changes in Mission’s guidelines to accommodate the 
demands of all three actors, Bipin was himself confused with these multiple guidelines. 
He talked extensively about how multiple channels had further deterred the process of 
providing welfare services to the needy. He said, 
The social welfare department prioritizes the forms that come from the MLAs. 
Forms from GRCs are thrown right down the pile (of forms awaiting sanction). It 
has been six months since we started collecting people’s pension forms but not a 
single case has started receiving money…people come and ask me, “arre bhai, 
kyaa hua hamare form kaa? Tumhare bass kii nahin to form vaapis kar do. Hum 
MLA ke paas hi jama karva denge. Tou kya hua agar wahaan paise lagte 
hain…kam se kam kaam tou ho jata ab tak hamara!” [oh brother, what happened 
of our forms? If you can’t process them then return them to us. We will submit it 
with the MLA. So what if we have to pay there. At least our work would have 
been done by now]. 
 
 Since Bipin lives in the same community where he worked, he said that people 
would often stop him on his way to ask about the status of their forms. “When I say it 
will take some more time, they get angry and ask me if I want a bribe to get them their 
pension.” Bipin’s experiences reveals that people’s perception about how welfare should 
be delivered does not change despite Mission’s efforts of changing the same. Some still 
believe that bribing concerned officials, be it MLA’s assistant or NGO staff, would get 
them quicker results. Bipin’s comments also reveal that most people were not aware of 
the obstructions that the NGOs faced from competing actors despite NGO staff’s efforts 
at publicizing the same.  
 The initial weakening of politicians’ absolute control over welfare delivery not 
only created conflict and unhealthy competition between NGOs and MLAs but also led 
to certain interesting developments in the mandate of the politicians. During a meeting 
of GRC project coordinators with their supervisors at the District Resource Centers 
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(DRCs) in December 2009, coordinators discussed their growing tension with the MLAs 
in their respective areas. Satpal, a 35 year old Hindu male project coordinator of Delhi 
Charities GRC mentioned during the meeting the reversed strategies that were being 
used by the MLA in his catchment area. Satpal said, 
 Before the MLA used to tell people that get lost, I don’t have any forms. He 
 would give no more than 100 forms out for pensions and all. But now the same 
 MLA is giving out lots of forms because he sees competition in GRCs which are 
 going to people houses and getting forms filled. But now, since MLA is giving 
 more forms and most of his forms are processed in time [by the welfare 
 department], GRCs are coming in bad light because  our procedures are taking 
 much longer in getting any pension to anyone. 
 
 Many GRC coordinators also pointed out that a parallel system of service 
delivery was being operated by local touts who falsely posed as GRC staff and extracted 
money from the community. The coordinators agreed that these touts were being 
encouraged, if not planted, by the community leaders and MLAs. Slums are carefully 
monitored for new actors by such leaders, and the touts could have clearly not missed 
their attention. During field visits, I often heard community residents informing the 
mobilizers about being approached by such individuals, but none of the four GRCs could 
catch such touts. Touts were seen by GRC coordinators as enterprising individuals who 
profited off the scheming local leader’s intentions to defame the GRCs. Satpal and 
several other coordinators present at this meeting talked openly about the “threat” and 
“competition” that the GRCs posed for the MLAs. Informal conversations over several 
months with GRC staff revealed to me that they took pride in being perceived as a threat 
by the politicians. My interviews with politicians however did not openly indicate this, 
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though they did expose a kind of time-tested animosity and distrust between the two 
actors that had only strengthened with the establishment of Mission.  
 Beyond doling out more forms to the slum residents and encouraging touts to 
defame GRCs, some MLAs were also devising other more visible strategies to gain 
public support. MLAs receive Rs. 2 crores (444,000 USD) from the Delhi government 
for a period of five years as development funds to enhance the infrastructure of their 
constituency. Prior to Mission, this development fund was inadequately used by some 
MLAs in poor areas because provision of welfare services sufficed to keep them 
connected with their constituency. After Mission was implemented, certain MLAs began 
to focus on these development funds. Yoonus is the pradhan of Jaan slum and also a 
Congress party worker. He works closely with the MLA here and was surprised when 
the MLA started taking interest in development works in his constituency. I asked 
Yoonus what the MLA thought about Mission. Yoonus said,  
Of course Mr. Zafar is feeling threatened. His power is slipping away…So he is 
coming up with new ways to connect with his constituency. Now he goes to 
break a coconut even at a freshly repaired side lane in the colony. Earlier, most of 
his development funds would be returned unused to the government. 
  
 Vimla, a low-income fifty year old Hindu woman who worked in a non-
partnering NGO with branches in Wedal and Sethu had also witnessed similar changes 
in other MLA’s mandate. She believed that Mission indirectly acted as  
…a wake-up call…a sign of MLAs understanding that their power can be 
challenged [by the work of Mission’s NGOs] and that more needs to be done as 
people’s representatives. 
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 In a bid to sustain their vote bank, some politicians started directing their focus 
on building roads and gardens in their constituency but they also continued to feel 
threatened. With a shared feeling of threat came the solidarity across ruling and 
opposition party MLAs to devise passive and active strategies of protesting against 
Mission.  
 I received an e-mail in February 2010 from a key informant working with a 
partnering NGO that a group of ruling party MLAs had gone to the office of a high 
ranking bureaucrat and threatened him to stop Mission’s intervention in welfare services. 
This bureaucrat had been deeply involved in designing Mission’s mandate and in 
promoting it as a strong platform for efficient welfare delivery. I could not triangulate 
this information and I don’t know how the bureaucrat responded to this threat. Neither 
did any Mission staff voluntarily bring this incident up with me during my follow-up 
visit in July 2010. The events that followed make clear the power of the politicians and 
the inability of the bureaucrat and even the Chief Minister to sustain Mission’s initial 
objectives.  
 By the beginning of 2010, MLAs began to actively opposed and complained to 
the Chief Minister about Mission’s intervention in six crucial schemes. The remaining 
36 schemes were not popular among the masses owing to their low publicity and 
inability to provide immediate cash benefits and were eventually merged down to 19 
schemes. Unlike other activities of Mission, MLAs’ protest against Mission never made 
it in newspapers. But the Mission headquarter, partnering NGO offices, and MLA 
offices were abuzz with the uproar that was being created by MLAs to get rid of 
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Mission’s intervention in social welfare delivery. There was a lucrative political and 
economic system at stake that needed to be protected by both actors – MLAs and NGOs. 
And since Mission was set up on the foundation that welfare departments and politicians 
are inefficient service providers that must be replaced with new institutional 
arrangements, it became clear that only the loss of one could translate into the success of 
the other – there was little scope for their equal co-existence in the system of welfare 
delivery.  
3.4.3 Phase III: Politicians replace NGOs 
 In this section, I provide extensive details based on government documents, 
newspaper articles and ethnographic data collected during July 2010 to show the 
processes that led to the radical shift in the Delhi government’s decisions regarding 
welfare delivery to the poor. On May 6, 2010, the Chief Minister called a special 
meeting of all MLAs to address their grievances regarding Mission and to discuss proper 
implementation of welfare schemes. Mission staff understood well by now that the 
MLAs were trying to oust them from welfare delivery and therefore prepared a special 
presentation highlighting the crucial role of MLAs in Mission’s activities. The intention 
was to make MLAs feel included as crucial actors in the new welfare delivery system. 
Mission director presented this power point presentation at the meeting in which one of 
the slides stated “Mission needs the support of our honorable MLAs” and went on to 
elaborate on at least five ways including “mentoring GRCs” and “identification of 
vulnerable families in respective area” (project documents accessed in July 2010). 
However, the presentation was not well received by the MLAs, especially opposition 
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MLAs who blamed the government for “outsourcing” various important governmental 
functions to NGOs, thus limiting the role of elected representatives. They questioned the 
Chief Minister regarding “serious irregularities in implementation of the program” 
(DNA, May 7, 2010). A senior opposition MLA also complained that in the last one year 
not a single person has been granted old-age pension through Mission (DNA, May 7, 
2010). However, Mission’s data suggests that this was not true. As of February 2010, 
GRCs across all nine districts of Delhi had filed 11,229 welfare forms with the welfare 
department but only 3,414 of these forms had been approved by the department, i.e. less 
than 37 percent of the total forms submitted were approved (District-wise status of 
sanctioning of schemes, Mission document, accessed in January 2010). These false 
allegations by the MLA were lost in the tensed environment of the meeting. Most MLAs 
were either not aware or were blatantly lying about of Mission’s achievements. The 
figures presented above also indicate that the social welfare department actively 
obstructed Mission’s welfare delivery.  
 A heated debate between the chief minister and the MLAs ended with the Chief 
Minister telling the MLAs that, “why are you blaming NGOs for being corrupt? You all 
also equally corrupt!” (Interview with Mission consultant, July 2010). This statement by 
the chief minister reveals that corruption was not even considered a valid ground for 
criticizing the NGOs because of the common knowledge (among MLAs, NGOs, 
citizens) that politicians were also very corrupt. The parade of accusations against the 
Delhi government and the NGOs overruled the details about Mission’s achievements or 
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willingness to include MLAs into the new system. The chief minister found herself in 
disagreement with the MLAs but had to make a feasible political decision. 
 Following this meeting, the Chief Minister withdrew Mission from the delivery 
of six crucial welfare schemes, also known as financial assistance schemes (FAS) which 
collectively received a total governmental funding of Rs. 4,568,700,000 ($99,319,565 
USD) in the 2010-11 fiscal year (Mission documents from Planning Unit, accessed in 
January 2010).53 This meeting was extensively covered by the print media. Jansatta 
(May 8, 2010), a prominent Hindi daily, carried a story under the following title, 
“pension yojna ab phir se vidhayakoon ke adhiin.” [pension schemes now back with the 
MLAs]. In a highlighted column were some large numbers like, “more than 250,000 
people receive old age pension. 60,000 people receive disability pension. 40,000 women 
receive widow pension” (Figure 3.3). These numbers would relieve anyone of confusion 
on why the MLAs were fighting to get these schemes back within their purview. The 
minutes of the meeting of May 6, 2010 meeting (accessed in July 2010) reported that the 
role of NGOs would be deeply truncated. NGOs would not deliver popular welfare 
services but would only provide peripheral support to the MLAs by conducting surveys, 
generating database (for helping with budget allocation of different schemes), generating 
awareness about different welfare schemes, and delivering direct services for women’s 
empowerment. The minutes also stated that “the department of social welfare shall 
attach one cadre officer with every partnering NGO to monitor the activities being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 These schemes are known as Financial Assistance Schemes (FAS), also popularly known as ‘pension’ 
schemes among my informants. They include the following six popular schemes: 1) old age pension; 2) 
widow pension; 3) financial assistance to disabled persons; 4) Ladli Yojna; 5) Financial Assistance to Poor 
Widows for performing marriage of their daughter, and; 6) national family benefit scheme. 
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conducted at these centers.” With this addition, the government had essentially changed 
the game. Mission’s NGOs that had previously aimed at making the department efficient 
and to replace the politicians in welfare delivery were now going to be monitored by the 
welfare department as per the demands of the politicians.  
 
 
 
  
 
Fig.3.3. Pension schemes go back to the MLAs. Source: Jansatta, May 8, 2010. 
 
 
 
 Mission’s partnering NGOs were expected to bring government services to the 
doorsteps of the poor in the most efficient and participatory manner. However, as of 
May 2010, Mission had become a back office (almost like a business process 
outsourcing unit, or a BPO), a cheaper (in comparison to the government bureaucracy) 
support unit where the mundane and labor-intensive processes of surveying the poor and 
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spreading awareness about services were conducted while the face-to-face politically 
and economically lucrative interactions between the poor and the government occurred, 
like before, in the offices of the MLAs and the welfare department.  
 “Mission” and “Convergence” are two words. The initial objective of Mission 
was to seek convergence of all 42 social welfare schemes and to bring them, alongside 
women’s empowerment programs, to the doorsteps of the poor through GRCs. These 
services converged at the GRCs in August 2008 but were forced to separate in May 
2010. Mission as it stands today is a platform that provides different women’s 
empowerment programs alongside informing slum residents about welfare schemes, and 
enrolling slum residents into certain federal schemes for their free health insurance or 
free identity card (RSBY and UID respectively).54 These free federal schemes 
(especially RSBY) still maintain a continuous interaction between the GRCs and the 
community, but not of the same degree as the welfare schemes.    
 During my follow-up fieldwork in July 2010, I conducted an informal follow-up 
interview with the Delhi government’s cabinet minister Raman. When I asked him why 
the MLAs withdrew their support for Mission, which started in the first place only after 
seeking approval of the Delhi legislative assembly (constituted by 70 MLAs), he said, 
When Mission was proposed to us in 2008, we all MLAs thought that it was an 
extension of the prior stree shakti [women’s empowerment] project of the 
government. These NGOs had played a vital role in it. So we thought they will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 RSBY provides Rs.30,000  ($650) worth of free medical treatment at any of the government-approved 
private hospitals. This scheme was launched in the face of poor public health facilities. UID or Adhaar 
card is a national-level scheme of the Government of India to create an all-inclusive identity card for each 
citizen. This Aadhaar card is expected to work through technologically connected systems across different 
government departments to allow the citizen to avail different government services without going through 
political and bureaucratic channels. The data collected through Mission’s three-phased door-to-door 
surveys are expected to be included in this database.   
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also do similar good work with the welfare service. But they have only filled 
their pockets. You have been studying this project…tell me, do you think they 
have accomplished anything? In fact, they took away our responsibilities towards 
our people and messed up the (welfare) system even further.  
  
Raman and other politicians had clearly misjudged the impact partnering NGOs could 
have on their political economy. In the process they also highlighted that programs for 
women’s empowerment were not taken seriously by them. But the politicians were quick 
at acting against NGOs. Between 2008 and 2010, NGOs emerged as strong partners of 
the government, disturbed the traditional nexus of welfare delivery, shook the powers of 
elected MLAs, and went back to (a little more than) their original functions of women’s 
empowerment. The expansion and contraction of Mission essentially translated into the 
expansion and contraction of the social and political capital in the catchment areas of its 
partnering NGOs. With the recent changes in Mission, partnering NGOs have covered a 
full circle. Like most other NGOs working in vulnerable areas, Mission NGOs also 
became known in the community as centers for women’s empowerment organizing the 
usual vocational trainings, health camps, and self help group formation for women. 
However, unlike most other NGOs, the large platform through which Mission operated 
its programs involved the participation of more than 400,000 women in its different 
programs. I discuss the impact of GRCs across Delhi slums on empowering a large mass 
of poor women in the next two Sections. The truncating of NGOs’ services in welfare 
delivery challenge theories on the ability of state-NGO partnerships to produce distanced 
and depoliticized relations between the state and the urban poor. I discuss this core 
finding in detail in the last section.  
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3.5 Angry NGOs: losing welfare, losing face 
 While politicians hoped to regain their power over their constituents with the 
sanctioning and delivery of welfare services, most partnering NGOs were visibly upset 
with these changes as of May 2010. There are three main reasons for this: 1) NGOs lost 
trust of several community members who had come to depend upon them for the 
doorstep delivery of their welfare services; 2) NGOs also lost a sense of authority and 
importance in their catchment areas; 3) Certain NGOs and NGO staff with political 
aspirations lost a platform for connecting with the community.  
 Partnering NGOs were furious with the Delhi government’s decision to truncate 
Mission’s work with welfare delivery. Prema is an activist with Humana NGO and has 
worked with slum communities in north east Delhi for over 20 years. In 2008, her NGO 
partnered with Mission and she became the project officer. Prema spent countless hours 
with her community mobilizers convincing the poor slum residents that the government 
had woken up to the needs of the poor and therefore a new system had been devised to 
get them welfare services through NGOs. She explained to them that they were 
entitlement holders, not beneficiaries, and had the right to make demands for welfare 
services of the government. I had observed Prema publicizing Mission’s objectives on 
multiple occasions. Her impassioned conversations with slum dwellers gave them hope 
that the revised system for welfare delivery through NGOs would ensure quick and easy 
assistance. But following is what she shared with me in July 2010, after Mission had 
been excluded from delivery of FAS schemes, 
We are left with no face to show to our community. Everything we said to them 
(about efficient doorstep delivery of welfare services) has now become empty 
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promises. They (community) are feeling betrayed. We are feeling betrayed. 
Mission started with grand plans of reaching out to the poor. But all these plans 
have fallen flat now…just when Mission was stabilizing and NGOs were 
beginning to reach out to the community, the politicians created a ruckus. Now 
the community is back at the mercy of the old system…and there is no way we 
can ever win back their trust.  
  
 The loss of trust or face in community was felt by the staff of several partnering 
NGOs. But the NGOs didn’t unite to resist these changes, and neither did the affected 
welfare-entitled individuals. With the withdrawal of six FAS schemes in May 2010, 
Mission had been demoted to a “women’s center” or a “silaii-kadhaii center” (tailoring 
center), terms many NGO staff used to share their disapproval of the changes. It is 
interesting to note that the withdrawal of six welfare schemes (and the subsequent 
unchallenged withdrawal of the remaining “unpopular” schemes) had destabilized 
Mission and obscured its objectives of ‘reaching the unreached’. It did not matter 
anymore for the partnering NGOs or the politicians that Mission still had a material 
presence in the midst of slums and resettlement colonies, that Mission still delivered 
women’s empowerment services to a significant population, that Mission still provided 
connection to popular and relevant schemes like RSBY and SJSRY. The rhetoric of 
making Delhi an inclusive city through Mission’s programs had as if evaporated with the 
withdrawal of these six schemes from Mission. It is also noteworthy that just like the 
MLAs, the partnering NGOs also maintained their focus on the six schemes. Like the 
MLAs, they too knew that the best way to connect with the community was to provide 
them services that give them immediate cash benefits. And just like the MLAs, they too 
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considered women’s empowerment programs a side activity with minimal political gains 
in comparison to the welfare services.  
 Mission NGOs had gained popularity and power by being affiliated with the 
government and delivering important government welfare schemes. More popularity in 
catchment area translates into increased utilization of services by community members 
which in turn meant larger numbers of beneficiaries to be shown to current and 
prospective donors. It is similar power that some NGO staff, especially project 
coordinators, saw themselves gaining had Mission continued with FAS delivery. Daman 
was a 30 year old Hindu male and works as project coordinator of Karya NGO, one of 
the most reputed Mission partners. His father was a local political figure and he too had 
aspirations of joining politics. During an interview with him in November 2009 (while 
Mission NGOs were delivering welfare services), we discussed his responsibilities as the 
coordinator of Mission’s project for his NGO. He had a clear vision for himself and how 
Mission would help him achieve that. Daman said,  
Daman: The only reason why I chose to work with this project is because I want 
to enter politics. Mission is a government project and so it is a very powerful 
project.  
RD: powerful in what sense? 
Daman: Powerful in the sense that it can provide immediate welfare assistance to 
those who need it the most. And since we (NGOs) work hands-on with the 
community and try to get them their pensions without them having to stand in 
lines or waste money on bribes, we establish a relationship of trust with these 
people. They know our names and remember our faces…now, not only pension 
but many people come to me with other grievances as well…like a family dispute 
or a case of fight with neighbors…they come because they know me and my 
work. All these connections will help me in the long run when I decide to contest 
for elections.  
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 Daman viewed Mission as a platform for achieving his political aspirations. 
Because he himself lived in a low-income colony and he had grown up witnessing the 
power an MLA could have in disbursement of welfare funds. Daman understood well 
how informal and formal political networks worked in such community settings to 
connect the poor with their rights. In his view, his work with Mission was preparing him 
well to become a part of these networks and to understand the workings of the 
government. He was confident that this preparation would launch him as leader.  
 After Mission’s withdrawal from FAS delivery, I conducted an informal follow-
up interview with Daman in July 2010. Even though the Gender Resource Center he 
coordinated was bursting with different vocational activities for women, he said he was 
dissatisfied with his job. I asked him why and he said, 
Anyone can run a center like this one…there are several such centers already 
running in this slum area. What was unique about this center was that it also 
provided welfare assistance. But with that taken away, we are like any other 
NGO in this area. Even though we are funded and supervised by the government, 
our worth has diminished in the eyes of the people. The only way we can still 
remain politically motivated with people is by making them aware about their 
welfare rights, that they can demand services from their MLA…with our help of 
course.  
 
 Daman talked about leaving this job because he didn’t enjoy the same power he 
once did. Like Daman, several other coordinators were also disillusioned with their once 
powerful positions now turned weak. The three NGO staff whom I informally 
interviewed in July 2010 did not show enthusiasm about the ability to continue to 
positively impact the lives of the poor through their other works. They had understood 
the power of the politicians and also that the Delhi government would not take the risk 
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of supporting NGOs above the politicians. The enthusiasm with which Mission had 
started in 2008 had weakened in the face of political pressures and the inability to 
challenge embedded political actors and systems – however corrupt and inefficient. 
Despite still being responsible for delivering other services, Mission experienced an 
almost self-professed demotion to a “women’s center”. 
 Interestingly, along with feelings of loss and anger, certain NGO staff also felt 
relieved with the recent changes. I had witnessed the pressure that the coordinators and 
community mobilizers felt on a daily basis while welfare delivery was still their 
responsibility. NGOs’ performance was under the constant scrutiny of MLAs and 
departments who claimed that Mission was a wasteful parallel system. Such accusations 
further pressured the NGO staff into performing beyond their capabilities or resources 
(discussed in detail in Section 5).   
 Krishna was a young, enthusiastic coordinator with a partnering NGO named 
Humane.55 He had witnessed more and more pressure being put upon himself and his 
staff to showcase the success of Mission. Even though he had enjoyed the popularity and 
goodwill that came with delivering welfare schemes in slums, he told me during a 
discussion in July 2010 that he was relieved with the change in Mission rules. He said,  
In a way this [change] is good. We were overworked. Our community mobilizers 
were going mad trying to identify the vulnerable and fill their forms…there was 
too much pressure from top to show that Mission can be a success. And who was 
suffering? We, NGO staff! We had to get at least a 100 forms filled and 
sanctioned every month irrespective of the fact that the guidelines were still 
unclear. Besides, the pressure to make Mission a success was solely on us. Was 
the social welfare department ever forced to sanction forms in a timely manner? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Humane was one of the GRCs that were not in my field but I had still had opportunities to interact with 
its staff. The other such GRC was Delhi Charities. 
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Were they ever told that you will not get your salary if you didn’t sanction 100 
forms a month? We were given such threats! So in a way this is great news for 
us. We can keep doing our women’s empowerment trainings and still get paid the 
same salary.  
 
 Until May 2010, the performance pressure on NGOs was so intense that staff 
turnover was abnormally high. For example, at Divya GRC at Jaan colony, community 
mobilziers were ordered to bring in ten filled FAS forms every day. The time it took the 
mobilizers to identity and reach one house, convince them about their benefits, and seek 
relevant paperwork – these activities took at least between one to three hours for each 
case as per my own field observations. Low salaries, long hours of work along with 
unreasonably high expectations meant that few staff members could do as expected or 
sustain their employment for longer than 6-8 months. Those who depended on their 
salary to feed their family continued to work. This in turn impacted Mission’s 
performance. The common complain across NGO staff was that only NGOs were facing 
the pressure of performance while other equally crucial actors like welfare providing 
departments were not being supportive of Mission. This throws light on what the 
government could and could not control. NGOs were funded by Mission and therefore 
could be told what to do and how. Welfare providing departments were an integral part 
of the government and had set bureaucratic work practices that could not be changed 
without long bureaucratic proceedings chaired and approved by busy actors like the 
lieutenant governor or Chief Minister. The departments did not share a donor 
relationship with Mission and therefore could not be pressured into working according to 
its expectations or regulations. On the contrary, because of the loss of political and 
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economic nexus that the welfare department shared with the MLAs, the staff at the 
department only further obstructed Mission’s work. As such, in spite of pressure from 
the chief minister and chief secretary who began to closely monitor these departments 
and urge them to cooperate with Mission, the departments continued to delay Mission’s 
work of welfare delivery by creating additional obstacles.  
 Due to changes in Mission’s policies, the nature and level of interactions between 
partnering NGOs and community members reduced significantly after May 2010. One of 
the main reasons for decrease in interactions was that NGO staff found it difficult to 
explain to the community about the changes in FAS delivery. As mentioned above, since 
much of the staff in Mission NGOs resided in or around the same areas where they 
worked, they had no respite from questions, doubts, and accusations raised by people 
whom they had promised speedy welfare delivery. Hundreds of filled forms that now 
remained stacked in one corner of the NGO office meant hundreds of queries and 
complaints that the NGO staff had to bear with everyday. Figure 3.4 below illustrates the 
bundles of returned forms to a GRC. Partnering NGOs lost much of their goodwill and 
trust that they had built over the years in their respective communities. The withdrawal 
of FAS from Mission weakened their patronage with the community. In spite of facing 
several roadblocks, NGOs continued to partner with Mission. In the next section, I will 
discuss the reasons that sustained NGO partnership in Mission. 
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Fig. 3.4. Bundles of returned forms at a GRC 
 
 
 
3.5.1 Why do NGOs want to partner? 
 Empirical evidence suggests that NGOs and Delhi government are tied in a 
mutually beneficial relationship through Mission. Amid concerns of growing 
depoliticization of the NGO sector and claims of its ability to salvage the government, 
NGOs are actively pursuing partnerships with the government due to three main reasons. 
First, running a GRC means a constant source of income for the NGO. The government 
pays Rs. 150,000 ($3,400) per month to each partnering NGO to run the Gender 
Resource Center. This constant flow of income sustains the NGOs compared to short-
term projects (O’Reilly, 2010).  
 Second, the NGOs are able to establish themselves even more prominently in 
their catchment areas. With a government project in hand, these NGOs get the authority 
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to invoke a sense of authenticity, importance, and urgency in their work among the 
community members. NGOs post photographs of their interactions with high ranking 
government officials and the chief minister on the main notice board of the GRC as a 
way to confirm that they are a partner with the government. Curiously enough, even 
though the government has failed to provide basic services to the urban poor, there is a 
near unanimous subservience and respect towards it (maai-baap attitude, c.f. Corbridge 
et al., 2005; Gupta, 1995; Sharma, 2006). Anything with a government stamp becomes 
trustworthy in the eyes of many citizens who think that private companies can just 
uproot and leave overnight but the government cannot.56 Such trust in the government 
shows that it is likened to an object that is so large and omnipresent that it can neither be 
dismissed nor replaced, nor expected to take flight. Similarly, partnering NGOs funded 
and supervised by the government were viewed as credible entities in comparison to 
non-partnering NGOs that continued to struggle to win the trust of the beneficiaries in a 
physical and social terrain filled with NGOs. Publicity banners, staff identity cards, 
visitor cards, photographs, handling of welfare forms and spoken words during 
interaction with community members were used as symbolic markers to convey to the 
common public in slums that NGOs are an avatar of the government. The term 
‘government’ is synonymous with large-scale presence, permanence, and security in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This point was clearly conveyed by the staff at Jaan GRC as we all discussed over chai the different life 
insurance policies available in the market. A particular private insurance company used a popular 
Bollywood actor as its icon of trust. But Shameem, a young Muslim woman community mobilier here was 
convinced that this actor did nothing to convince the slum residents about the trustworthiness of the 
company. She said, “who knows when they will pack their office and run away? Will these people then go 
knocking at the mansion of this famous actor? There have already been so many cases like this. That is 
why people don’t trust these private companies.” The male community mobilizer, a 35 year old Muslim, 
agreed with Shameem and added, “now look at Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). It is a government 
company and so people take it with their eyes shut.” 
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minds of the common person. (It is the same logic that makes Indians admire 
government jobs as a symbol of prestige and assurance of stability or upward class 
mobility). Like the government, these “government stamped” NGOs were also viewed 
by some community members as more powerful and stable than other non-partnering 
NGOs.  
 A third reason for the NGOs’ willingness to carry on with their partnership was 
Mission’s ability to make its events high-profile by inviting important people like the 
President of India, Chief Minister of Delhi, cabinet ministers, Bollywood actors, and 
media. Until May 2010, the Chief Minister of Delhi considers Mission a “flagship 
project” and attended several Mission events that require the compulsory attendance of 
partnering NGOs. In her speeches during these gatherings, she would remind the NGOs 
that they were doing great service for their nation and that their efforts will be 
recognized during award ceremonies for best performing GRCs. She said, “Remember, 
you are the core of ‘Team Delhi’...so work hard and win a position for yourself in the 
society.” She evoked the sentiment of a unique opportunity for selfless service and 
greedy publicity in the same line. Publicity received at this level helped NGOs build 
their credibility in their respective catchment areas and, most importantly, in the 
development sector – which further translated into easier access to larger projects funded 
by national and international development agencies. 
 I attended some such events organized by Mission. Post-events, NGO staff would 
feel re-energized to serve the government. Photographs taken in such events would make 
their way in large print on the main notice board of the GRC for the community to view. 
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As Daman (the aspiring politician) of Karya GRC said, “Who would have thought that 
people like us [NGO staff] could one day share the stage with the Chief Minister of 
Delhi! This is an honor that one can get only in such projects…”  
 The social, economic and political connection available at these events had given 
way to a snowball effect that attracted other NGOs to the government. On August 14, 
2009, Mission celebrated its first anniversary. The President of India was the chief guest 
of the ceremony and she herself handed certificates and handsome cash prices to NGO 
and government workers of Mission. On August 15, the newspapers carried award 
pictures which immediately found their way onto the main notice boards of successful 
NGOs. Mission soon began receiving scores of applications from other NGOs eager to 
become partners. Mission’s events and their publicity had been so effective that a high-
ranking staff at Mission headquarters was irritated with the amount of time she has to 
spend answering complaints and accusations of favoritism from NGOs that failed the 
GRC selection test. She said,  
…these NGOs file charges of corruption against us under the Right to 
Information Act if they are not selected. They claim that we select only those 
NGOs that can give us hefty bribes…And we have to spend days every month 
just answering these. This is an absolute waste of our time!  
 
 The staff’s frustration was triangulated one day in the field when I met with an 
ex-partner NGO that had been blacklisted by Mission due to financial discrepancies. The 
head of this NGO was a talkative man who informed me that he had filed a Right to 
Information (RTI) application to know why his NGO was not selected initially. He said, 
“… then the RTI did its magic and we got the GRC in a few months!” It was evident to 
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me after talking with other GRC staff that this NGO was notorious for its corrupt 
practices and that is why Mission did not want to select it as GRC. However, it appears 
that Mission decided to give this NGO a chance instead of going through the 
cumbersome RTI process of explaining their decisions.  
Such competition among NGOs to partner with Mission indicates that the 
government had successfully created a willing army of non-state actors to serve its 
agendas for/to the poor. Through Mission, the government had absorbed majority of the 
civil society within its developmental ideology and machinery with the exclusive 
intention of counting, categorizing, serving and governing the poor in Delhi.  
 Publicity and red carpet treatment to partnering NGOs gradually reduced with the 
challenges they met from MLAs and welfare department staff. During follow-up 
fieldwork in July 2010, it became clear that Mission will not have its annual award 
ceremony in August 2010. Nonetheless, applications from interested NGOs to partner 
with Mission continued to pour at their headquarter because Mission still provided a 
stable source of income and a stamp of reliability as a “government-run center”, thus 
proving once again the staying power of the ‘government’ in the minds of the poor and 
those who serve them. Having established the reasons that prompted NGOs to partner 
with Mission, I will now examine the how the changing rationality of government is 
redefining civil society as an object as well as a subject of government (Sending and 
Neumann, 2006, p. 652). 
3.6 Changing the NGO sector: from advocates to contractors? 
 For the Delhi government, the problem of the urban poor needed to be given a 
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clear solution—a solution that had its basis in managing the poor by collaborating with 
those who were already providing them services. A need for managing the poor into 
becoming citizen-subject assumes that they were not already managed. And that perhaps 
they were not if we were to look at the poor from the lens of the political society 
(Chatterjee, 2004). A managed or “tamed” citizen would be one who self regulates 
herself into becoming what the state expects her to (Cruikshank, 1999). The poor in 
slums are seen by the state as untamed and un-regulated subjects simply by virtue of 
their illegal occupancy and dependence upon paralegal mechanisms to avail basic 
services.  
 The primary problem that concerned the Delhi government was its inability to 
establish itself at the level of the slums due to lack of efficient service-oriented 
administrative structures like those of the NGOs. Government dispensaries, community 
halls, public schools and even elected politicians are public service institutions but are 
unable to prove themselves as effective development actors in the same everyday and 
accessible manner as some NGOs did. An NGO staff sums up the difference between 
government and NGOs,  
There are no long lines here and we are polite to them. We don’t ask for 
paperwork, we provide unconditional services and we are located inside their 
community. The government is not like this.  
  
 In comparison, the government is difficult to access, provides inefficient services 
(ex. poor quality education in public schools, poor facilities in public hospitals, long 
waits for welfare) and its paperwork is too complicated for the non-literate poor to 
understand.  As discussed above, with one NGO for every 400 people in India, NGOs 
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are the more convenient and efficient development actors that had come to overshadow 
the visibility of the government in the slums of Delhi prior to Mission. 
 As a result, a consortium of 104 best performing NGOs, most of which were 
already working in the slums and resettlement colonies, were hand-picked by the Delhi 
government to work with Mission as its partners. With this partnership, the government 
co-opted a significant percentage of the prime development actors and institutions in 
Delhi. NGOs were now paid and supervised by the government; in short, they were 
development contractors hired by the government in order to expand the government.  
 NGOs have been used as development contractor by the government in the past. 
What is unique here is the coming together of more than 100 NGOs on a common 
platform to restructure government’s services for the urban poor. As one newspaper 
report states, “the GRCs are being pitched as the face of the government at the 
community level, and are the main interface between the two.” (The Hindu, August 14, 
2009). A big chunk of the NGO sector in Delhi is already a part of Mission and the rest 
are following as Mission expands to all vulnerable areas. This partnership has changed 
the NGOs in significant ways. As Rajan, coordinator of a GRC named Sharan NGO 
says: 
Earlier, we used to be always protesting against the government. We were the 
voice of the common man. We used the Right to Information Act to challenge 
corruption in government…but there is no escaping the fact that the government 
has tied our hands by giving us these GRCs. All NGOs that took on GRCs are 
handicapped. We may oppose certain governmental policies and the way it 
functions…but can’t do anything about it. After all, the government has become 
our employer. 
 
In a similar vein, Bilal, a staff in a Mother NGO that supervises GRCs points out: 
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What has changed is that all big NGOs in Delhi have become partners with the 
government through Mission. So now there is little civil society voice left to raise 
issues like recent hike in transport price etc. not a single NGO said anything in 
Delhi! The NGOs are now working with the government. They have also become 
a part of the government. So they don’t say anything against it like they did 
before. NGOs have started to think like government and work like government. 
 
 Rajan and Bilal express discontent at the changing nature of NGOs. According to 
them, Mission has altered the ideological bend of the NGO sector as a whole in Delhi. 
They both lament a loss of advocacy and activism in the NGO sector. A growing body of 
scholarship on NGOs explores the relationship between the neoliberal state, the market 
and the NGOs to show that boundaries between the three are blurred and that NGOs 
often become convenient machines to bring forward ideologies of neoliberalism at the 
grassroots. It is here that NGOs find themselves differentiated from their past identity as 
advocates and activists working with the people rather than serving the people as their 
clients (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Kamat, 2004; Kapoor, 2005; Fisher, 2006; O’Reilly, 
2011a, Townsend et al., 2004). As Nagar and Raju (2003) point out, NGOs cannot be 
entirely blamed for joining the bandwagon of neoliberalism because neoliberalism is 
increasingly becoming the only bandwagon passing through the town. NGOs are merely 
following the trend and ensuring that their economic benefits improve in a sustainable 
manner through this trend. 
 A quick examination of the 104 partnering NGOs clarifies that majority of them 
are small-scale project-based awareness or service dissemination units for larger national 
or international projects and therefore have mostly maintained a safe distance from the 
government. Their previous and current projects (alongside Mission) showcase that very 
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few NGOs ever locked horns with the government, thus leading to an insignificant loss 
of advocacy or activism when partnering with Mission. As Kamal, the high-ranking staff 
of an MNGO says on being asked about loss of civil society voice,  
NGOs don’t represent the civil society. They only represent the objectives of 
their donors. Most don’t even know the meaning of advocacy. Advocacy is what 
big NGOs…like international NGOs can afford to do. Other NGOs do business, 
not social work. Most NGOs working with Mission are small. They want funds 
for survival, not for changing the system. 
 
Kamal views advocacy as the privilege of the well-established NGOs while 
smaller NGOs are consumed in the everyday business of development. He discounted 
the ability of smaller NGOs to raise a voice against the government because in order to 
survive, they need funding from this very government. In his mind, an NGO can do 
either one of the two – work with the government, or challenge the government. On the 
contrary, Ankita thinks that NGOs nowadays are diverse in their work. She is the 
director of an influential but small NGO named Humana that has partnered with Mission 
since its policy deliberation phase. On being asked whether being Mission partners 
deters her NGO to highlight government’s lapses, she said, 
Of course my NGO can still criticize the government if and when required. See, 
 you must understand that NGOs don’t do just one thing. Like we are not just 
 Mission’s partners. We have at least four more projects going on simultaneously 
 and some of them are actually about encouraging public action against certain 
 government policies like slum demolitions and the nonsense Commonwealth 
 Games. Who is stopping us from criticizing the government? All that we expect 
 to do is make the government accountable; it doesn’t matter whether that 
 happens by working as partners or as critics of the government. 
 
 Ankita does not see any ideological tensions emerging from the NGO-
government partnership through Mission and does not hesitate to claim that “NGOs are 
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making government cautious - they are watching [the government] and will raise hell if 
needed”. On being asked whether “all” NGOs have the desire or capabilities to “watch 
over and criticize” the government, Ankita suggested that NGOs, by virtue of being 
“non” governmental, are creating alternative spaces which can be utilized for a variety of 
things – be it service delivery on behalf of the government or criticism of governmental 
policies. Her outlook towards the NGO sector was positive because she ran a successful 
NGO which had been able to engage with the government in multiple ways, unlike other 
smaller NGOs that survived from one funded project to the other. For such smaller 
NGOs, Mission came as a respite because it is a long-term project that could provide 
continuous funding, and therefore should be secured by working with, not against the 
government. During fieldwork, I did not come across a single non-partnering NGO that 
was not awaiting an opportunity to partner with Mission. And neither did any GRC in 
my field sites indicate that they were contemplating ending the partnership. 
 As welfare delivery channels for the Delhi government, partnering NGOs faced 
significant changes in their everyday work practices (c.f. O’Reilly, 2010, p. 183; 
Townsend et al., 2002; Trudeau and Veronis, 2009, p. 1120). For the first time in Delhi, 
104 NGOs of different capabilities, resources and political orientations were working on 
a common platform with the government. In the process of using NGOs to expand 
welfare services in the slums of Delhi, the government used techniques of monitoring 
and supervision like accounts keeping, weekly and monthly report submissions, surprise 
visits in the field, regular training workshops, and of course by funding them. Being a 
government-run project, Mission’ partnering NGOs were expected to absorb the 
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hierarchical and bureaucratic structures of the government. All partnering NGOs were 
divided into a hierarchy across three categories. This hierarchy reflected a changing 
NGO sector. NGOs had never found themselves categorized into hierarchies but were 
now adopting a government-like structure and the accompanying culture of supervision-
subordination while also being expected to maintain a corporate-style competition 
between one-another to outperform the other and climb the hierarchy (awards and 
publicity served towards this end, as examined in an earlier section).  
 The use of NGOs (Mother NGOs and DRCs) to supervise the GRCs imposed a 
hierarchy over all partnering NGOs through which NGOs began to regulate one-another 
to ensure their compliance with the government’s expectations. This is the essence of 
neoliberal governmentality wherein the government enables a web of regulatory 
transformations such that each stakeholder is closely monitored by the other and ensures 
that they conduct themselves as per the expectations of the state. On the surface, it seems 
that Mission was promoting “governance beyond the state” (Swyngedouw, 2005) by 
using non-state actors to replace government as a provider. Following Foucault, I argue 
that the Delhi government was blurring the boundaries between government and 
governance and in fact producing “government-oriented governance” wherein new 
technologies of governance were designed, implemented, and heavily regulated by the 
government. These new technologies create new relations and channels of critical 
supervision between the different non-state actors such that the authority of the 
government became automatically embedded in their everyday practices.   
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3.7 Discussion and conclusions  
 Scholarship on governance has been conventional in its approach towards 
understanding changes in state-civil society relations (Held and McGraw, 2002). The 
generic argument hints towards a zero-sum game wherein the non-state actors are taking 
over state authority and essentially weakening state power. But the conception of 
governance-beyond-the-state is not simply limited to an analysis of the types of actors 
involved and the shifts in their authority. I argue the changing nature of the civil society 
should be located within the Delhi government’s overarching agenda of creating a 
world-class and inclusive Delhi and the political economy of its slums.  
 It is now an established fact that global trends towards capital accumulation in 
urban centers around the world are impacting the ways urban governments are changing 
their techniques of governing their citizens, especially the poor citizens who do not 
automatically fit within the neoliberal development paradigm (Banerjee-Guha, 2009; 
Batra, 2010; Harvey, 2005; Mahadevia, 2008). But what demands more exploration is 
the disturbances and alterations faced by this neoliberal agenda in the face of stiff 
political opposition from the same actors that constitute the neoliberalizing state. The 
tug-of-war between politicians and NGOs for the political economy of welfare of the 
poor in Delhi is so intense that it creates the effect of the Delhi government losing its 
ability to actually care for its poor. However, despite unexpected changes, in fact 
because of these changes, the Delhi government has been able to accomplish a technique 
of neoliberal governmentality through which partnering NGOs are regulated by the 
government, politicians are able to maintain their power, and the Delhi government is 
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able to avert any political dilemmas. The agenda of good governance still stands strong 
as the NGOs continue to operate from the GRCs emplaced within each poor community 
to enumerate the poor, inform the poor about welfare services, provide other effective 
schemes, deliver women’s empowerment services to poor women, and basically 
continue to function as the grassroots extension of the Delhi government. Though the 
partnering NGOs have lost the goodwill of some community members, their partnership 
with the government does not shrink their ability to exploit the government funds and 
infrastructure for their own benefits like extending beneficiary count for their other 
development programs running alongside Mission, economic stability, and improved 
opportunities for more donor funding from other sources. Despite the truncating of 
NGOs’ engagement with welfare delivery, the Delhi government has achieved control 
not only over a significant part of the NGO sector (through funding, supervising, 
awards) but has also continued to extend its reach within the homes of the poor as the 
NGOs continue to count and serve them at their doorsteps.  
 In this Section I have traced the ways in which state and non-state actors face 
transformations due to the introduction of a new institutional arrangement to serve the 
poor. I have elaborated on the power struggles for welfare delivery between politicians, 
welfare department, and partnering NGOs. These power struggles highlight the 
complexity involved in extending welfare to the urban poor. As the Delhi government 
tries to clean up its welfare mess to make Delhi a world-class and inclusive city, a series 
of highly political and economic relations are thrown into disarray. How different actors 
reorganize their power and scramble to serve the poor – this is the story of a 
182	  
	  
	  
	  
neoliberalizing welfare state caught between new and traditional arrangements for 
serving and governing the poor. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183	  
	  
	  
	  
4. APNI ROZI KII MAHEK 
	  
4.1 Introduction:  
 “Apni rozi kii mahek” (The sweet smell of her income). This is the title of a 
newspaper article on successful self-help groups run by poor women living in 
resettlement colonies on the peripheries of Delhi (Jansatta, August 23, 2009). These 
women previously resided and worked in the heart of Delhi but were resettled after their 
slums were demolished in 2008. With the slums, their social and economic networks 
were also demolished. This article tells the story of poor women rising from the rubble 
and creating a new life for themselves through their participation in Mission’s women’s 
empowerment programs. They formed a self help group and started a micro-enterprise 
for making and selling jewelry items. Now, their success is defined by the sweet smell of 
their income. 
 This newspaper article is a fable, a feminist fable to be more precise (Cornwall et 
al., 2008).57 These poor women are mythologized as hard-working, strong-willed, and 
responsible individuals who flourish under a women’s empowerment project of the 
Delhi government. The Delhi government that previously shunned them into the 
peripheries now wanted to empower them. In many ways, this small article summarized 
the evident contradictions in the Delhi government’s policies as it continues to demolish 
slums to create a world-class Delhi for attracting neoliberal capital, and simultaneously, 
has also established Mission Convergence to reach out and care for those very poor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7632240.stm 
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people it renders unreached (Mahadevia (2011) calls this the “paradigm of deliberate 
confusion”). By participating in Mission’s women’s empowerment programs like self-
help groups, the poor women were expected to make the best of their situations and to 
work towards alleviating their poverty through entrepreneurial engagements. But the 
conditions under which poor women were expected to weave their feminist fables were 
harsh. Lack of basic amenities and economic opportunities potentially pushed women 
towards participating in Mission’s programs, but these programs did not empower 
women to understand and challenge the government policies and other structural issues 
that continued to marginalize them.   
 Such “feminist fables” were not restricted to the margins of the city alone. The 
head shot of a woman with a confident gaze, wearing a bright red bindi on her forehead 
invites you at every GRC in several slums and resettlement colonies across Delhi. From 
the peripheral resettlement colonies to the large slums inside the city, this woman has 
become an icon for Mission’s women’s empowerment programs. GRCs offer a package 
of free programs ranging from vocational trainings to medical and legal aid for the 
“holistic empowerment” of poor women.58 Despite the stated and ideological emphasis 
on their “holistic empowerment”, Mission focuses more prominently on their economic 
empowerment – for poor women to experience the “sweet smell of their income”. The 
newspaper article that I mention above hints at the impacts Mission’s programs are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 “The Woman Empowerment Component is aimed at holistic development of the marginalized 
vulnerable women through interventions in the areas including Literacy, Health, Livelihood. Under a well 
structured programme, the GRCs provide Non-Formal Education, Vocational Training and Skill 
Development, Health and Nutrition through camps and clinics and are also instilling virtues of thrift and 
micro credit through formation of Self-Help Groups (SHGs). The SHGs play a much wider role ranging 
from that of community peer groups to pressure groups. “ (http://www.missionconvergence.org/women-
empowerment-component.html) 
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having on the lives and livelihoods of some poor women. I claim this reported piece of 
success as “fables” not because I am unconvinced that participating women have 
improved their economic status through Mission’s programs, but because these 
improvements are misjudged as sole and strong indicators of their holistic 
empowerment. I unpack these claims below.  
 Ethnographic evidence from my fieldwork indicates the following concerns with 
such fables: First, that women’s empowerment as a feminist agenda for building political 
agency and conscientization, awareness raising, challenging structural violence, and 
articulating women’s basic rights are sidelined by the sweet smell of women’s own 
income, thus also sidelining the structural issues that perpetuate gendered poverty (and 
hence the need for such programs) in the first place. Second, these fables also indicate 
the conventional practices undertaken by development projects to calculate and 
popularize their success while leaving untouched issues that can be politically and 
socially controversial for them. Third, the feminist fables hint at the ways in which 
development programs circulate shallow ideas about what women’s empowerment 
should mean, and the end results it should generate. Though these ideas arise out of real 
issues on the ground, they don’t fully integrate the social, political and economic 
complexity that come together to maintain economic and gendered discriminations from 
the contradictory and confusing policies of a neoliberal state and the status quo of the 
patriarchal society. Therefore, I want to make clear that my concern with women’s 
empowerment is not limited to the question of patriarchy (as is usually expected); it also 
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warrants attention to how neoliberal urban development policies have been sustaining 
the poverty and subordination of the targets of such programs. 
 In this Section, I critique the very premise on which the Delhi government 
decided to introduce programs to empower poor women. My aim is to examine the 
possibility of a co-existence of neoliberal governmentality and patriarchal status quo that 
influence women’s empowerment programs to meet “other” objectives. I ask: why did 
the Delhi government initiate uniform women’s empowerment programs for all poor 
women in Delhi? And, how does this program impact the government’s intentions of 
making Delhi a world-class city that is also inclusive and caring towards its poor. By 
using NGO-run Gender Resource Centers (GRCs) to extend a conventional set of 
women’s empowerment services that were already being provided by several other 
NGOs across the slums of Delhi, I argue that Mission’s practices intended to: 1) make 
legible for the government the previously uncounted and poorly managed poverty in 
Delhi, and; 2) make visible the “caring” nature of the Delhi government; and, 3) make 
self-regulated economic subjects of the poor women by using partnering NGOs to 
conduct their conduct as per the intentions of the neoliberal state (As discussed in 
Section 3, NGOs too became instruments and effects of the circuits of neoliberal 
governmentality).  
 Foucault (1991) argues that disciplining the subject to self-govern is the most 
effective and powerful form of governance. Further, Cruikshank (1999, p. 40) asserts 
that “constituting the need and interest of others to fulfill their human potential is a mode 
of governing people.” Therefore, the question of whether the state is conducting the 
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conduct of the citizen or whether the citizen is acting in self-interest – becomes obsolete. 
It is through the panoptic of creating responsible, self-governed subjects that I am 
analyzing Mission’s women’s empowerment programs. I assert that establishment of 
women’s empowerment programs across Delhi slums should be examined from the lens 
of governmentality to understand the nuanced link between the Delhi government’s 
aspirations to produce a world-class city that can attract global capital, manage its 
poverty, and show that it cares for its poor. 59 In this Section, I examine women’s 
empowerment as a strategy of governance to prove that despite its well-meaning and 
holistic intentions, its programs work, in expected and unexpected ways, to enable an 
unproductive coexistence of neoliberal governmentality and patriarchal status quo.
	   This Section is divided into six sections. In the next section, I provide details 
about the women’s empowerment program after which I examine feminist and 
development literature on approaches to empowerment and then delve into theories on 
governmentality and empowerment. In the subsequent sections, I will provide 
ethnographic details on the workings of Mission’s women’s empowerment programs and 
end with a section of discussion and conclusions. 
4.2 Stree shakti60 in the slums of Delhi 
 In general, empowerment means the ability to modify unequal power relations. 
Mission’s women’s empowerment programs implemented through community-based 
GRCs include: vocational trainings, self-help group formation, non-formal education, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “to evolve the image of Delhi as a ‘caring’ city’” – the exact phrase used on Mission’s website, 
http://www.missionconvergence.org/survey.html 
60 Stree Shakti means women’s power. Mission’s current women’s empowerment program is an expansion 
of a prior Delhi government initiative known as Stree Shakti. 
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free legal counseling, free medicines and medical check-ups, and free nutrition camps – 
only for poor women. Based on recent updates from a key informant, I learned that the 
self-help groups are in the process of being developed as platforms for: 1) linking up the 
groups with the federal government’s Swarn Jayanti Swa Rozgar Yojna (SJSRY) self-
employment scheme that will provide trainings in marketable vocational trades (like 
nursing, home help, driving, welding, information technology) and loans for small 
businesses. The SJSRY-Mission link-up is currently in its planning phase; 2) mobilizing 
women group members to offer their voluntary services for community development (I 
don’t have the details on what this entails), and; 3) mobilizing women group members to 
create advocacy groups like Mahila Mandals (women’s committees) and youth groups 
that will incorporate, among other activities, a popular “We Can” campaign to end 
violence against women.61   
 The 2009 project report (Journey of Partnership, 2009) elaborates on the 
achievements of the women’s empowerment programs. Below is a section from the 
report. This section is titled “GRCs: Expanding horizons” (emphasis added),  
- Total GRCs functional as on November 2009: 94 [104 as of August 2011] 
- Total number of women vocationally trained by the GRC in the year 2008: 25,986 
[72,000 as of August 2011, explained below] 
- Total number of women benefited under health camp in the year 2008: 125,121 
- Total number of women benefitted under nutrition camp in the year 2008: 70,906 
- Total number of women benefitted under Non Formal Education in the year 2008: 
7,934 
- Total number of women benefitted under legal awareness in the year 2008: 66,560 
- Total number of Self Help Groups formed in the year 2008: 565 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 This campaign was designed and funded by an international organization named OXFAM. It was taken 
over by the Government of India until 2005 when its funds ran dry. Currently, Mission is trying to 
incorporate the design and programs of the campaign within the existing institutional space offered by 
Mission’s SHGs. 
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 These official numbers total up to an impressive 400,000 participants and are 
presented as proof of women’s empowerment in annual reports, publicity brochures, 
meetings, and workshops of Mission. But my research shows that these numbers do not 
represent the complete picture on the ground – the number of women attending different 
camps and trainings might be correct but not the assumption that all participating women 
have equally “benefitted” through these programs. Participation and empowerment are 
two different things. 
 Information about number of successful cases was not collated at the level of the 
Mission headquarters or the monitoring Mother NGOs. GRCs kept some basic 
information about successful cases of vocational trainings, mostly in the form of 
“successful cases studies” pasted on their notice boards. Nitin, a 28 year old Hindu male, 
is the monitoring officer with a mother NGO that supervises the work of several GRCs. 
One of his main tasks was to evaluate the progress with vocational trainings at the GRC. 
Nitin informed me that an approximate total of 700 women have graduated from across 
the four vocational trainings provided at the four GRC in my field sites since the 
trainings started there two years ago. Each training class enrolled 200 women across its 
four trades and each batch graduated in six months. Therefore, across the 104 GRCs in 
Delhi approximately 72,000 women have received training in trades like tailoring, 
beautician, or basic computer education over the past two years. Nitin noted that at the 
most there were 5-7 successful cases from each batch of 200 at each GRC. For example, 
Nitin shared that Karya GRC at Sethu slum was able to place 5 of its trained women in 
some form of job. That means an average “success” rate of 3 percent, wherein success is 
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defined by Mission as a trained woman earning more than Rs.3000 ($66) per month. I 
discuss concerns with this “success” criterion in a later section. Despite the low success 
rate, Mission continued to engage with at least 400,000 women through trainings, camps 
and self help groups across 104 slum areas in Delhi.62 
 Mission documents are brimming with the assertion that poor women are the best 
channels to effect change in their families and communities. The focus is specifically on 
poor women (and not poor men) because the government believes in the feminist myth 
that poor women are accessible and responsible actors that can empower their families 
and communities by empowering themselves (Cornwall et al., 2007; Molyneux, 2008). 
According to Mission documents, poor women are Delhi government’s “partners” in 
alleviating poverty and in also making Delhi an inclusive city. The face of a woman with 
a confident gaze is used as Mission’s icon in most project documents. The photograph of 
another strong-willed woman in a Mission report (2009) announces that poor women 
have undertaken a “journey of partnership” with the Delhi government (Figures 4.1 and 
4.2). Both these faces represent an underprivileged yet strong woman, a willing partner 
of the Delhi government who empowers herself, finds solutions to end her poverty, and 
also showcases the Delhi government’s efforts at including the poor in an aspiring 
world-class city.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 I have calculated this number based on the abovementioned Journey of Partnership report (2009), 
updated information from monitoring staff, and by estimating an increase in the total number of women 
who have participated in the different programs since 2009. I am certain that 400,000 is a conservative 
estimate but I provide this in the absence of any current official data from Mission.  
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Fig. 4.1 Mission’s icon for women’s empowerment 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. “Journey of partnership”. This photograph illustrates a partnership between 
poor women and the Delhi government. Source: Annual Report, Mission Convergence, 
2009 
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 Also, Mission documents are abundantly clear in their assertion that women’s 
empowerment is the answer to poverty alleviation and the inclusion of the poor in a 
city’s social and economic life (c.f. Moser, 1993; UNDP, 2003). The following 
paragraph holds excerpts from Mission’s official statement on women’s empowerment 
(emphasis added).63 
Women are central to Mission Convergence Program with focused interventions 
designed for their economic, social and psychological empowerment. The 
programs are developed on the universal premise that women are central to 
any development agenda for true and lasting development. Woman form the 
nucleus of the family, community, society and nation. An empowered and 
enlightened woman will ensure that her family benefits from her, and will 
unleash a chain reaction that would push development agenda up the scale 
to encompass all in its entirety …The journey of women’s empowerment starts 
from the individual to the family, from there to the community then to society 
and finally to the nation. Individual and family are the major challenging 
areas to address the issues of women and girls. Promoting community 
participation to hammer in gender equality and to bring about positive attitudinal 
and behavioral changes towards issues of women and girls is thus fundamental to 
Mission Convergence Programme.	  
 
 This official statement justifying the need for women’s empowerment programs 
shows vividly that Mission is aiming to do two things: 1) express that women are the 
best agents for transforming family and community; and, 2) express that women’s 
empowerment is hindered by family and community. Mission’s programs are therefore 
seen as the solution to empower poor women and to do so in ways that also change 
family and community’s perceptions and behaviors about women’s rights and 
capabilities. However, my ethnographic research examined in a later section reveals that 
on the ground, Mission’s women’s empowerment programs emphasize on the economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 http://missionconvergence.org/women-empowerment-component.html 
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development of poor women and their families without fully addressing their gendered 
socio-familial conditions. I assume that the recent planning around incorporation of 
rights-based We Can campaign through SHG groups would help bring issues of gender 
discrimination to the fore. However, I will rely on my observations and data collected 
during fieldwork in 2009-10 to reveal the then situation on the ground.  
 One could argue that women’s economic empowerment could eventually trickle 
down to end their social discriminations and other forms of subordination. But evidence 
from micro credit efforts focusing on the economic empowerment of poor women in 
patriarchal societies proves to the contrary (Goetz and Sengupta, 1996; Kabeer, 1998; 
Mayoux, 1999). Further, Batliwala’s (1994) research on the Integrated Rural 
Development Program in India shows that women’s economic strength does not 
automatically make them powerful. As women get busy with becoming economic 
resources their gendered responsibilities to empower self and family increase and they 
are left with little time to question their gendered subordination (c.f. Rowlands, 1997, p. 
132; Dhanraj and Batliwala, 2004). Mayoux (2002) argues that gender, caste, class, and 
culture are prime determinants in how social relations play out in enabling or disabling 
women to gain power out of their economic achievements. Poor women’s economic 
achievement or empowerment must be even more critically examined within the 
paradigm of exclusionary neoliberal development as slum demolitions, limitations on 
informal livelihood opportunities, peripheral resettlement or homelessness, and a general 
environment of class-based marginalization engulfs the aspiring world-class city. 
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 My purpose is not simply to prove or examine whether the empowerment 
programs of the Delhi government implemented by partnering NGOs are good or bad, 
libratory or conformist, but to argue that such mass-scale women’s empowerment 
programs of the government are laden with limitations as well as unexpected 
possibilities (Foucault, 1982, p. 231; Sharma, 2006, p. 90). My aim is not simply to 
prove that Mission is a neoliberal program that wants to produce pacified and discipline 
subjects, but rather, to raise questions about the kinds of citizen-subjects that are 
produced through programs of women’s empowerment in a neoliberalizing India. In the 
next section, I first draw on feminist and development literature to chart the journeys 
through which women’s empowerment as a strategy of development has evolved so far. 
Next, I examine practice theories on the structure-agency bind and then move on to the 
theories of governmentality to highlight whether and how empowerment projects 
produce governable and “other” kinds of subjects. 
4.3 Approaches to empowerment  
 The low status of women in India attracts a continuous flow of gendered 
development interventions. Gender inequalities in access to basic services like health, 
education, nutrition, and employment favor men over women. Further, such 
discriminations have promoted imbalanced sex ratios across majority of India (Agarwal, 
1992; UNDP, 2003). In Delhi, the sex ratio in 2004 was 823 females per 1000 males 
(Delhi Planning Department, 2009).64 As such, the majority of development programs 
today incorporate women into their agenda (Boserup, 1970; Conrwall, 2003; Kabeer, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 ‘Gender revolution in national capital’. The Pioneer. August 13, 2009. 
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1996; O’Reilly, 2003). The inclusion of women in the development paradigm is neither 
new nor confined to India. In fact, as I demonstrate below international efforts by north 
and south feminist scholars and activists since the 1970’s have ensured the inclusion and 
gradual but weak mainstreaming of women into development policies across the world. 
Below, I first summarize the feminist attempts at placing social relations at the center-
stage of women’s empowerment, and then provide a brief critique of why this attempt 
failed to effect social change.    
 Prior to the 1970’s, development programs largely ignored the need for women-
specific programs. The main development trend of the 1970’s was poverty alleviation, 
and women had not yet been discovered as a solution. Boserup (1970) used a liberal 
feminist perspective to critique development theories of that time to argue that women 
should not only be seen as welfare recipients, mothers and wives, but also as individuals 
with productive potential to positively impact the development agenda. The United 
Nations Decade for Women (1976-85) highlighted the role of women in the economic 
and social development of their countries and communities (Boserup, 1970; Cornwall 
and Anyidoho, 2010; Moser, 1989, p. 1799; Rowlands, 1997). This led to a radical shift 
from welfare-oriented, family-centered programs which targeted women as mothers, to 
an emphasis on the economically productive role of women. This was known as the 
Women in Development (WID) approach, and with it began the widespread 
development trend focusing on women as previously untapped economic resource. 
Income-generating projects for women gained popularity overnight (Moser, 1989, p. 
1800). Women began to be seen as ‘instruments’  and ‘resources’ that could help meet 
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developmental needs and carry the burden of modern economic development, but the 
social structures that caused women’s subordination remained unquestioned (Rowlands, 
1997).   
 After WID, several other approaches invaded the development landscape but 
women’s economic productivity continued to be promoted as panacea for poverty 
alleviation, and also as a tool for women’s empowerment.  The Gender and 
Development (GAD) approach was framed in the 1980’s by collectives of feminist 
groups as a critical response to the WID approach as uncritical in its use of woman as a 
productive economic category without focusing on the social inequalities they continued 
to experience (Batliwala, 1994; Kabeer, 1996; Moser, 1993). Concerned with the 
dynamics of gender relations, GAD went deeper than seeing women as instruments or 
resources for development, and sought to mainstream gendered power relations that lead 
to women’s subordination in most societies. It examined the value systems that defined 
the sexual division of labor. On the ground, GAD efforts produced results; 1980’s 
onwards, empowerment approaches moved from WID to GAD as development practice 
now resonated with empowerment as “…a process of transformation involving both the 
acquisition of capabilities and the changes in subjectivity that enable agency to be 
exercised” (Molyneux, 2008, p. 783). Paulo Freire’s theory of critical consciousness 
(1972) also found popularity in several women’s empowerment programs, including the 
Mahila Samakhya program of the Government of India that was initiated in 1989 in 
eight states across India for rural women’s empowerment for gender equality and social 
change (Anupamlata et al., 2004; Sharma, 2006). The mainstreaming of gender power 
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relations did not however succeed in producing favorable environments for social 
change. I discuss these criticisms in detail later. Below, I first present the prominent 
frameworks within which most women’s empowerment programs have come to situate 
themselves. 
4.3.1 Liberal and liberating approaches to empowerment 
 Beyond WID and GAD, the inclusion of women in the development paradigm 
involved many other frameworks. Adding nuance to Moser’s work on practical and 
strategic gender needs (1989, 1993) Sardenberg (2010, p 233-234) proposed liberal and 
liberating approaches to empowerment. She argues that it is important to distinguish 
between the two approaches because they help us understand different ways 
empowerment can be recognized to effect change in accordance with the cultural and 
social norms that restrict women. The liberal approach focuses on individual growth and 
on the rational actions of social actors (Romano, 2002). It is atomistic and in the process 
of attending to the individual, it completely misses out the power relations that bolster 
structural discriminations to remain unchallenged. Sardenberg (2008) claims that, quite 
like the practical gender needs proposed by Moser, liberal empowerment is 
depoliticizing and technical in nature. However, unlike practical gender needs that focus 
primarily on the fulfillment of basic everyday material necessities more relevant for 
women living in poverty, liberal approach looks at their individual development in 
accordance with their cultural norms and traditions. The ‘liberating empowerment’ 
approach, in contrast, situates power relations at the center. Its core objective is to 
question and transform the patriarchal domination of women by focusing on women’s 
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organizing for collective action while also attending to the importance of the 
empowerment of women at a personal level (Sardenberg, 2008, p. 18-19). The focus 
therefore is on intrinsic (Kabeer, 1999) and extrinsic grounds of empowerment in order 
for women to attain self-determination as well a collective agency for questioning 
patriarchal structures. In summary, while the liberal approach softly nudge society to 
make space for women, a liberating approach pushes social norms to change and address 
power disparities in gender relations. Below I discuss Mission’s work in the context of 
these approaches. 
 Women from conservative families allowed to step outside home to attend 
tailoring classes at GRCs so that they can start their own business– this is an example of 
an atomistic liberal approach to empowerment; and women coming together through 
self-help groups for campaigns like “We Can” to know their rights and to challenge 
gendered violence in the process – this would be an example of a collective liberating 
approach to empowerment. The energetic woman consultant in-charge of tying the We 
Can campaign with the SHGs calculated during an interview that twenty SHGs with a 
total of 400 women in each of the 104 GRCs across Delhi would mean a strong base of 
around 40,000 women which could be put to better use than “just meeting to save some 
money”. She believed that the implementation of this campaign at such a large platform 
would be a “preventive not curative intervention to handle women’s violence and other 
related issues”. The consultant viewed SHG for the sole purpose of economic 
betterment as an incomplete strategy for women’s empowerment. While the consultant 
was excited about this introduction, she was well aware of the limitations it could face 
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by being a part of Mission’s rigid institutional arrangement. She said, “there is a 
difference between a project and a campaign and this [campaign] should be seen 
beyond limitations that a project faces.” But the consultant was hopeful that the 
campaign will lead to greater rights awareness within the otherwise mundane economic 
practices of the SHGs. I use the distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘liberating’ 
empowerment as proposed by Sardenberg (2008, 2010) to recognize the nuanced 
potential of Mission’s women’s empowerment programs to produce varying degrees of 
desirable changes in women’s lives. 
 In the following section, I briefly discuss the popular development discourses 
that continue to define women as instruments of development. I argue that even though 
the partnership between feminist and development theory has made progressive leaps 
from WID to GAD and other nuanced approaches, remnants of the WID framework 
(alongside project pressures to show tangible success) continue to guide discourse and 
practice in the development sector in ways that weaken the call for women’s strategic 
needs for empowerment. Further, Wallace and Coles (2005) argue that the GAD agenda 
too eventually watered down as women started to be seen as a “problem” that could be 
solved through technical frameworks and action plans.  
4.3.2 Women as victims, heroes, and weapons  
 Development discourses have met with criticism for assuming that women are 
easy-to-mobilize, responsible, sincere, caring, and hardworking, and therefore must be 
viewed as sustainable developmental solution against poverty (Cornwall et al. 2004, 
2008; Kabeer, 1996; Molyneux, 2008; Mohanty, 1991; O’Reilly, 2003). This mass-
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inclusion of women as favorable development subjects has been criticized by feminists 
for not only sidelining women’s struggles for strategic and liberating empowerment but 
also for decontextualizing it in ways that leave the unequal power relations intact 
(Cornwall and Edwards, 2010; O’Reilly, 2006, 2011b). Further, the interpretation of 
women as reliable development subjects has also created strong widely circulated 
“women as victims” myths, i.e., all women living in the peripheries are “poor, 
powerless, pregnant” (Cornwall et al. 2004, p. 2; Mohanty, 1991; Win, 2004). The 
participation of these “victim women” into development projects is therefore seen as an 
achievement of projects like the state’s anti-poverty campaigns.  
 The “women as victims” myth is paired with “women as heroes” myth to suggest 
that women are in fact the best development solutions/instruments against their poverty 
because they are responsible, hard working, and easy to mobilize. Such myths that 
circulate women as victims and as heroes have led to the inclusion of women in several 
development projects. The GAD approach deepened the agenda for gender 
mainstreaming in the development sector for which “institutional packages”, 
frameworks, tools, and trainings were created to better understand and serve the complex 
relations of power and position faced by women (Wallace and Coles, 2005). However, 
these frameworks often get embroiled in the “project mentality” that oversimplify and 
dilute the agenda for social change, as is also evident in the consultant’s concern with 
the incorporation of the We Can campaign into Mission as a “project”. 
 Nonetheless, development projects continued to put both myths to best use for 
motivating women to empower self, family, and community. The economic and social 
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development of a family and community therefore came to rest on the poor women as 
she was mobilized to become a ‘weapon against poverty’ (DFID 2006: 1). Molyneux 
(2008) argues that the design of state-sponsored women’s empowerment programs, like 
the one she studies in Mexico called Opportunidas, marginalizes the role of men to 
empower the self and family while playing an active role in feminizing  responsibility 
and obligation for managing poverty; women are made to do more to ensure household 
survival while men do less (Chant, 2006).  Similarly, through Mission’s most popular 
women’s empowerment programs like vocational trainings and self-help groups, an 
entrepreneurial strategy of development takes precedence over women’s exercise of 
agency (Wilson, 2008). Instead of liberating women, these programs work to enable 
relatively liberal practices for women to realize their potential as entrepreneurial and 
responsible individuals that have the potential to lift self and families out of poverty.  
 As “weapons against poverty”, such programs try to train women’s labor to  meet 
their practical needs while also developing their capabilities and skills to experience a 
liberal version of empowerment, but they also feminize the responsibility as well as 
solutions for poverty alleviation. There is no doubt that poor women want skills to meet 
their practical needs, but as I will show in a later section, programs and trainings for 
developing skills mostly operate in isolation of women’s social and economic realities 
and therefore often fail to produce a mass of skilled women prepared or willing to 
alleviate their poverty based on self-interest and interest of the neoliberal state. 
 Addressing women’s practical needs is easier to implement and manage through 
women’s empowerment programs as they yield tangible results for both – poor women 
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and their benefactors. In comparison, liberating empowerment demands commitment for 
the time and energy of women willing (and capable) to look beyond their immediate 
practical needs, and delve into certain socially contentious practices. Perhaps that 
explains Mission’s decision to hybridize women’s empowerment in phases – free 
trainings and camps first established Mission in the community as a safe women’s-only 
space (now known in community as “silaii-kadhaii center”, indicating “mild” service 
delivery), and; the W Can campaign being incorporated into SHGs at this later stage 
when communities have been served by GRCs for at least three years. Policymakers and 
grassroots workers alike shy away from programs that focus exclusively on the political 
dimensions of empowerment, expecting rightly that women’s empowerment as an 
exercise for political awakening and collective action could threaten embedded power 
structures of patriarchy, class, and caste, and therefore weaken their goodwill within the 
community or even threaten to shut the project (O’Reilly, 2010). As Cornwall et al. 
(2004) argue, in order to make empowerment palatable to the mainstream, its radical 
transformative agendas are diluted and “empowerment” means individual women having 
a little more money. Cornwall and Anyidoho (2010, p. 145) state that due to the 
technical and apolitical nature of the vastly popular liberal empowerment approach, 
implementers realize that women’s empowerment becomes a hyperbole where ‘power’ 
is missing and what remains is ‘em-ment’ – empowerment without any power. This, 
according to Batliwala (2007) is ‘empowerment lite’, a vague copy of the real thing with 
a little of its element but none of its zest. Feminists have been disappointed with the 
rapid emulation of liberal empowerment and consider it a dilution of the gender agenda 
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that demands collective transformation of political, societal and economic relations 
(Cornwall et al., 2007; Sholkamy, 2010).  
 Cornwall and Edwards (2010) remind us that empowerment	  is a complex process 
and cannot be achieved through quick and easy technical solutions because they do not 
even touch upon the roots of women’s oppression. As such, they suggest that women’s 
empowerment programs should divert its current emphasis on accommodating or adding 
women within the inequitable existing structures as instruments of development, and 
should focus more on changing structures that create the need for development 
interventions in the first place.   
 Why, despite progress in understanding the current limitations and future scope 
of women’s empowerment, have we been stagnant and discriminatory in our 
development practices? This question is a part of the larger question of structure-agency 
bind, and whether feminist engagements have the potential of escaping this bind. 
Feminists have taken as their core agenda the need to question dilutions of women’s 
empowerment agenda and maintain empowerment as a radical strategy for social change 
(Anupamlata et al., 2004; Cornwall et al., 2010; Dhanraj and Batliwala, 2004; Nagar, 
2000; Nagar and Raju, 2003). In the section below, I examine how poststructuralist 
theories on power proposed by Foucault and practice theories proposed by Bourdieu and 
Giddens have provided the foundations for feminist scholarship to not only recognize the 
relations of power that maintain the structure-agency bind, but also to challenge this bind 
in favor of a more nuanced politics of gendered agency (Ortner, 1996). Later, I examine 
Ortner’s subaltern practice theory as a feminist project for recovering the “intentional 
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subject” from the circulations of the structure-agency bind to argue that the subject is not 
entirely muted by the hegemony of a supposedly cohesive structure as proposed by the 
above theorists.  	  
 Foucault, Giddens and Bourdieu are placed within the category of 
poststructuralists. In general, one can see common trends in their analysis of power 
within the structure-agency bind. They believed that structure and agency (Giddens) or 
the field and the habitus (Bourdieu) can only exist in relation to one another. While 
structure is the overarching social system based on rules and laws that limit an 
individual, agency refers to the capacity of each individual existing within this structure 
to make her own rational choices. Though Giddens proposes clearly in his theory of 
structuration that the agency is not a ‘cultural dope’ and has the ability to effect change 
within the structure, Foucault and Bourdieu have been blamed especially by feminists 
for explaining the nature of power in the mechanisms of oppression but for not providing 
a solution for its transformation (Lawler, 2004; McNay, 1992).  
 Foucault’s definition of power guides our understanding of women’s agency – 
prospects and limitations. He rejects the idea that power is anchored in macrostructures 
or ruling classes and is repressive in nature. He observes that power is productive and is 
everywhere in modern society; power relations are necessary precondition for the 
establishment of social relations which are unstable and changeable. Power operates 
through the hegemony of norms (Diamond, 1988; Foucault, 1980; McNay, 1992). Like 
Giddens, Foucault believes that the individual can resist the governmentality employed 
for maintaining social order through the techniques of self governance (enabled by the 
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productive and disbursed nature of power), yet he reminds us that although practices of 
the self are freely selected by the individual, at a basic level these practices are defined 
by the social context (Diamond, 1988; McNay, 1992, p. 68). Feminist critique of 
Foucault’s model of power highlights how he only calls for an exposure of systems of 
power relations but does not push towards transformation, perhaps because of his own 
positionality as a white western male whose understanding of power is not from the 
perspective of the dominated and is therefore skeptical about transformative effects for 
social re-organization (Hartsock, 1990). As such, Foucault’s model of power, though 
widely used within feminist theory to understand the nuances of its production and 
hegemonic adoption, can be effective for a feminist political agenda and specifically for 
a theorizing for women’s agency only if it is able to provide the possibility of 
transformation to counter hegemonic hierarchies (Hartsock, 1990).  
 A Marxist theorist, Bourdieu (1986, 1987, 1990) proposes two core ideas that are 
crucial for social science till date: 1) the interrelation between social, cultural and 
economic capital and ‘symbolic violence’ as a means to hegemonize power relations 
arising out of capital-class nexus; 2) the concept of ‘field’ and ‘habitus’ and the doxic65 
nature of the habitus which enables its unquestioned submission to the field within 
which it gains its meaning. In essence, habitus determines actions of subject and 
production of agency. But since habitus is determined by social factors, agency is also 
produced within pre-existing social relations. Therefore, the agency (that is intersected 
by relations of class, gender, caste, religion, age, and nationality) is never really able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Doxa means the self-evident nature of things that are therefore not questioned. 
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evolve as a foundational resistance to the patriarchal structure. Lawler’s (2004) research 
on British working class women highlights that the agency’s cooption by the structure 
poses a threat to the validity of resistance – even if the agent/subject does resist, what 
gets counted as resistance are only those forms of contestations that are approved by 
bourgeois observer/authority/power. Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus is criticized by 
Bulter (1999; also Butler and Scott, 1992; Ortner, 1996) as nothing more than 
materialistic determinism which does not offer a theory of agency but merely that of 
social reproduction. However, Bourdieu does propose that habitus can act against the 
structure if conditions within it arise such that they no longer obtain. His theory on the 
capital-class network has been extended by feminists and other scholars to argue that 
social, political, and cultural capital can work together not only to extend hegemony of 
the elites but also to enable the dominated class to use their capitals and create cracks in 
the structure (c.f. Jeffrey et al., 2005). This extension has often meant putting the 
“intentional subject” and her agency at the center of the practice theory – a concept that 
was largely marginalized by practice theorists like Bourdieu and Giddens (Ortner, 1996). 
 Bourdieu (1990) and Foucault (1980) contend that resistance and domination co-
exist, that resistance is complicit with power. Further, as Lawler (2004) reminds us 
above (following Foucault), if resistance depends upon the authority of the 
field/structure to be even called resistance, then how can it possibly destabilize the same 
structure that enables its existence in the first place? In doing so, Lawler highlights the 
field-habitus bind that allows women to act but only within structures that absorb 
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women’s actions instead of allowing them to alter them. The theory of structuration 
discussed below throws more light at the circuitous nature of this bind.  
 Giddens theory of structuration asserts that all social actors, no matter how 
oppressed they are, have some degree of agency which produces social change while 
also reproducing social structure (Giddens, 1984). This, he calls the duality of structure. 
He argues that action and structure cannot be analyzed separately, as structures are 
created, maintained and changed through actions, while actions are given meaningful 
form only through the background of the structure. Giddens overt recognition of the 
agency comes as a relief for feminists. However, like Bourdieu, Giddens theory of 
structuration does not pay special attention to gender and the distinct ways in which 
gendered subjects interact with the rules and resources within specific societies. Also, 
contrary to earlier excitement over the theory of structuration, feminists are quick at 
pointing out that, like Bourdieu (1990), Giddens too prioritizes the power of the structure 
over that of agency (Ortner, 1996), thus also asserting for feminists that the rules of the 
patriarchal structure assume the un-intentionality of the doxic agency to operate beyond 
the structure.  
4.3.3 Subaltern practice theory 
 The poststructuralist practice theory has helped feminists like Ortner (1996) to 
develop a “project” that draws out the possibility for women’s “intentional” agency by 
problematizing the formidable bind of structure-agency. Ortner (1996) argues that the 
postructuralist concern with “being constructed” has sidelined the “making” point of 
view of the actor who intentionally resists, negotiates, or appropriates the structure. She 
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criticizes practice theory for not attending to the calls for action and change by subaltern 
groups (like of feminists and post colonialists) in favor of a myopic and rigid view of the 
structure as a machine that operates in isolation of the intentions and desires of the 
subjects. Ortner warns against defining the structure as a “totalized” and 
“hypercoherent” object in favor of a more nuanced interpretation where multiple rules 
and regulations exist alongside multiple intentions and desires (she calls these “serious 
games”). Taking inspiration from Gramsci’s practice of politics, Ortner suggests that one 
can look for “…the slippages in reproduction, the erosions of long standing patterns, the 
moments of disorder and the outright “resistance”” (1996, p. 17). This, she calls the 
‘subaltern practice theory’. Ortner notes that while poststructuralism excluded the 
intentional subject, subaltern practice theory offers a complex, fragmented, and 
expanded view of the hegemony of the structure and puts the desire back in human 
intention to change the picture (1996, p. 11). 	  
 Feminist theorists unanimously agree that women’s empowerment must entail a 
process of change in which patriarchal relations are challenged, so that men’s traditional 
control over women ceases (Batliwala, 1994; Magar, 2003). More precisely, Kesby 
(2005, p. 2050) defines empowerment as a “non-linear process that involves an 
individual as well as a collective journey of awareness, politicization, reflection, and 
action for change”. He argues that empowerment remains incomplete if it does not 
develop into collective forms of struggle for challenging hegemonic formations (Kesby 
2005, p. 2051). In a similar vein, Kabeer (1999) argues that women must be able to 
make strategic life choices, and that is possible only by questioning the societal 
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regulations against women’s oppression. Kabeer (1999) defines empowerment as “…the 
process by which those who have been denied to make strategic life choices acquire such 
ability”. In these definitions of empowerment, feminist scholars believe in the role of 
critical consciousness (Freire, 1972) and “intention” (Ortner, 1996) that must lead to 
collective and individual action to first understand and then challenge structures of 
oppression, to disturb the status quo, and to question gendered relations based on power, 
control, ownership, and capabilities. 
 Finally, I bring forward Rowlands’ (1997) theory of empowerment. Rowlands, 
like Kesby, is clear that in the context of gender and development, empowerment should 
be viewed as a process (not as an end result) that varies according to the personal 
experiences and cultural, political, economic, historical, and geographical locations of an 
individual (1997, p. 129). She further asserts that despite different situations that produce 
different meanings of empowerment, the core value of empowerment hinges on gaining 
self-respect in order to challenge internalized oppressions – the first step towards 
challenging structural violence. Rowlands (1997, p. 13) takes further Kabeer’s claim that 
people must develop the ability to make strategic choices (1993) and asserts that there 
are multiple factors – internal and external – that impact individual’s ability to make 
strategic choices in the first place. Following Gramsci and Bourdieu’s conception of 
hegemony and doxa respectively, Rowlands highlights that women cannot recognize or 
maximize their opportunities unless they do not attend to the following three dimensions 
(1997, p. 15): personal - confidence in self and in ones capacities, undoing internalized 
oppressions; relational - ability to negotiate and influence relationships at domestic and 
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community level; collective - finding common agenda and working to end oppression, in 
a collective and cooperative spirit, not competing. Rowlands is most effective in 
recognizing the internalized as well as structural oppressions that feed one-another to 
reproduce gendered inequality, and also offers tangible pathways for the making of the 
intentional subject.  
 The challenging of “hegemonic formations”, as Kesby (2005) points out, is the 
core objective of empowerment. However, I bring back Lawler (2004) here to argue that 
if resistance is in fact complicit with power, then, how does a feminist agenda help 
achieve women’s empowerment? I argue that between Ortner’s (1996) subaltern practice 
theory that allow the intentional subject to realize empowerment between the cracks of 
unplanned disorder and planned resistance, and, Rowlands’ (1997) call for the 
systematic ‘personal-relational-collective’ workings to overcome internalized and 
structural oppressions, hegemonic formations can be resisted, authority can be 
weakened, and the structure-agency bind disturbed. Despite my feminist convictions that 
social change for gender equality is possible, I am also aware, and therefore demonstrate 
in the next section, how development projects for women’s empowerment like Mission 
operate within the confines of the hegemony produced through the co-existence of the 
techniques of neoliberal governmentality and patriarchal control. The use of 
empowerment therefore develops as a tool for governmentality with the 
intentions/expectations of mobilizing and training poor women as governable subjects 
that must “conduct their conduct” to alleviate their poverty to fit within the aspiring 
world-class city. The “intention” therefore is pre-defined by the state on the basis of 
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producing a citizen-subject who assumes the harmonious conflation of self-interest and 
state interest. 
4.4 Empowerment as a governance technique 
 Empowerment has become a popular strategy of neoliberal governance and 
development (Chatterjee, 2004; Cruikshank, 1999; Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010; 
Molyneux, 2008; Nagar and Raju, 2003; Sharma 2006). In today’s era of neoliberal 
development, empowerment as a call/tool for political conscientization and radical 
mobilizing against oppressions is being popularly replaced by empowerment as a 
technical development intervention designed by experts to produce governable subjects 
(Cornwall, 2010; Sharma, 2006). Empowerment is therefore gaining popularity as a 
technique of governmentality – of programs or strategies that shape the actions of others 
(Cruikshank, 1999).  
 Foucault’s theory of governmentality (1991) exposes the ways in which states try 
to produce citizens best suited to fulfill its agendas and to propagate its ideologies. 
Governmentality is defined as diverse processes by which conduct of a population is 
governed by different institutions, discourses, norms, identities, and self-regulation. In 
sum, governmentality propagates “the conduct of the conduct – myriad ways in which 
human conduct is directed by calculated means” (Dean, 1999:10). Cruikshank (1999) 
argues that schemes for the welfare and empowerment of the subjects, for correcting 
their deficiencies, are a manner of governing – a technique that relies on voluntary 
compliance of the subjects (not on violent coercion) to help people help themselves, or 
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to convince them to conduct their conduct in their own interest as per the state’s 
expectations.  
 Feminists have shared a troubled relationship with the state. Marxists feminists 
especially have situated the state as the prime actor in perpetuating class and gender 
divisions of power which maintained social relations oppressive to women because 
states are captive to particular socio-spatial orders (Chouinard, 2004, p. 230; Silverblatt, 
1991). The feminist struggle against hegemonic forces therefore included the fight 
against the state as a patriarchal construct (“man in the state”, Brown, 1992) and a 
partner of the capitalist market that is unwilling to examine unequal gendered relations 
of power, control, and subordination (Chachhi, 1991; Heng, 1997; Kandiyoti, 1991; 
Sunder Rajan, 2003). Feminist scholars have been wary about state intervention in 
programs for women’s empowerment and have questioned whether such intervention 
leads to the “governmentalizaion of empowerment” (Brown, 1992, p. 7; Fraser, 1989; 
Sharma, 2006). “Governmentalization of empowerment” has two meanings for the 
purpose of my research – the bureaucratic processes of the government that overtake the 
feminist meanings of empowerment, and; the intentions of the government to produce 
governable subjects rather than empowered citizens that can question its power. The 
main question then is: what does the state really aim to achieve through its promotion of 
women’s empowerment projects? And, further along, do government-initiated women’s 
empowerment programs only produce regulated subjects of the state, or, do poor 
women’s engagements with the state through these programs also expand their 
relationship with the state and produce active political subjects?  
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 Brown (1995) has been at the forefront of attacking the disciplinary and 
constitutive relationship of women to the state. She questions liberal feminists who 
defend the role of the state in the empowerment of poor women that produces their 
constrained and depoliticized subjectivities. In response to Brown, Piven (1990) argues 
that to view the state as an enemy of women is a failure in understanding  that all social 
relationship are laden with power, and the possibility of governing the subjectivity and 
conduct of poor women is open even in feminist movements (c.f. Cruikshank, 1999; 
Rowlands, 1997, p.52). I agree therefore that empowerment is a strategy of 
governmentality which is shared by different benefactors and programs – be it the state, 
feminist movements, or NGOs – “to act upon others by getting them to act in their own 
interest” (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 68) 
  Empowerment programs undertaken by government or through government-
NGO partnerships should not automatically send out red signals. The 
governmentalization of empowerment does not mean that end results would necessarily 
produce subdued, disciplined and responsibilized women as apolitical subjects (as 
proposed by Funiciello, 1993, among others, and criticized by Cruikshank, 1999; 
Sharma, 2006; Li, 2007). Sharma (2006, p. 82) aptly notes that a government-sponsored 
women’s empowerment program is like a double-edged sword – it can produce political 
citizens or regulated subjects, but can also have other effects on poor women. Based on 
her fieldwork with a quasi-government women’s empowerment program in northern 
India, Sharma (2006, p. 81) argues that attention should be paid to the “unexpected 
forms” through which poor women learn to engage with the state, and even hold it 
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accountable, not perhaps mainly for changing their gendered situations, but for 
expanding their political agency by interacting and negotiating with the mechanics of a 
government-run program. Cruikshank (1999, p.39) asserts that to assume that state 
intervention in welfare and empowerment cancels out citizenship and produce 
depoliticized subjects is to limit the scope of what such programs really do. She argues 
that such voluntary (not coercive) programs actually put power into operation to produce 
a “wholly new kind of being” – one that is in fact constituted as a political citizen that 
must act on their own behalf in their own interest.  
 I agree with Sharma and Cruikshank and extend on their theses in the context of 
Mission’s programs to argue that such empowerment programs have become a popular 
strategy not only for normalizing self-regulation but also for opening up venues for 
direct and indirect kinds of state-citizen interactions – some of which produce informed 
and economically empowered citizens that benefit from the new institutional 
arrangements like Mission, while others produce citizens that clearly understand their 
limitations to conduct their conduct as per their own needs and interest (that the state 
helps them produce so that they can help themselves to fulfill them) (Cruikshank, 1999, 
p. 38). However, I also argue that to recognize the role of the state in simply helping the 
citizen realize her own interest (as a tool for efficient government of populations) would 
provide an incomplete picture of the multiple contradictory roles of the neoliberal state 
in creating an aspiring world-class city.  
 The long-term visible marginalization of the poor in Delhi, as already discussed 
in detail in Sections 1 and 2 were not a result of the state’s role in preparing the citizens 
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to act in their own interest. That the state continues to expand the neoliberal aspirations 
over the backs of the poor only proves its success in keeping mass revolutions and 
political upheavals at bay through strategies of politics and development programs such 
that poor citizens believe in the conflation of the interest of the state and the self 
(Chatterjee, 2008). One interpretation therefore is that the state prepares poor women to 
work towards their own interest and needs through programs of Mission. Another 
interpretation is that by making women work in their own interest, the state also prepares 
women to absorb the state’s interest in managing poverty in compliance with the 
neoliberal urban development paradigm. 
 As examined in an earlier section, poor women are viewed as sound 
“instruments” or “weapons against poverty” that can be trained to become responsible 
economic resources. This view entails a shifting of responsibility from the state to the 
willing/participating woman such that the state takes a back seat while poor women 
work harder through vocational trainings and community activism for women’s rights 
within the pre-designed institutional framework of state-regulated projects like Mission 
to create their own exit routes out of poverty and gendered subordination. In essence, the 
state produces the interest of poor women to alleviate poverty without producing their 
self-interest in addressing the structural issues that create and sustain their poverty.  
 Dolhinow’s (2005, p. 575) ethnographic study focused on how NGOs working in 
the colonias on US-Mexico border tie the colonias people to the neoliberal state through 
programs targeting women in the colonias. She states that “global economic 
restructuring and neoliberal policies lead women to take greater responsibility in the 
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process of social reproduction and NGOs play an important part in this repositioning of 
responsibility by providing technical and organizational support”. The neoliberal era is 
indicative of such shifts in responsibilities from the state to non-state entities or to poor 
citizens themselves. With the use of empowerment as a strategy to produce self-
regulated and governable citizens, such neoliberal shifts have become even more 
automatic. And empowerment of poor women especially has emerged as a popular 
mantra of neoliberal governmentality in cities like Delhi where rampant poverty must be 
managed to make Delhi a world-class city.   
 Even though this mantra is critiqued for producing a depoliticized mass of poor 
women, it is also examined for producing “wholly new kind of beings” that embody 
state expectations (structure) while also expanding their political and economic 
possibilities through their interactions with the state machinery (actions of the intentional 
subjects) (Cruikshank, 1999; Li, 2007; Sharma, 2006). Feminists recognize that structure 
uses seemingly anti-hegemonic techniques like empowerment only to further incorporate 
agency into its hegemony. However, feminists also point at the slippages that such 
techniques allow for the intentional subject to question this hegemony. These slippages 
are also motivated by women’s engagement with other NGOs in their area that provide 
them the awareness to criticize and negotiate with the structures of the neoliberal state 
and of patriarchy. I argue that women’s empowerment programs operate within 
unquestioned (but not totalized) structures; however these alone do not dictate the kind 
of citizen-subjects that can be produced through these programs. Such programs, simply 
by virtue of being “women’s empowerment” programs operated in “gender” “resource” 
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centers allow for the  intentional subject to look for slippages (if not for revolutions) in 
the oppressive structures of poverty and patriarchy. Programs like Mission therefore 
serve dual function – produce self-interest of participating women to work for the 
(conflated) benefit of the self and the state, and, provide spaces through GRCs for 
participating women to look for “slippages” by learning skills for rising above poverty 
and nudging certain gendered social norms (irrespective of whether women are able to 
utilize these skills in self-interest/state interest).  
 In the section below, I use my ethnographic data to show that Mission’s 
programs for women’s empowerment attempt to promote state’s efforts at neoliberal 
governmentality without disturbing the patriarchal status quo as per its core objectives. 
However, the programs also give participating women opportunities to step outside 
home and train their labor for the possibility of meeting their practical needs and 
experiencing liberal empowerment – albeit within the unchallenged but possibly fluid 
and fragmented structure of patriarchy. 
4.5. Empowering poor women in Delhi 
 Each Gender Resource Center provides the same package of services to the poor 
women in its catchment areas. In general, while some of the vocational trainings (like 
beautician, tailoring, basic computer) and the free medical camps are popular among the 
GRC beneficiaries, non formal education (NFE) classes, legal counseling, and nutrition 
camps are often thinly attended. Vocational trainings are most popular services that 
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provide four different livelihood trainings to around 400 women per year at each GRC.66 
Below, I will provide glimpses into several events and experiences that take place within 
a GRC to show how intersection of different factors impact women’s participation in 
Mission’s programs. These glimpses will allow us to understand how women’s 
empowerment is implemented and interpreted within specific spaces where Mission 
works to produce empowered women.  
4.5.1 Learning “homely” skills 
 Nasreen is a17 year old Muslim woman living in Jaan resettlement colony with 
her maternal relatives. Coming from a conservative Muslim family, she was never 
enrolled in school. GRC Divya (Divya means ‘light’ in Hindi) is located near her house 
and many of her neighborhood friends attended the different training programs offered 
here, the most popular one being tailoring. One day, while I was observing the activities 
at this GRC, Nasreen walked in and sought admission in the tailoring class. The tailoring 
instructor, a middle-aged Muslim woman, asked her, “why do you want to learn 
stitching? Are you going to get married?” Nasreen replied to the negative. After 
learning from Nasreen that she was non-literate, the teacher told Naseer to first join the 
non-formal education (NFE) program because she would not be able to follow the 
instructions in her class otherwise. Nasreen said she would come back later to enroll in 
NFE and left. A month later, I asked the instructor whether Nasreen returned to enroll in 
the NFE classes, she said no. The instructor then explained to me that young women like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 I was recently informed over phone by an informant that Mission has reduced the number of vocational 
trainings to two. He mentioned that the focus is gradually shifting towards not only training women but 
towards connecting them to the market.  
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Nasreen are sent to the GRC by their families to learn skills like tailoring, beautician, 
and craft-making as a way to prepare them for the wedding process – an eligible bride is 
one who knows “homely” skills that can be put to use if her family allows her to, or 
when the family falls in distressed times. She further discussed that few women become 
economically independent after learning different vocations there; they either started 
something very small at home, or don’t use their new skills at all.   
 Nasreen’s interest in joining the tailoring classes and her rejection of the NFE 
classes shows that poor women made economical decisions about their participation in 
women’s empowerment programs based on narrow gendered expectations of their 
families and society from such programs. The waitlists for tailoring and beautician 
courses versus the poorly-attended NFE classes further proved this point. While tailoring 
provided a tangible skill-set they could utilize to earn an income at any time in their life, 
NFE provided only foundational skills that did not directly translate into economic 
opportunities. However, if women were allowed to join only specific economically 
viable trainings, then why were they not able to or allowed/able to put their skills to use 
towards the desired end? I argue that most poor women could decide upon learning a 
skill but not upon utilizing it. Unlike Nasreen, there were several women who attended 
vocational trainings out of their own will and with the knowledge/consent of their 
families. While attending trainings at a GRC was socially acceptable for some families, 
translating the trainings into women’s public economic labor was difficult, not only 
because of the social and familial regulations against gendered labor outside home 
(especially among Muslim families), but also because of the lack of additional resources 
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required to translate the trainings into profitable business ventures for the poor women. 
And yet, poor women like Nasreen who were willing to attend trainings at the GRC only 
highlighted that women tried to step outside home and attend programs that held the 
possibility of empowering them (as per the expectations of the program and the state), 
but did so in agreement with the social and familial gendered regulations. This also 
partially explains the gap in women’s participation in vocational trainings versus success 
in putting those skills to use.  
4.5.2 The writing on the wall 
 The evidence of gap between women’s participation and women’s empowerment 
was pasted on the walls of the GRCs. In several GRCs, the walls were covered with two 
kinds of publicity materials: lists indicating the large number of women graduating from 
different vocational trainings, and, a handful of ‘success stories’ of women who, upon 
graduation, were able to start a small business or find a job and gain economic stability. 
These stories (like the success story mentioned in an earlier section) showed a clear 
difference in the lives of these new entrepreneurs – poor women attended vocational 
trainings, started a business, and found economic stability and self-respect. These 
successful cases did provide hope and enthusiasm to participating women, some of 
whom faced challenges in translating their trainings into successful income-generating 
activities and hence their “empowerment” as prescribed by the state.  
 Nitin, a Mother NGO staff who monitored the GRC programs informed me that 
Mission headquarters collated information about the number of women who joined or 
attended the GRC programs across Delhi, but not the number of successful cases. But he 
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was sure that that information would not be useful because the criteria for defining a 
successful case were not flexible enough to grasp the ground reality; only those women 
who earned above Rs.3000 ($66) per month after training at the GRC were considered a 
successful case. He described the problem: 
Most women have seasonal small-scale businesses, not a permanent job. They 
might earn Rs.2000-3000 ($45-66) during a couple of festival months and Rs.400 
($88) during most other months [talking about beauticians and tailors, two most 
popular trades at the GRC]. So their income fluctuates. But majority are not even 
able to start anything [any business] because they don’t have the resources [to 
invest]. So I would say overall, there are at the most 5-7 successful cases from each 
batch [of 200 women undergoing training] at most GRCs. 
 
The monitoring staff knew that a 3 percent success rate was abysmally low but didn’t 
show any dejection with it; he was hopeful that trained women were able to put the 
training toward “some” economic gain at least, if not to earn above Rs.3000 per month. 
He asserted again that the low success rate was due to high expectations (Rs.3000) and 
fewer women with the resources to meet those expectations. But he didn’t mention why 
then Mission continued to provide training or to maintain an unachievable measure of 
success if it could not meet its own expectations? Another MNGO staff (details withheld 
for ensuring confidentiality) whom I met while she was monitoring a vocational training 
at Karya GRC shared the problem of GRCs competing with one another to “show” 
successful cases. She said, “successful cases would mean better chance at getting 
awards and recognition, and who doesn’t want that?” But since few such cases really 
existed where women earned a stable Rs.3000 per month, she said that some GRCs 
provided inflated numbers which were revealed as fake cases during her verification 
visits to the houses of the “successful” women. She went on to say, “such
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very rare, and we stopped them completely by doing more intensive verifications in the 
field.” Between Nitin and the woman monitoring staff, it was evident that poorest 
women lacked resources to meet Mission’s expectations of success. But it was also 
evident that the GRCs wanted to showcase “successful” cases and therefore hinted at the 
possibility of GRCs preferring participation of women who already had some resources 
at their disposal. Observations at GRCs made it obvious to me that majority of trainees 
came from relatively better-off families. But access to resources was not a guarantee of 
their economic empowerment or independence, as I shall demonstrate below as I 
examine the disparity between participation and empowerment by bringing in voices 
from the field. 
 While participating in a beautician training class at the Wedal Colony GRC 
named Sharan, I asked a group of young women whether they had plans to open their 
own beauty parlor in the near future. Savita, a young Hindu woman in her early-twenties 
who lives in the Wedal resettlement colony said, “This training is just one thing. You 
need other things too, like money for initial investment and support from family. My 
father doesn’t even know that I come here…” Her father does not know because he 
wouldn’t allow her to participate in the programs if he did. Sharan GRC is far away from 
Savita’s home. She convinced her mother to let her attend the training at the GRC but 
she said that she could not even dare to mention the thought of walking such a long 
distance and crossing a slum on the way for attending classes at the GRC to her father. 
Savita kept her father unaware of daily classes and therefore slipped away from his 
patriarchal control, only to realize that the slipping away produced no tangible economic 
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results for her. The GRC did give Savita the opportunity to learn and socialize with her 
friends, but it did not expand her opportunity to do what she wanted to do – earn her own 
money. Savita was one among the several participating women who were convinced – 
through a mix of their own economic conditions and the teachings at the GRC – that 
earning their own income would pave an exit route out of poverty and gendered 
subordination (the latter being more of a concern for Savita, but was not openly 
disseminated among participating women as a core objective of Mission’s work). 
Participation in Mission’s programs therefore became one of the venues for young 
women like Savita to temporarily escape the patriarchal gaze, but not to permanently 
alter the gendered power relations that gave authority to that gaze. Savita’s statement 
also shows that women recognized that multiple resources and social-familial support 
must come together to translate their participation into beneficial economic or social 
outcomes.  
 During fieldwork, I interacted with several women like Savita – young and 
energetic, but only too conversant with the limitations of converting trainings into 
income. I also met some women from income-poor families who were determined to 
make the trainings work for them. These were mostly married women who joined the 
GRC trainings to find small-scale solutions to the poor conditions at home. Chandra, an 
enterprising 30 year old Hindu woman from Wedal slum attending the beautician 
training said when I asked her why she was participating, 
  I will get to learn something here…better than sitting at home. I learn tailoring at 
 Chetak sanstha that is near my house. So let’s see what I can do with both or at 
 least one [training]. You know I came here from a village, didn’t know 
 anything, didn’t study much. But one can’t survive like that here… 
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 Chandra talked at length about the fast city life, inflation, her part-time home 
based work of assorting plastic toys that paid too little, her decision to not have more 
children, and her husband’s income not enough to even cover the school expenses for 
her son, their only child. She had devised extensive plans for what she wanted to do with 
the trainings and was one of the few participating women I interacted with who also 
knew that the SJSRY federal scheme lends money to poor women for starting small-
scale businesses. Chandra was willing to exploit all possible opportunities to provide for 
her family. In many ways, her energy and economic desperation were both symbolic of 
the poor women who were prepared to work in the interest of the self and the state. 
 I also met some women residing in slums who, unlike Savita, could not attend 
vocational trainings even though they came from poorer families and therefore could 
have possibly benefited more from their skill enhancements. Seema and Reema were 
Hindu sisters who lived with their parents and two other siblings in a one room house in 
Wedal slum. They were around 19 and 20 years old respectively. Their father was a 
night guard at a small factory. Both sisters and their mother worked at least 10 hours 
every day folding book pages and then binding them into books. The work was seasonal 
and often took the entire family’s labor to produce a maximum income of Rs.150 ($3.50) 
per day. This family was relatively poorer in comparison to Chandra’s. Between saving 
for their weddings, building another room in their house, and the everyday food 
expenses for six people, their daily wage does not add much to their father’s monthly 
income of Rs. 3000 ($66). Recognizing the tight situation, the enterprising sisters found 
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other means to make money by working as paramedic assistants during special 
government events or as nurses’ aid in a community-based clinic.  
 During an informal group discussion, Seema and Reema told me that they knew 
about the GRC courses but could not afford to spend time away from income-generating 
works. Seema said, “two hours every day for learning beautician course would mean 
losing Rs.30 or so ($0.70) in daily wages.”  The sisters’ daily wages accompanied by 
care work for their families left them with little or no time to participate in the trainings. 
Those who eventually did end up participating at GRCs were women who could afford 
to not earn a daily living. The sisters’ inability to participate in Mission’s programs 
reveals a clear class distinction in women’s participation in Mission’s programs.67 As 
already examined, there are additional costs involved in putting trainings to use. Besides, 
their labor for domestic care giving and for home-based informal businesses was 
important for their families’ everyday survival. This situation made me question whether 
Mission’s programs were really ‘reaching the unreached’? Or, were they only reaching 
those who could afford to have the energy, time and resources to reach it? The different 
programs at GRCs are expected to work as a ‘package’ and help women attain ‘holistic 
empowerment’. But gendered social restrictions and poor women’s lack of time and 
resources to participate in Mission’s programs diluted the possibility of women’s 
empowerment. In the section above, I have illustrated why some poor women were 
eligible (and willing) but unable to benefit from Mission’s programs even if they could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 This class distinction is relative considering that the majority of people living in slums and resettlement 
colonies are not income-rich. Some earn more money than the others and can therefore afford to not 
engage in additional home-based small businesses. 
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afford to participate in the same. Next, I examine how women who did participate in 
Mission’s programs to earn a living faced competition on the ground as the same 
conventional package of programs provided by several other NGOs produced higher 
supply but lower demand for women’s skills in their local markets. 
4.5.3 Empowerment overload 
 Zones of poverty are over-served by NGOs that mostly provide a conventional 
package of services for women’s empowerment. As a result, hundreds of women who 
acquire new skills through vocational training programs at these NGOs find their skills 
redundant due to a saturated local market where the supply for women’s conventional 
skills becomes much higher than the demand. I claim that this demand and supply 
imbalance produced by the development sector indicates the problem of “empowerment 
overload”. In trying to economically empower women, training programs of several 
NGOs do not predict the repercussions such mass-scale supply of women’s standard 
skills will have on the local markets. They focus on training women, not on how, if at 
all, these trainings can be absorbed by the local market, thus showing that most 
programs operate within their own bubble of meeting narrow project outcomes. The 
saturated local markets further reduce women’s ability to bargain for fair wages and 
therefore increased work burden with only a marginal increase in their incomes. The 
services that are expected to empower them therefore work to diminish the value of their 
labor.  
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 And until recently, Mission was no exception as it only further added to this 
overload.68 Women at Wedal Colony shared during an informal group discussion that the 
vocational trainings at GRCs offered limited choices in learning new and lucrative 
trades. The same classes for tailoring, beautician, craft-making and basic computer 
education were offered by several other NGOs that had been working in the slums for 
decades prior to Mission. In Wedal colony alone, there were at least twenty-five NGOs 
offering an array of services to its 100,000 residents. Bina, who learnt tailoring at Sharan 
GRC, said,  
 There are so many NGOs providing the same training in every nook and corner 
 of this colony…there is a tailor sitting in almost every house here but one can’t 
 find willing customers….such a waste [of training] 
 
Bina’s views confirm that empowerment is fraught with contradictions – it can empower 
women in one sphere and simultaneously dis-empower them in another (Nagar and Raju, 
2003; Rowlands, 1997, p. 132). However, what does this kind of empowerment mean for 
those poor women who know that their trainings produce mild results and their social 
conditions don’t change? (O’Reilly, 2006). And why then do these programs continue 
despite a “success” rate of 3 percent? 
 Molyneux (2008, p. 181-182) states that programs for raising incomes like 
vocational trainings, self-help groups and micro-credit lending, are a	  central part of 
neoliberal poverty-alleviation strategies which has absorbed a substantial number of 
poor women. Yet, many such programs fail to even raise women’s economic status 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 As mentioned earlier, Mission is in the planning phase for a tie-up with the SJSRY federal scheme for 
providing free unconventional and marketable vocational trainings to poor women. 
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because they are not sensitive to what happens outside the group meetings or program 
offices. More often than not, poor women’s inability to garner support from other family 
members and from male-dominated economy renders them vulnerable to failure.  
 Despite such failures, women’s participation in such programs becomes the best 
way for governments to attract attention and goodwill of poor women that keep them 
“distracted from wider political considerations and submerged within the minutiae of 
issues in their own backyard” (Taylor, 1996, p. 785; Dhanraj and Batliwala, 2004). I 
view Mission’s women’s empowerment programs, especially vocational trainings and 
self-help group formations as efforts towards pacifying and embedding participating 
women’s agency within confirmed developmental activities for their empowerment; 
such programs work to create confusion around state’s “real” intentions and distract the 
poor from questioning exclusionary policies (Mahadevia, 2011). In this sense, the state 
could be criticized for incorporating the seemingly anti-hegemonic and power-altering 
concept of women’s empowerment and then disseminating it through specific programs 
and channels that only strengthen its hegemony – not challenge it. Of course those 
women who can’t spare time to participate in GRC programs also often lack time to 
engage in the long and tenuous processes towards transformative politics69. Especially 
relevant are the parallels I can draw between the example of how an ex-chief minister of 
Andhra Pradesh (a southern state of India known for its booming information technology 
industry) initiated a state-wide self-help group based poverty alleviation program for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 However, it is important to note that poor women’s choices to train or to protest are constrained by the 
lack of time and energy because of the lop-sided socio-familial pressures to provide care and to earn. 
Women receive larger burdens – be it from their own families or from development programs – the onus is 
mostly on them to “somehow” keep the children fed and the house functional. 
229	  
	  
	  
	  
poor women while his economic policies were actively transforming the state into a 
neoliberal hub of global business in ways that did not hold any benefit for the poor. The 
ex-chief minister used the power of development project to pacify the poor citizens of 
his state by focusing on women (Dhanraj and Batliwala, 2004).  
 In a similar vein, Mission has been initiated as the Delhi government’s flagship 
project for the benefit of the poor at a time when the city-state is undergoing pulsating 
infrastructural facelifts and economic boom that does not impact the poor in any positive 
manner. At GRCs, poor women are motivated to join self-help groups and vocational 
trainings not only for improving their social status and standard of living but primarily 
for lifting their families out of poverty. I participated in a women’s meeting at a GRC 
where the male project coordinator was teaching women the benefits of learning a new 
trade through the vocational training program. 
 If you learn this (vocation) you will be able to become independent…you will 
 earn your own money. You will be an independent woman. You will be able to 
 buy things for  your children. You will see to it that they go to a good school and 
 get good education. You will give them nutritious food. You will have izzatt 
 (respect) when you contribute towards your  family’s income…they will see that 
 you are more valuable outside the kitchen, not just inside it… 
  
 I have heard similar speeches at the GRCs where I conducted my research. 
Women were urged to join the programs so that they could lift their families out of 
poverty, raise their standard of living, and also get more respect from others. But these 
were not easy aspirations to pursue for women lacking time, resources, and ability to 
makes independent choices within the confines of embedded poverty and regressive 
gendered social norms. The programs did not emphasize on the need for women to 
develop their political agency to alter the structure, but simply gave hope that held little 
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meaning within their existing social and economic conditions as already discussed 
above.70 Nevertheless, several poor women pursued these aspirations and took upon 
themselves the additional burden of developing self and family as per the expectations of 
the programs. Mission’s programs gave the impression that large number of poor women 
participating in empowering activities could alter their economic and social conditions. 
But this impression did not hold ground in the face of unquestioned regressive gendered 
norms and entrenched poverty further accentuated by exclusionary city modernization 
policies. An implicit accommodation of patriarchal norms into Mission’s programs come 
to light as I further analyze the ethnographic data below. 
 In spite of GRCs’ efforts to work in culturally sensitive ways, the programs at 
GRCs came under fire from some prominent men in the community. I attended a GRC-
community meeting at a GRC named Delhi Charities located in a predominantly Hindu 
and low-income unauthorized colony in north east Delhi. This was the first meeting 
between GRC staff and colony residents and the young Hindu male coordinator named 
Pankaj organized this meeting to inform the residents about the GRC activities. The 
meeting was thinly attended by fourteen middle-aged (40-50 years) Hindu male residents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The “We Can” campaign that is being planned for inclusion into Mission’s programs will work to create 
awareness around issues of domestic violence. I speculate that such a campaign might not focus 
aggressively on the other aspects of women’s subordination. I understand that issues of subordination are 
overlapping and that women’s call to end violence will bring forth questions about women’s other rights 
as equal humans and equal citizens. But I am not certain whether the campaign’s implementation within 
Mission’s “project” structure will provide enough scope for poor women to raise voice against social 
“norms” (violence is common but is not a norm) and especially against state’s exclusionary neoliberal 
policies like slum demolitions and privatization of public land and right of the poor to the city. The 
connection between a campaign against violence and women’s call for action against patriarchy and the 
exclusionary neoliberal state is a difficult one to make as of now. I concur with Sharma (2006) that the 
campaign might open up unexpected venues that might not overtly challenge or change anything but will 
create new relations between the participating women, their families and communities, and the neoliberal 
state. 
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and one elderly Hindu woman (70+ years, she was the mother of one of the male 
participants). Pankaj started the meeting by introducing himself and his staff and moved 
on to explain each program in detail. He was interrupted by the pradhan (local leader) 
who asked in an agitated voice, “Okay so all this is for women. What about the men?” 
That question onwards, the participating men poured their views on how all NGOs and 
government projects focus so much on women that the men are completely forgotten. 
One man was rather riled about one specific program - free legal counseling for women. 
He narrated the case of his friend who was in jail because of false dowry charges by his 
wife. The pradhan spoke again,  
 So much is done for women that now they have started dancing on our heads!71 I 
 tell my daughters that they should stay away from such ideas (of women’s 
 empowerment)…they must adjust after marriage.  
 
Using the word ‘adjust’ in English, the pradhan noted that GRCs programs were against 
the traditional norms that women must compromise with the expectations of their 
families and society. Legal counseling was especially seen as something that would 
make women un-compromising. While all fourteen men criticized the women-focused 
services provided by this  GRC, the old woman participant sat in the corner of the room 
next to us (me and my research assistant Geeta) and the GRC women staff. Without any 
intention of sitting there, I found myself huddled together with other women in this small 
room full of men who were afraid of how GRC programs would increase legal cases 
against men and make women rethink the importance of following social gendered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 “Dancing on our head” is a popular phrase used in northern India. It conveys that those who were 
“given” some privilege start taking it for granted and asking for more, therefore deviating from the norm 
of “receiving” the privilege and being thankful and satisfied for it. 
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norms. Pankaj did not intervene throughout this conversation as the community men 
discussed yet another kind of “empowerment overload” – one that could empower 
women in ways detrimental to the social fabric of their society. The meeting ended with 
a GRC-sponsored lunch. Next day onwards, programs began at the GRC and within a 
month all vocational training classes were full. Perhaps, the pradhan and his colleagues 
realized that GRC programs posed little threat to their power and that they mostly 
provided passive programs for women to learn some vocations and get free medicines – 
neither of which could possibly weaken their patriarchal control. I argue that some 
GRCs therefore allowed for so much flexibility with social norms and sensitivities that 
their programs sustained the unquestioned reproduction of patriarchal norms in the slums 
of Delhi 
 As women-only spaces, GRCs operate as safe and desirable spaces for women 
(especially young/ adolescent women). I observed that young women enjoyed their time 
at the GRC; the casual all-women’s environment allowed them to develop friendships 
away from home chores or familial restrictions. During fieldwork, I observed that not a 
single woman across GRCs ever expressed vocally that she was here to empower 
herself, to be an equal member of her society, or to raise a voice against gendered 
discriminations. I understand that not vocalizing women’s empowerment does not dilute 
its credibility. However, my observations across GRCs reveal that the concept of 
women’s empowerment was rarely directly discussed by GRC staff or beneficiaries. A 
concept that has been so vastly adopted by government and NGOs that it has lost its 
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spark; as one GRC staff puts it aptly, “women’s empowerment ka bhartha bana diya 
[has been beaten to death]…”72  
 Treated as panacea for all developmental ills, women’s empowerment has gained 
much scholarly attention but fails to generate equally stimulating debates on the ground. 
Why? I argue that somewhere between Mission’s tall statements about women’s 
empowerment and the everyday implementation of its programs, the political ideology 
of change has been sidelined while revealing rather clearly that women’s empowerment 
is used as a concept to validate governmental presence and intervention in the lives of 
the poor. The programs expect to train women to rise above poverty, to share the state’s 
responsibility for poverty alleviation and community incorporation into its programs, 
and to also perceive the state as a caring developmental actor in their everyday lives. 
This also explained why GRCs did not want to disturb the oppressive social norms 
controlled women choices and access to resources.  
4.6. Discussion and conclusions 
 Several development programs assume that poor women need to be empowered 
because they are poor and powerless and that their empowerment will happen through 
their participation in a staple set of programs. It is assumed that yet another policy 
intervention that repackages and implements the staple set of programs will succeed in 
empowering poor women in a society where power dynamics between women and men 
and poor citizens and exclusionary neoliberal state both remain unaddressed. I argue that 
such interventions or programs provide only a partial platform to change women’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72. Bhartha bana diya means to squash or beat something until it cannot be squashed any more. 
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conditions but these conditions are unlikely to change unless gendered regulations and 
citizenship rights are also not addressed.  
 My research shows that beyond Mission’s reports that paint the project as 
successful in “benefitting” thousands of women, the ground realities are very different. 
Mosse (2005, p. 14) argues that “policy primarily functions to mobilize and maintain 
political support that is to legitimize rather than to orientate practice.” Development 
projects, when working to maintain (or gain) political support succeed in generating a 
caring aura towards the beneficiaries. Mission mobilizes the poor women to not only 
assist the state in appearing as their caring and vote-worthy patron, but to join free 
programs to “instill the appropriate motivations and social habits” (Everingham, 2001, p. 
118). I bring back my initial question and discuss below: what kind of gendered subjects 
are produced through Mission’s programs?  
 GRC as a homogeneous institutional arrangement spread across the slums of 
Delhi provided a set of programs through which the participating poor women’s “self-
interests” were expected to be accomplished. Mission’s programs provided (truncated) 
scope for their liberal empowerment so that they could learn new skills and 
responsibilize themselves as instruments for poverty reduction. Mission’s programs for 
the “holistic empowerment” of poor women were expected to strengthen their agency to 
equalize gender relations and therefore change the oppressive structure so that they 
could be better prepared to work in their self-interest. However, my research indicates 
that the “rules” of patriarchy along with limitations of resources and capital do not build 
the agency of the poor women to become economic actors as per the needs of the self 
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and the expectations of the state. Both factors came together to weaken the state’s plans 
for preparing women as “partners” of the government in fighting poverty. Mission’s 
programs expected the state to engage thousands of voluntarily participating women into 
a web of programs to uplift their family and community, to be mobilized as subjects 
willing (but not always able) to conduct their conduct as per self-interest and state’s 
aspirations. However, many poor women who were mobilized and some out of them 
who were convinced to becomes responsible for reducing their poverty could not do so. 
This shows that at one level the poor women were able to partially escape the structure 
of neoliberal governmentality and yet became “whole new political beings” (Cruikshank, 
1999) that were counted and categorized based on their poverty and gender, that entered 
the government records and administrative arrangements of surveillance, that were 
considered effective instruments of poverty reduction and a desirable subject of the 
massive institutional arrangement across the slums of Delhi – and yet majority of these 
400,000 participating poor women could not become the entrepreneurial face of a 
poverty well-managed by the aspiring world-class Delhi. 
 By analyzing Mission’s programs in the context of Delhi’s aspirations to become 
a world-class city, I argue that the Delhi government was trying to reform the way it 
developed its poor citizens. Mission extended the government’s material presence in the 
slums of Delhi, showed that it cared for the poor, and floated specific ideas about poor 
women’s self-interest and entrepreneurial capabilities as “weapons against poverty”. But 
poor women were not silent spectators to such programs. They were intentional subjects 
who understood their marginalization within the dual and co-existing structures of 
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neoliberal urban development (spawning a particular kind of governmentality) and 
patriarchal control. Participating women recognized which programs could meet their 
needs, and which could not, even if these needs were defined by socio-familial 
expectations. Women operated in their interest but within their social regulations to 
extract the most out of these programs. Some of them learned vocations knowing well 
that they will not be allowed or able to use. Others used the GRC as a safe space where 
they can spend time away from domestic pressures. And few others like Chandra 
continued to train with the hope that they will help them improve their lives. Many 
others like sisters Seema and Reema, who were unable to participate in these programs 
due to their more pressing economic responsibilities highlight its myopic practices that 
weaken the agenda for “reaching the unreached”.  
 I argue that women’s empowerment should not simply be criticized as piecemeal 
free services; it should be analyzed for the kinds of citizen-subjects that are produced as 
a result of its possibly unintended but clear coexistence with neoliberal governmentality 
(conduct of conduct as per state’s neoliberal aspirations) and patriarchy (conduct of 
conduct as per gender social norms). While the former enables voluntary participation of 
thousands of women to recognize their self-interest/state interest, the latter restricts that 
realization to its fullest potential as women nudge and create slippages but are largely 
tied down by their gender and poverty to claim the resources (available through GRCs) 
and become empowered.  
 The successful group of women in the far-flung resettlement colony who have 
experienced the sweet smell of their income are examples of how women’s 
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empowerment agenda is popularized as a panacea to alleviate poverty, and how the 
everyday practices and long-term outcomes associated with these programs gradually 
become safe technique to distance these women from the real structural issues, like – 
why they are living in the margins of the city and why they are responsible to end their 
poverty – burdens that they didn’t bring upon themselves but were imposed upon them 
by the forces of patriarchy and urban neoliberal development (seeped in circuits of 
global and local capitalism). One could argue that these self help group members are so 
busy earning a basic living that they can’t invest their energies to question or resist the 
forces that maintain their marginality. I would counter-argue that programs like Mission 
serve an unintentional but crucial purpose at the micro-level in muting such questions by 
engaging a large mass of women across Delhi slums into programs that could manage 
their immediate needs without addressing their long-term circulations in and out of 
different vulnerabilities (including gendered discrimination). Again, participating poor 
women become “wholly new kinds of beings” that acquiesce to state’s programs that 
“produce their interest in helping themselves” (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 38). Participating 
women are “made” political beings through programs like Mission that use the language 
of empowerment and partnership to include and develop them – within the patriarchal 
structure – as per the will of the state conflated with the women’s intention and desire to 
rise above poverty. As Delhi transforms itself to attract global capital, Mission’s 
programs offer poor women limited scope to slip out of the marginalizing structures of 
patriarchy and exclusionary neoliberal development – neither of which are totalized 
hegemonies but largely work to sustain gendered discrimination and poverty. This status 
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quo occurs in such complex ways that the intentional woman subject is entrenched into 
the programs that extend neoliberal governmentality (conduct of conduct) without being 
able to actually utilize the programs in her self-interest to alleviate her poverty or to end 
her gendered subordination. 
	  
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
239	  
	  
	  
	  
5. POOR WOMEN AND THE (CARE) WORK OF EMPOWERMENT 
	  
5.1 Delhi government’s ladli 
 I begin this Section with two engaging observations from the field. On August 
14, 2009, Mission Convergence celebrated its one year anniversary. This event was 
attended by more than 300 staff members from Mission’s partnering NGOs, high-ranked 
government officials, politicians, Chief Minister of Delhi, and the President of India. 
Certificates of appreciation and handsome cash awards were given to hard working 
NGO staff. 19 year old Deepa was one such staff member. Surrounded by the president 
of India and the Chief Minister of Delhi, she gracefully received her rewards before 
merging back into the cheering crowd. Next day, India’s most popular English 
newspaper declared her ‘Delhi government’s ‘ladli’73.  “Woman power” – declared the 
captioned photograph of Deepa standing with the President and Chief Minister (Figure 
5.1). So what made Deepa Delhi government’s ladli? She is one of the 100+ women 
community mobilizers working at Gender Resource Centers across Delhi. Deepa came 
from a poor family that lived in a low-income colony in Delhi where Mission operates 
one of its GRCs. In spite of facing stiff opposition against working outside home, Deepa 
had aspirations of being independent. She joined as a community mobilizer at the GRC 
in her community.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ladli is a Hindi term meaning ‘loved one’. Ladli is also the name of a Delhi government scheme for 
promoting education of girl children by providing cash incentives to the girl child.  
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Fig. 5.1. Delhi government’s ladli. Deepa receiving an award for best female community 
mobilizer from the President of India (left) and the Chief Minister of Delhi (right) 
Source: Times of India, August 14, 2009 
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 Deepa earned a monthly salary of Rs. 5000 ($11274) for working long hours to 
deliver Mission’s two core services: empowerment of poor women; and, hassle-free 
delivery of social welfare schemes. According to the newspaper article, Deepa was the 
ladli of Delhi government because she worked hard to connect poor and disempowered 
women (like her previous self) to different government services aimed at their holistic 
empowerment and social security. The newspaper article suggested that Deepa had 
broken away from the restrictions of her family and society to emerge as a strong, 
independent woman, that she enjoyed her work because she helps others achieve what 
her work had helped her achieve – empowerment. In the process of empowering others, 
Deepa had also become empowered.  
 Deepa may be unique in her work, but not in the situations through which she 
had emerged to become a mobilizer. Several women mobilizers I interviewed faced 
similar economic, social and familial constraints and yet stepped outside home to work. 
Deepa succeeded in empowering poor women like herself by investing her sincere 
emotional and physical labor as per Mission’s expectations. She symbolized the ladli 
possessing “woman power”. I argue that women like Deepa epitomize the objectives of 
the Delhi government to produce empowered women who step over rules and 
restrictions to empower self and serve community. The Delhi government’s appreciation 
for Deepa was based not simply on her sincere work but also on her assumed ability to 
network with women community members based on her gender, local personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 As of 2011, GRC staff had a salary hike: Community mobilizers Rs.6500 ($150), vocational training 
instructors Rs.5500 ($120), project coordinator Rs. 13,000 ($260), program officer Rs. 10,000 ($225) per 
month. The work of community mobilizers is considered most tedious, physically draining and demanding 
from all ends – community, GRC staff, and Mission headquarters. 
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knowledge of the community, and a somewhat shared set of social, economic and spatial 
vulnerabilities (Jenkins, 2008; Leonardo, 1987; Werner, 1998). 
 Based on ethnographic research with women community mobilizers, I argue that 
the work of the ideal mobilizer is dictated by two prominent factors: 1) Mission’s 
technical approach (‘add women and stir’, Cleaver, 2001; Cornwall et al. 2004, p. 4; 
O’Reilly, 2003, 2011b) towards empowering women that expected mobilizers to 
promote a popular set of programs already being implemented by several NGOs in the 
Delhi slums, and to do so by attending to the scripted work methodology and expected 
outcomes in the field; and, 2) mobilizers’ overlapping/ hybrid identity as a woman 
community member and a mobilizer, i.e. as a subject75and an agent of these programs 
that pushed them to customize Mission’s script in accordance with lived experiences, 
ground realities, and community’s expectations (Jenkins, 2008; Nagar and Raju, 2003; 
O’Reilly, 2003, 2006). I describe both these factors in the light of the next observation 
from the field.  
 The scene with Deepa receiving accolades from the President and Chief Minister 
is blurred as I witness Sheetal’s work in the field a month later. Sheetal was a 21 year 
old Hindu resident of a resettlement colony in north east Delhi. She was from a low-
income family and had been working with GRC Karya at the Sethu slum near her house 
for a year now. I regularly accompanied her to the slums where she enrolled women to 
participate in the GRC programs and also disseminated information about different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 I want to clarify here that the “subject” of Mission’s programs are not only the women who participate 
in its programs but all those who are targeted for participation, i.e. all those women categorized within the 
social, spatial, occupational and income vulnerability criteria. Also, not all women mobilizers resided in 
the same communities where they worked. Many lived in nearby resettlement colonies or other low-
income colonies that faced similar, but not the same, kinds of spatial vulnerabilities as the slums.  
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welfare schemes facilitated through the GRC. One day, we visited a slum to enroll 
women for an upcoming nutrition camp at the GRC. According to Mission documents, 
providing information about nutritious food is important for the health of women and 
their families, and therefore falls within the ‘holistic empowerment’ paradigm. During 
this camp, participating women were given demonstrations on how to select and cook 
nutritious but cheap food. Cooked food samples were later distributed among them.  
 Sheetal walked briskly, skipping over open gutters and simultaneously greeting 
people with a loud call ‘sab theek?’ [is all well?]. She was in a hurry because she had to 
enroll at least 25 women to attend the nutrition camp to be held next day at her GRC. 
“Sir [GRC project coordinator] has given us all strict instructions…each person must 
be able to get at least 25 people from the basti [slum] …” Then she stopped and asked, 
“could you help me get 25 names down on this register? It’s getting late and I need to 
get home soon.” I agreed and we divided our territories. However, I soon realized that 
women here were not interested in my speech on the benefits of attending a nutrition 
camp. Most women there were busy making small decorative strings which were to be 
sold at two cents each for the upcoming Diwali festival; women were busy earning a 
living. After several failed attempts, I headed towards Sheetal and observed the 
following conversation between Sheetal and a small group of women. 
Sheetal: come for the nutrition camp tomorrow at the center from 12 to 2pm. ok? 
Woman 1: what is happening there? 
Sheetal makes an eating gesture with one hand and then chews on a mouthful of 
imaginary food. 
Woman 2: So write my name then. And add my youngest son too. 
Woman 1: how much food will you give? 
Sheetal [scribbling names in her register]: depends…if more women come then we’ll 
have more…but no use cooking for just a few of us, right? 
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Woman 2: okay. I will tell others too.  
 
From then on, Sheetal had hit a golden technique. She looped around the 
congested lanes quietly gesturing to women that they will be served free food. She 
would first quickly say a line or two about the paushtik aahaar camp [‘nutrition camp’] 
at the GRC and then immediately demonstrate the ‘free food’ clause through sign 
language. In her decision to skip the script about benefits of nutrition camp in favor of 
cautiously advertising free food, I concur that Sheetal made some clear decisions 
regarding how women’s empowerment activities should be translated in the field. Based 
on our prior interactions it was evident to me that Sheetal understood very well that the 
overarching goal of the nutrition camp was to make women active and aware decision-
makers for their and family’s health. Sheetal was also aware that GRCs were to seek 
women’s participation in different activities in order to make them jaagruk (aware), and 
that asking them to participate in return for free food was not an acceptable technique 
(and therefore must be conveyed with quick gestures). In my view, Sheetal’s silent 
performances at each door made clear the fact that pressure for women’s participation 
exceeds ideals of women’s empowerment (O’Reilly, 2006), thus producing certain 
shallow but effective participation-attracting techniques76. Sheetal used a smidgen of the 
script taught to her in Mission’s workshops but she added materials to the script based 
on her local knowledge of people’s vulnerabilities and people’s perception about “such” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Such participation-attracting techniques are not uncommon across NGOs in general. In fact, NGOs use 
refreshments and even entertainment openly to popularize their programs in the community. But most 
NGOs I have observed don’t exclusively focus on such techniques, unlike Deepa. NGOs and community 
members are both aware of donor pressures for showing numbers. But they both are also aware that such 
shallow techniques could gradually reach donor attention and loss of reputation in the community. Hence, 
NGOs mostly use such techniques with caution, and with success of numbers. 
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camps in her catchment area, which she knew would help her generate quicker 
participation (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). She was doing the work (of ensuring women’s 
participation in the nutrition camp) that she was expected to do but she did it in a way 
she deemed efficient to meet expected outcomes (by quietly highlighting free food). The 
next day, Sheetal met her coordinator’s expectations by ensuring a well-attended and 
therefore successful nutrition camp. This success was shown in Mission reports by 
highlighting the number of women in attendance along with photographic proof of the 
same. 
 That day, as we got more than expected names down on the register and parted 
ways, I couldn’t help but think back on Deepa’s accolades as Delhi government’s ladli. 
While Deepa was portrayed as a young woman who had empowered herself and other 
poor women through Mission, Sheetal struggled to ensure women’s participation in 
Mission’s activities, and in the process, altered the meaning of empowerment as 
prescribed by Mission. Sheetal, like Deepa and most other women mobilizers, shared 
similar social and economic conditions, did the exact same work for Mission, faced 
similar pressures and deadlines, and, in the process, made new sense of how ideas of 
women’s empowerment should reach poor women. These ideas emerged as quick 
solutions to the “community participation crunch”. Such crunch created additional work 
pressures for community mobilizers and also showed the community’s low expectations 
of several such programs that either do not represent their interests and needs, or fail to 
provide the intended services/ outcomes despite attracting their participation. In the 
course of this Section, I will offer ethnographic insights from the field to show the 
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diverse ways in which women mobilizers translated women’s empowerment in different 
situations as Mission hired their gendered, local, interactive and emotional labor to 
empower their own communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2. Making a Living. A woman resident making decorative strings to sell for the 
upcoming Diwali festival. On her side is Sheetal’s register. 
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Fig. 5.3 Mobilizer in the community. Research assistant Geeta standing on the right 
corner (in pink salwaar kameez) observing Sheetal (sitting on left, face covered with red 
scarf) as she mobilized women for the nutrition camp. 
 
 
 
5.1.1 “Poor Women” 
 Let me start by first clarifying that ‘poor women’ is not a blanket category. Many 
slum residents in Delhi are not income-poor but live in marginal spaces because they 
cannot afford to live elsewhere. As such not all women living in slums and resettlement 
colonies that are working with Mission are income-poor. But there are several mobilizers 
who come from income-poor families that are dependent on their salaries. Many poor 
248	  
	  
	  
	  
and non-poor women living in marginal spaces face several similar vulnerabilities like 
poor education, struggle for basic amenities like sanitation and water, unsafe 
neighborhoods, socio-familial restrictions from working outside home or community, 
and high demand for balancing their domestic care giving labor and economic labor at 
home or outside. Some of these latter set of vulnerabilities are not uncommon in upper-
class neighborhoods but they come together more persistently in marginalized areas to 
hinder women’s capabilities for seeking better-paying, non-local jobs that are not as 
emotionally and/or physically demanding of them.  
 I use the term “poor woman” in this Section to refer to the subject as well as 
agent of Mission’s programs that lives in the slums, resettlement colonies and similar 
low-income areas of Delhi and are the “target population” in GRC “catchment areas” of 
Mission’s programs. The category “poor woman” or “vulnerable woman” originated out 
of the Delhi government’s emphasis on using Mission to empower all women living in 
these vulnerable spaces. This constructed category therefore assumed that these women 
are not already empowered in the ways the government would expect them to be – as 
women who should be capable to alleviate the vulnerabilities of their family and 
community that are at the core of the government’s transformation agenda for the 
making of a world-class city. My use of this category is an expression of how it is 
adopted and altered by those women who are impacted by as well as a part of running 
the machinery that created it.  
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5.2 Research focus and Section outline 
 In Section 4, I have provided an overview of literature on gender and 
development and also offered my critiques on the meaning of women’s empowerment as 
prescribed by Mission. Here, I will trace the meanings and practices that come to 
re(define) empowerment as poor women become NGO staff for a Delhi government 
project to empower other poor women like themselves. I focus on the urban poor woman 
as a ‘subject-agent’ who is the subject of development projects like Mission and is also 
employed as an agent of the community’s development. I examine the multiple 
subjectivities formed by the development discourse and ask: how do women who are the 
‘targets’ as well as ‘implementers’ of development schemes negotiate their experiences 
and subjectivities in everyday work practices? I pay special attention to the impact their 
institutional practices have on their work and on their own gendered self (Goetz, 2001; 
Nagar, 2006; O’Reilly, 2003, 2006). 
 Using discourse analysis of Mission documents, participant observation, and 
interviews with community mobilizers, I argue that women mobilizers redefine the 
agenda of poor women’s empowerment based on their personal experiences as “poor 
women”, and expected (professional) and personal kinds of emotional investments in 
their work – which come together to create diverse nuanced interpretations of Mission’s 
objectives in particular and the extension of  women’s care giving and emotional labor 
into the development sector in general. Further, women mobilizers highlight the 
technical undertones that guide Mission’s work with women’s empowerment, and also 
find themselves working as technical pawns for the program. I use geography theories of 
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women’s labor in the development sector and theories on interactive carework and 
affective/ emotional labor to highlight the subject-agent hybrid and the interplay of 
project expectations and personal experiences to tell the story of empowerment from 
those who do the work of empowering.  
 This Section is divided into six sections. In the subsequent three sub-sections, I 
examine the economics behind hiring poor women as field staff, and, the ways in which 
Mission comes to promote a gendered division of labor within its work practices. The 
third section examines theories on development workers and the hybridity of subjects 
and agents. Fourth section examines theories on interactive and emotional care work. 
Further in this section, ethnographic data is examined to situate the woman mobilizer as 
a sympathetic and empathetic care worker who is impacted by the client’s conditions but 
unable to produce desired results. The fifth section looks at how success is redefined 
through Mission’s practices. The last section ends with a discussion and offers 
conclusions. 
5.2.1 The gendered economics of development 
 As NGOs continue to receive global recognition and funding, NGOs are also 
hiring more people (Townsend et al., 2002; Dichter, 2005; O’Reilly, 2011a), thus 
indicating the increasing demands of a professionalizing development sector impacted 
by neoliberal trends (Nagar and Raju, 2003; Jenkins, 2008; Dolhinow, 2010). With more 
than one NGO per 400 people in India, NGOs have also become a big employment 
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generators in India (Indian Express, July 7, 201077). This has created greater interest in 
transforming women’s voluntary labor as domestic care givers into women’s low-paid 
labor as semi-skilled local experts that disburse services and information for the 
development of their community. In compliance with gendered norms, women are seen 
as ideal candidates for projects focusing on women within their own communities. 
Majority of the development projects have at least one component of women’s 
empowerment while several projects focus exclusively on women’s empowerment or 
well-being (Molyneux, 2008). 
 Ragi was 25 year old Hindu woman community mobilizers with GRC Desh 
working in Surja slum near her home. She had witnessed the growing NGO industry in 
her own community over the past 10 years. Ragi’s estimate was that there were at least 
5000 NGOs in Delhi, employing approximately 50,000 people at approximately 10 staff 
per NGO. This meant approximately 1 percent of Delhi’s working age population was 
engaged in the NGO sector. She further said,  
And out of the 8-10 staff in each NGO, at least 3 or 4 are from poor 
background…they take up the position of fieldworkers…their economic 
conditions are not good and so they join an NGO after completing tenth or 
twelfth standard. Some women who are comfortable venturing outside home also 
join to run their households. But nothing changes – neither the conditions of 
those who work here, nor the conditions of the communities where these NGOs 
work 
 
 Even though Ragi’s number crunching was anecdotal, I did agree with it. Having 
worked with NGOs in Delhi, I noticed that NGOs had become a popular source of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/first-official-estimate-an-ngo-for-every-400-people-in-
india/643302/ 
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employment for several young women residing in spaces that offered few other jobs so 
close to home. As the 22 year old Muslim woman mobilizer at Divya GRC stated 
clearly, “The GRC is an all-women’s center and it is in the community. That is why my 
mother allowed me to work here.” NGO work at the grassroots has two prime gendered 
characteristic - working within ones community, and serving others. However, I am not 
convinced with Ragi’s argument that NGOs altogether fail to change the condition of 
their clients and their local staff. On the contrary, I would argue that feminist and 
politically-inclined organizations especially have been able to make participating women 
economically independent and aware of their rights.  
 In my view, the hiring of poor women from within community offers a clearer 
understanding of the economics of development. By hiring poor women, NGOs show 
their deep commitment towards community-oriented participatory development while 
being able to save money and also benefit from local knowledge of the staff. Young 
women from low-income families residing in catchment areas take up the job of a 
community mobilizer which pays them $150 78 per month for work that expects them to 
achieve women’s empowerment through their trained emotional, interactive, and 
gendered labor. Women’s labor is assumed to be gendered, local, and emotional and 
therefore corresponding with their domestic care giving labor. Further, mobilizers’ work 
is often viewed as “social work” or “jan seva” by Mission officials, one of whom 
argued that “…mobilizers get an honorarium, not a salary. Social workers don’t get 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Average monthly income of people residing in low-income communities usually varies between 
Rs.3,000 - Rs.15,000 ($65 - $330) per month. Women get relatively lower-paying jobs. Many of my 
women informants worked from home and earned between Rs. 1000 – Rs. 3000 ($22 - $60) per month 
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salaries!” (Interview with Mission headquarters staff, November 2009). Women 
mobilizers doing jan sewa provide their professionally trained gendered and interactive 
labor to serve their community, more specifically to mobilize women to be like them – 
willing to provide their labor for the empowerment of their family and community. A 
chain reaction set off by the Delhi government’s ladlis is expected to serve the purpose 
of mobilizing thousands of women across the slums of Delhi to become responsible 
agents for poverty alleviation and community development. 
 There are several factors that influence women’s decision to work as mobilziers 
with Mission. During workshops and trainings for mobilizers, Mission often invokes the 
‘public good’ sentiment to motivate workers to treat their jobs as a personal interest in 
serving their society (jan sewa). Mobilizers are exalted as the “hands and eyes’ of the 
community” and as “the real connection between government and its poor people” 
(Chief Minister’s speech during award ceremony, August 14, 2009). In essence, 
mobilizers are expected to serve the ‘public good’ by selflessly working for their 
impoverished communities. However, a reasonable monthly salary makes their decision 
easy as mobilizers get paid more in comparison to other jobs available within their 
community.79 Further, Mission is a Delhi government initiative and those working at its 
GRCs therefore work for the Delhi government – a prestigious opportunity in a culture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Women and men community mobilizers are paid the same monthly salary of Rs. 6500. However, there 
are cases where GRCs pay lower salaries to women mobilizers because some women have lower 
educational qualifications. I was informed of one such instance at Divya GRC. Two Muslim woman 
mobilizers were asked to reduce their working hours to half per day and were paid half of their regular 
monthly salaries. However, due to heavy work load and unmet deadlines, I mostly found one young  
mobilizer working overtime for which she was not paid. She said during our interview, “They know I need 
this job.” The money that was saved by the GRC from the salaries of these mobilizers was used to hire 
another male mobilizer who focused on welfare delivery. 
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that views “government” jobs as relatively better-paying with the additional bonus of 
making relevant personal contacts with staff at different partnering NGOs and 
government departments.  
 Interviews and interactions with women mobilizers reveal that most had two 
opinions about their job and whether it empowered them. Many women mobilizers 
considered their job as an opportunity to contribute to their family income and to help 
their community. Mobilizers also mentioned that the words and actions that formed their 
everyday work, like –stepping outside home, traveling alone in the field, interacting with 
women and men, holding large group meetings, informing people about welfare and 
empowerment programs, report writing, form filling – these practices came together to 
make them feel “different” and “stronger” in comparison to other women in their 
community. But more prominently, mobilizers pointed out that the long hours, short 
deadlines, confusing guidelines, strict supervision, and unreal expectation – all of these 
created an unproductive work environment and an internalized sense of failure for them, 
therefore challenging Mission’s assertion that women staff members like Deepa were 
empowered simply by stepping outside home and working with Mission. Instead, many 
women mobilizers recognize that Mission’s women’s empowerment objectives as 
unachievable. How then were they expected to empower other poor women? 
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5.2.2 Reproducing gendered labor  
 Each Gender Resource Center (GRC) operated by an NGO has ten staff members 
out of which two are community mobilizers (hereafter ‘mobilizers’).80 In accordance 
with Mission regulations, each GRC must recruit one female and one male mobilizer 
from the same or similar community where the GRC works. The emphasis was on hiring 
low-income candidates so as to give them an opportunity to serve their communities and 
become self-reliant (Interview with Mission staff, July 2010). Both mobilizers worked in 
separate catchment areas under the GRC to disseminate information about GRC 
activities, to recruit poor women in GRC’s women’s empowerment programs, and to 
help eligible people receive welfare services. According to Mission policies, there is no 
distinction in the work expectations from female and male mobilizers; both mobilizers 
are expected to perform all these tasks in their respective areas. However, my fieldwork 
suggests that women mobilizers tried to balance but still focused more on women’s 
empowerment and lesser on welfare delivery component while men mobilizers focused 
mostly on the latter. The work of empowering poor women is considered pre-gendered 
because of social norms that allow a more comfortable relationship among women 
mobilizers and women beneficiaries (Leidner, 1999; O’Reilly, 2006).  
 In the slums of Delhi, receiving services was as gendered as delivering services. 
While women community members absorbed information on welfare and women’s 
empowerment disseminated by the mobilizers, it is the men usually assumed charge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 One project coordinator (mostly men), one program officer (mostly men), four vocational training 
instructors (all women), one Self Help Group coordinator (mostly women), one Non Formal Education 
teacher (women), two community mobilizers (one woman and one man), and one office help (mostly 
women). Majority of the staff, excluding project officer and program officer, come from same or similar 
low-income communities where they work. 
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following the procedures for availing welfare. This was more a result of the pre-Mission 
channels for welfare delivery that involved exploiting male-dominated social networks, 
bribing, running to offices and standing in long lines. Welfare-entitled women also 
traveled long distances and stood in lines, but they did not interact as regularly with the 
male middlemen who assisted with the welfare delivery. As a result, even though women 
mobilizers informed women beneficiaries about welfare services, the information 
usually moved ahead after intervention of the male family members. Since welfare 
services provided (until May 2010, as discussed in Section 3) the possibility of more 
tangible and immediate benefits and women’s empowerment programs did not 
commonly lead to immediate and economic tangible outcomes, the latter was sidelined 
in favor of the former during the time of my fieldwork in 2009. After May 2010, 
women’s empowerment became a prominent set of programs and the work of women’s 
mobilizers therefore increased.  
5.2.3 Doing the work of empowerment 
 Empowerment is a political process which aims to strengthen the social, political, 
and economic capabilities of an individual. Though empowerment as a concept is well 
examined (Batliwala, 1994; Cornwall et al., 2010; Cruikshank, 1999; Dhanraj and 
Batliwala, 2004; Kabeer, 1999; Kesby, 2005; Klenk, 2004; Rowlands, 1997; Molyneux, 
2008), and so are the projects that implement empowerment (Anupamlata et al., 2004; 
Li, 2005; Magar, 2003; Molyneux, 2008; Sharma, 2006), what demands more attention 
is the impact of the work of empowerment on the staff who do this work and the impact 
of the women staff on the work of empowerment (c.f. Goetz, 2001).   
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 Development projects face many distortions between their planning and 
implementation phase and most of these distortions or alterations emerge from activities 
of project staff (Gupta, 2001; Mosse, 2005; O’Reilly, 2003; Sharma, 2006; Weisgrau, 
2005). Feminist scholars like O’Reilly (2003, p. 273) and Anupamlata et al. (2004) 
assert that most analyses of effects of women’s empowerment projects overlook the 
impact of internal staff dynamics and individual staff experiences between field and 
home. Feminist and development scholars like Goetz (2001), Wiesgrau (1997), Crewe 
and Harrison (1998), Mosse (2001, 2005), O’Reilly (2003, 2004, 2006, 2011a), 
Anupamlata et al. (2004), Singh and Nagar (2006), and Jenkins (2008) have attended to 
the nuances of development fieldworkers’ subjectivities, the intermingling of their 
personal (as development subject) and professional (as development agent) experiences, 
and the tensions between gendered labor and discriminatory practices of a development 
project. There is also a growing body of scholarship on development fieldworkers, their 
behaviors, choices, and the obstacles they face (Anupamlata et al., 2004; Crewe and 
Harrison, 1998; Dolhinow, 2010; Goetz, 2001; Mumtaz et al., 2003; Jenkins, 2004; 
O’Reilly, 2003 2004, 2006, 2011a).  
 O’Reilly’s (2003, 2004, 2006) research on women fieldworkers in rural 
Rajasthan provides a foundation for my own research to understand how women 
mobilizers “negotiate meanings, spaces, and practices” (2004, p. 175) of women’s 
empowerment in the slums of Delhi. O’Reilly (2006, p. 1077) argues that fieldworkers 
should not simply be viewed as instruments of development who mechanically 
implement projects. Instead, the power dynamics involved in their everyday work along 
258	  
	  
	  
	  
with their interpretations of the development ideals on the ground calls for a deeper 
examination of the work, behaviors and practices of development fieldworkers. O’Reilly 
(2006, p.1076) states that interconnections between gendered relations of power, the 
positionality of fieldworkers, and individual practices in the field have been sidelined by 
development policymakers in favor of attention to the practices and results of 
development projects. She argues that there is a need to bypass the quest for ideal 
development tools like participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) and in fact turn inwards 
to locate the workings of project ideals on the ground through the works of fieldworkers. 
On a similar note, Mumtaz et al. (2003) and Anupamlata et al. (2004) turn inward to 
reveal that expectations of women fieldworkers are often contrary to the cultural realities 
on the ground and the ideologies/ work practices of the organization, thus leading to a 
situation where little outcome (which is usually participation) is achieved and the labor 
of women fieldworkers is questioned; relations of power based on gender, class, and 
caste remain unquestioned within the organization and the work area.  
 My research expands on their scholarship by focusing on the internal and 
everyday functioning of a government-NGO partnership in the slums of Delhi. I locate 
women mobilizers of Mission as the eyes and ears of their communities that the Delhi 
government intends to develop to better fit an aspiring world-class Delhi. I argue that 
Mission women mobilziers as hybrid ‘subject-agent’ are the subject of the government’s 
development aspirations and the agent or mediator that work to entrench its aspirations 
on the ground. My use of theories across feminist geography, economics, and 
development alongside ethnographic evidence indicate that the binaries of personal and 
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professional come together and transmute the institutional objectives of women’s 
empowerment into fluidly disseminated and equally fluidly accepted practices of 
women’s empowerment. Below, I discuss scholarship on how contemporary 
development expectations are diffusing the category of the subject of development and 
the agent of development. 
5.3 The making of the subject-agent 
 Klenk (2004, p. 70) suggests that development discourses enables creation of 
multiple subjectivities through which some become ‘developed’ in comparison to the 
‘other/underdeveloped’. However, my research suggests that the supposedly divisive 
nature of the development discourse (Escobar, 1995; Klenk, 2004) that pitches the 
‘developed’ vs. the ‘underdeveloped’ is not as clear cut. Movement of people, 
experiences and knowledges between the two categories within an expanding 
development sector are creating multiple blurred subjectivities. By subjectivity here I 
mean the identity of the individual as it emerges from her social, political, historical, and 
cultural contexts (Nagar, 1997).These blurred subjectivities are a product of the 
emphasis on participatory development that engages the community in projects aimed at 
empowering them (with the obvious other goals of also showcasing the success of a 
project). Further, as NGOs become implementing agencies for government services, they 
use market principles of efficiency and cost reduction and therefore look towards hiring 
willing community residents into the labor intensive, interactive, and community-
oriented works of the project (Feldman, 1997). Feldman notes that the skills and jobs the 
state could not provide these community residents are eventually provided by NGOs that 
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work as government’s contractors. This devolution of state’s welfare responsibilities at 
these two different levels leads to a situation where the resident/NGO staff becomes the 
subject as well as agent of development projects. These imbrications of what I call the 
‘subject-agent’ allow us to move towards a more nuanced examination of dichotomies 
produced by as well as within the development sector. 
 Mission’s community mobilizers unsettle several dichotomies like public and 
private, formal and informal, emotional and logical, learned and experienced and show 
how closely the domestic and the professional exist in their everyday lives. Staeheli 
(1996) urges for a re-conceptualizing of publicity and privacy such that the ‘content’ of 
action is separated from the ‘space’ in which it takes place. This separation, she insists, 
would debase the assumption that the two are separable in that only public actions are 
effective and the private produces no action. The content of action of the mobilizers 
when seen without reference to the space of its performance suggests the fluidity with 
which their internalized and expected duties as domestic care givers overlapped with 
their work as paid and trained mobilizers. Mobilizer’s actions and the ensuing results 
only prove that known spaces become receptors of scripted words and actions for 
mobilization that are delivered according to the personal, private, emotional, and rational 
interpretation of the programs. Taking Staeheli’s argument forward, I also suggest that 
women mobilizer’s overlapping identities and overlapping actions/ behaviors indicate 
the fluid ways in which they understood space. The agenda of the Delhi government to 
“reach the unreached” in the slums of Delhi had created “catchment areas” served by 
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partnering NGOs. These “catchment areas” were communities where mobilizers resided 
and worked to produce complex meanings of the state’s development agenda. 
 I extend on O’Reilly’s (2006) refined focus on subjectivities of women NGO 
workers as discussed above to assert that contemporary development projects with a 
focus on women’s empowerment significantly blur the boundaries between ‘developed’ 
and ‘underdeveloped’. ‘Poor women’ as a category requiring development and poor 
women as grassroots development workers both come together to diffuse assumed 
tensions between segregated categories of ‘developed’ and ‘under-developed’. My 
ethnographic data reveals how the working of an agent/mobilizer is heavily defined by 
her experiences and expectations as a subject of development. The developmental efforts 
of the caring and inclusive state categorize the poor woman as a subject that must be 
better served and empowered. However, women’s experiences and expectations of the 
state remain poor and women mobilziers’ internalized recognition of the same, in light 
of their negotiations within the patriarchal status quo, impacts their work as the agent/ 
mobilizer of the caring government’s programs.  
 My ethnographic data does not provide a sweeping picture of dejected mobilizers 
churning helplessly at the margins of the state and the society. It highlights the complex 
ways in which status quo is maintained in a society. Tensions between professional 
expectations, internalized limitations, and an emotional investment in their work as 
mobilizers come together to produce a stunted effect of the programs at one level and a 
continuing expansion of the state’s “caring” agenda at another level. I support this 
argument later with ethnographic evidence from the field. Below, I delve into theories of 
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care work and emotional labor to situate the work of women mobilizers as care work that 
is gendered, emotional, and interactive, and to argue that these characteristics produce 
certain unexpected meanings and outcomes. The training of women mobilizers involves 
the development of their work as interactive and emotional, but also produces 
internalized responses beyond women mobilizer’s professional expectations. Theories of 
care work and emotional labor have been sparsely used to examine gendered labor in 
implementation of government projects that arise out of a call for making an inclusive 
and world-class city. I adopt these theories to explain how the Delhi government’s 
agenda to “reach the unreached” and to “evolve the image of Delhi as a caring city” 
trains the paid labor of poor women to extend its agendas for continuing political 
legitimization and poverty management in the slums of Delhi.  
5.4 Gendered economies of care work 
 Care work is defined as the “multifaceted labor that produces the daily living 
conditions that make basic human health and well-being possible” (Zimmerman, et al., 
2006, p.3). Gendered economies of care work have become a hot topic among feminists 
to showcase the continuing exclusionary nature of mainstream economics that still 
separates labor and remuneration based on gender and space (public vs. 
domestic).Women’s participation in the formal as well as informal labor force has been 
vastly examined by feminist scholars in the field of anthropology, economics and 
sociology (Hochschild, 1983; Liedner, 1999; Cameron and Gibson-Graham, 2003; 
Sudarshan and Bhattacharya, 2009; Williams and Crooks, 2008). Women’s work within 
the domestic sphere for sustaining or expanding social networks has also strengthened 
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feminist theories on the different facets of care work (Stack, 1975; Leonardo, 1987; 
Werner 1998). Studies on networking for social as well as economic gains through 
feasting, festivities, gift exchange, and everyday gendered interactions have opened up 
new venues to discover the different ways women provide their physical, emotional, 
interactive, and mostly unpaid labor to manage the household and create community 
security nets during rough political and economic conditions in a nation (Stack, 1975; 
Werner, 1998).  
 These works assert that specific attention needed to be paid to the economic 
values of women’s care work, to introduce care work within the formal economy, and to 
extend the definition of economics to include alternative, non-capitalist, and women-
dominated forms of productions (England, 2005; Hochschild, 1983; Leidner, 1999). But 
knowledge produced through these endeavors, however commendable, does not explain 
the social and economic dynamics that constitute women’s labor in the development 
sector. It is important to conceptualize this specific labor kind because several 
development projects utilize women’s pre-configured social role as a gendered, 
emotional, interactive and continuous care giver at the domestic level to justify her role 
as a caring development worker who extends her services for the benefit of the 
community, and with that, also extends the agenda of the caring state. The kind face of a 
woman wearing a simple cotton saree and holding a bag, walking through spaces of 
deprivation with great ease is the staple representation of a professional development 
fieldworker.81 Such representations highlight the gendered nature of development, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 This representation was used by one of Mission’s publicity video productions for the federal self-employment scheme known as 
SJSRY described in Sections 3 and 4. This representation is also common across non-partnering NGOs’ publicity materials. 
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“care” for the poor and needy articulate development fieldwork as a type of care work. 
Below, I provide literature on why and how care work takes emotional and interactive 
forms, and the impact it has on programs like Mission.	  
	   To care for someone is to ensure their well-being. England and Folbre (2002) use 
‘care work’ to define occupations that help develop capabilities of their clients by using 
instrumental tasks and affective relations. Sustained personal face-to-face interactions 
with intrinsic motives for recipient’s welfare are also seen as key factors determining 
care work (Folbre, 1995). England (2005, p. 383) uses Leidner’s (1993) term ‘interactive 
service work’ to define “all jobs involving giving a face-to-face service to clients or 
customers of the organization for which one works”. According to both authors, these 
jobs include nurse, waitress, usher, receptionist, sales person, nanny, etc. I apply the 
term ‘interactive service work’ to also define the work of community mobilizers – work 
that involves face-to-face service to poor people by creating affective relations for the 
purpose of meeting project outcomes, i.e. greater and sustained women’s participation in 
Mission’s programs. The use of emotions in interactive care work is crucial as a way to 
maintain community interest in the project by creating close and conducive relations 
with its members (Hochschild, 1983; O’Reilly, 2011a; Wharton, 2009).  
 Mission’s mobilizers are trained to interact personally and continuously to 
mobilize the community to join programs that would empower them. As per their fixed 
routine, mobilizers must spend between 2-4 hours in the field every day building 
relations, disseminating information, and mobilizing participation. During field visits 
with mobilizers, I observed that much of the emphasis in their work was on developing 
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‘family-type’ relations with women in their catchment areas to seek their continuous 
participation in Mission’s activities. During workshops and trainings for mobilizers, 
trainers often invoked the ‘public good’ sentiment to motivate workers to treat their jobs 
as a personal interest in serving their society. Mobilizers were reminded that they were 
the “ears and eyes of the community”, “the voice of the grassroots”, “the real 
connection between government and its people”.82 However, even though Mission 
exalted mobilizers’ work as “jan sewa” or service to community and some mobilizers 
prided themselves in serving their community, a decent monthly salary was the prime 
reason why most mobilizers continued working despite extreme work pressures. 
Mobilizers decided to sell their emotional interactive labor in return for money. England 
(2005) provides an exhaustive framework to understand different kinds of care work, 
including “public good” (mentioned above) and “commodification of care work” that I 
discuss below. The commodification of care work framework highlights the dilemma 
with paying for labor that often creates varying degrees of emotional attachments 
between careworker and the client. Hochschild (1983) argues that being paid to create an 
emotional attachment with clients can be detrimental to the care workers. Considering 
that mobilizers are also expected to provide an interactive service to clients who 
experience different vulnerabilities, mobilizers are emotionally affected by their plight 
and share their pain. The mobilizers I interviewed narrated at least one incident (as part 
of the questionnaire) where they felt emotionally entangled in the lives of their poor 
clients, but most could not do enough to empower them. In the sub-sections, I share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 These quotes are from interviews with mobilizers and GRC staff and also heard by me at workshops I attended with GRC staff 
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examples where the mobilziers felt sympathy and empathy respectively, both 
succumbing to the same outcomes.  
5.4.1 Emotional and interactive work of women mobilizers 
 Mission policies lay much emphasis on mobilizers to interact with the 
beneficiaries using a mix of emotional as well as rational ways. Because women 
mobilizers were also community members, they were expected to reach out to poor 
women by creating a good relationship with them.  For example, women mobilizers are 
reminded by their project coordinators that they must be able to “…win over the trust of 
women and get them involved in our activities.” (observation during staff meeting at a 
GRC, 2009). I witnessed in the field that women mobilizers went on daily field visits 
and spent hours often revisiting same families, convincing women to join the programs, 
using examples of themselves and other participating women to extract their 
participation. And yet there were recurrent discussions over mobilizers’ not being able to 
convince certain poor and/or conservative families.  
 Mobina was a 40 year old Muslim woman resident of Sethu resettlement colony 
and worked as a mobilizer with Karya GRC in Sethu slum. During one of our field 
visits, she mentioned to me that it was very difficult to recruit women from Muslim 
families in her community. Mobina’s GRC had been successful in mobilizing a 
significant number of Hindu women, but Mobina was troubled about poor participation 
of Muslim women. She shared with me her views on how religious orthodoxy kept many 
Muslims poor and that women especially were the most affected.  Mobina’s prior work 
experience with a feminist NGO was instrumental in driving her to make efforts beyond 
267	  
	  
	  
	  
the call of her duty to engage women from the Muslim community, but with little 
success. She said,  
 I use everything…I tell them ‘look at me, I am also out of my house and 
 independent and nothing has happened to me’ but they [Muslim families] still 
 don’t agree [to participate]. The ones that do send their daughters and sisters out 
 do so after we have visited them multiple times to convince them. And even then, 
 only mothers are convinced…they start sending their daughters to our center 
 without informing the men…all this takes a lot of work…talking, convincing, 
 telling them we are also like their family and wish them well…it takes forever 
 and even then we are not successful all the time. 
 
 Mobina used her ability to work outside home as a Muslim woman to convince 
and inspire families to let their daughters join programs at the GRC. Observations in the 
field showed that community members reacted diversely to such mobilization exercises 
– some clearly stated their disinterest, others expressed ambivalence, and few others 
took interest. Mobina would pick on these reactions to decide how much time and 
emotion she wanted to spend. Irrespective, she started conversations by showing interest 
in women’s personal lives and then gradually moved towards disseminating information 
about Mission. With interested families, conversations comfortably shifted between 
neighborhood news, family matters, and women’s empowerment programs. Mobina’s 
identity as a community member helped her better exercise her emotional labor among 
these families. Mobina also often used examples of other women from the community to 
showcase GRC’s reach and credibility among locals. Being a local woman, she was able 
to quickly locate a comfort zone between herself and the poor women (not men) as she 
gradually tried to pave way for their inclusion into the GRC activities. 
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 During my field visits with women mobilizers, I witnessed several such scenes 
and interactions between the mobilizer and the families. These interactions would slowly 
turn from scripted interactions (on either side) to casual discussions, evoking feelings of 
sisterhood and family-type relations. I realized that interactions turned personal once the 
mobilizers were invited inside the house and offered water or tea, as if the collapsing of 
spatial boundaries of public and private also collapsed the boundaries between a 
development subject and agent. The women mobilizers performed emotional labor 
through face-to-face, voice-to-voice contacts (Hochschild, 1983) that include spoken 
words (emphasizing on personalizing the relationship by using terms like sister, mother, 
family, asking about health of children) and specific behaviors (sitting on the ground 
with others rather than sitting on a chair, drinking chai at a house however poor, talking 
only to women). They made efforts to empathize with the situation of their beneficiaries, 
“to feel their feelings as part of their own” (England et al., 1986, p. 91) by always 
starting conversations with specific questions about which school the children went to, 
or when the family will visit relatives in their native village, or whether the pregnant 
woman got her health check-up, or whether the family was planning their daughter’s 
marriage.  
 During these women’s-exclusive interactions, women mobilizers were expected 
to keep their emotions under check while successfully inciting emotions of their 
beneficiaries (Hochschild, 1983 on expectations of ‘emotional labor’). In Mobina’s case, 
her emotions of frustration with religious conservatism motivated her to work for her 
community even beyond the expectations of Mission. She immersed herself in her work 
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and openly used her emotions as a Muslim woman and a concerned mobilizer to 
mobilize women. However, like in the case of Sheetal discussed in the first section of 
this Section, emotions were not used as a core component during all interactions and 
women mobilizers did not always move swiftly between professional and emotional 
scripts prescribed to them through Mission’s staff trainings. While Mobina used her 
empathy towards Muslim women in her community and her passion for gendered 
equality to serve her community, Sheetal preferred a rational approach to attract their 
participation. Nonetheless, considering that mobilizers were expected to provide an 
interactive service to clients who live in poverty, mobilizers were emotionally affected 
by their plight and shared their pain. Most mobilizers shared their entangled emotions in 
the field Below, I share two examples where the mobilziers felt sympathy and empathy 
respectively, both succumbing to similar outcomes.  
5.4.1.1 Sympathy 
 Neetu was a young Hindu woman working as a mobilizer in Wedal slum. She 
shared her inability to emotionally cope with the neglect suffered by two young destitute 
sisters at the hands of their relatives living in Wedal slum. Over a period of five months, 
Neetu tried to convince the relatives to allow the sisters to join women’s empowerment 
activities at the GRC but regular visits exposed to her the desperate conditions of the 
sisters. During an interview, she mentioned, 
 I would go to their house every day, try to persuade their uncle to allow me to 
 talk with them [sisters] and include them in our activities…but he wouldn’t allow 
 that...I got so depressed with their situation that I decided to drop their case. I still 
 pass by that house but I can’t get myself to knock at that door anymore… 
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 Neetu tried to mobilize the sisters but she didn’t have the authority or power to 
intervene and help the sisters in any way. Also, she told me during the interview that as a 
young woman working in a crime-ridden and conservative environment, she feared for 
her safety if she continued to intervene. She said, “I don’t know…what if that family gets 
angry at me?” She persuaded her GRC coordinator to take action and move the sisters to 
a destitute women’s shelter. The coordinator tried to use his contacts in the NGO circle 
to get the sisters admitted to a shelter. In the meantime, the work pressure on the GRC 
became so intense that the coordinator and Neetu got caught up with more immediate 
deadlines. 
 Neetu wanted to help the sisters but after trying for more than six months, she 
gave up. She realized that in order to keep her job, she had to show more immediate 
results in the number of women participating in women’s empowerment activities at the 
GRC, not case studies of how the GRC tried to assist two women. Further, Neetu 
understood her lack of authority but she couldn’t control her emotions towards the 
situation. Lack of authority to effect change deepened her emotional turmoil with this 
case and she decided to permanently distance herself from it. She said, “Now I don’t 
even pass through that lane anymore…I couldn’t do anything.” Similar instances were 
shared by others and suggested that emotional labor when provided with minimal power 
to effect change is detrimental to the workers (Hochschild, 1983; Wharton, 1999). As 
mobilizers, they were expected to feel and care in order to serve the poor. But their 
feelings, accentuated by face-to-face regular interactions, could not enable them to effect 
change. Development projects like Mission accomplish the task of highlighting 
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deprivation and desperation and then showcasing through photographs and numbers the 
large masses that are “reached” through camps and trainings. What remains un-
showcased is the fact that the breadth of the reach of the program hinders its depth. 
5.4.1.2 Empathy 
 Other than cases of emotional labor and its effect on the mobilizers, there were 
several cases where the mobilizers did not feel emotionally attached with their client and 
yet had to exhibit care. I also simultaneously witnessed that the ‘uncaring’ or lack of 
emotions was not caused due to lack of sympathy or lack of understanding the situation 
but in fact due to empathy arising out of complete recognition of the ground realities. I 
witnessed this kind of uncaring yet empathetic behavior in Shakeela, a 22 year old 
Muslim mobilizer with Divya GRC working in Jaan slum. Shakeela and I often 
frequented the field as she mobilized women to join women’s empowerment programs 
and assisted them with welfare services. One day in mid-November 2009, we met an 
elderly woman. She had recently come to know that she and her husband were eligible to 
receive the $20 each worth of old age pension from the government’s welfare system. 
The old couple lived in a shanty at the peripheries of Jaan slum, had no paperwork or 
identity proof to prove their age or residence. As soon as Shakeela heard that they have 
no paperwork, she moved away and said,  
 Amma, main tumhari madat kaise karoon? [mother, how can I help you?] You 
 don’t have any documents which are required for getting pension…by the time 
 you run around to get  these documents made you would have spent all your 
 money. I am telling you, don’t get into this problem [jhanjhat]…it’s not worth 
 it… 
  
272	  
	  
	  
	  
But the old woman was adamant that she would get the paperwork ready for availing 
pension. She continued to request Shakeela for her help but Shakeela kept saying, “koii 
faydaa nahin hoga Amma” [all efforts would be useless mother]. As an observer, I was 
beginning to get angry at Shakeela. As soon as we left the house, I asked Shakeela why 
she refused to help the old woman. She told me in a patient tone,  
 I know! I live here. I have dealt with the government departments …these things 
 are impossible if you already don’t have some proof… and they have nothing to 
 show.  
  
Shakeela decided to not help the old woman based on her own experiences with getting 
widow pension for her mother. A few years ago, Shakeela’s father passed away and the 
family decided to move from their village in the neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh to 
Jaan resettlement colony (near the Jaan slum where we met the old woman) to be closer 
to her mother’s relatives. With no paperwork and identity proof, Shakeela and her 
mother struggled to get the mother enrolled for widow pension. She told me that they 
paid bribes and spent months waiting at government offices to get a response. The whole 
process took more than two years after one of their relatives who knew the local 
politician intervened and took the matter in his hands. Shakeela’s family was relatively 
better-off than the old woman. They lived in a pucca (brick constructed) house in a 
resettlement colony and had relatives to help them out. The old woman lived in a shanty 
and it seemed like she had no networks to assist her. Shakeela made the calculations, 
compared situations, and realized that there was a thin chance of the old woman ever 
availing her welfare entitlement, especially when multiple guidelines and conflict 
between department and Mission were further stalling an already crumbling system (as 
273	  
	  
	  
	  
discussed in Section 3). In doing so Shakeela further internalized that “poor woman” like 
her mother and Amma would continue to remain at the margins of the state’s attention. 
 During our interview a month after meeting Amma, I again asked Shakeela about 
her duties and why she decided not to assist Amma with her paperwork. At first she was 
taken aback at the bluntness of my question. But then she composed herself and said, 
 There is too much work to be done and I have to be smart about what I choose to 
 do and  what I choose to not do. If I took up Amma’s case, I would have still been 
 wasting days  at the welfare office and I wouldn’t have been able to do anything 
 else…I have to make  daily reports, go to the field to disseminate information 
 about our programs, organize meetings, assist this one and that one with their 
 work…I mean what all can I do? And what all could I have done had I been 
 stuck with Amma and her paperwork?  
 
 
 In making choices between what work to do and not do, Shakeela was ensuring 
that she was doing the work that created the required results in a timely fashion – results 
of number of women participating and benefiting from her GRC. Amma’s case would 
have definitely counted in the results had it delivered the expected outcomes in a more 
timely manner. But since Shakeela knew that the process would be stretched over 
months and would eat into her other more immediate result-generating works, she 
decided to convince Amma of the uselessness of even seeking her help.   
 There were several instances where mobilizers juggled between different work 
expectations. At the level of GRCs, staff was aware of the difficulties in enabling 
holistic empowerment of poor women or assisting poor people with welfare while also 
struggling to meet expectations to show “success” based on the numbers, not progress 
with individual cases.  The work of the mobilizers shows the complex ways in which 
status quo of unequal power relations is maintained while intervention for change 
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become irrational in the face of Mission’s more immediate tangible, visible expectations 
of the mobilizers. These recognitions give rise to emotions of empathy and sympathy 
such that despite knowing or feeling the situation of a woman subject, the mobilizer is 
either unable to or intentionally does not want to work towards changing the subject’s 
situation. The inability to effect change or to empower poor women comes from several 
factors, including lack of authority, and an incisive understanding of the structural 
violence that also permeates her everyday life as a “poor woman” at the margins of the 
state and society. The practicality with which mobilizers evaluated each case and 
realized their limited authority in effecting change further dampened the feminist zeal of 
women’s empowerment to a great degree. The lived realities of each mobilizer in 
situations similar to those of the women they serve diluted the women’s empowerment 
agenda to a degree where it was considered irrational to divert from everyday routines, 
meetings, marches, camps, and trainings and immerse into activism-oriented assistance.
 It would be easy to place the blame on the mobilizers for not doing their job well. 
It would be even easier to suggest that the women’s empowerment component is 
dispensable. However, I argue that the women’s empowerment component suffered 
because the mere exercise of sustaining the project in the face of political pressures had 
overtaken its core objectives of empowering poor women. The sustainability of the 
project depended upon the visible and countable mass inclusion of women residing in 
the slums of Delhi. In the face of exclusionary neoliberal urban growth and the failed 
attempts at serving the poor through an efficient welfare delivery system, women’s 
empowerment programs entrenched in the Delhi slums through GRCs worked to still 
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prove the government’s inclusive and caring agenda. The frenzy around making the 
conventional programs a “success” was impacted by the internalized skepticism of 
women mobilizers who considered Mission a good idea bogged down in an institutional 
arrangement trying to do too much with limited resources and lack of clarity. Women 
mobilizers were unable to separate their experiences as marginalized citizens due to their 
failed encounters with the state because projects like Mission continue to be burdened by 
the technicalities of sustaining their existence such that they are unable to redefine new 
relations between the state and the poor or radicalize the call for women’s equality. 
Further, as women mobilizers got absorbed in institutional demands, they became active 
partners of the state in creating a mirage of a caring state that had mobilized 400,000 
women to participate in its programs to become empowered (as discussed in Section 4).  
5.5 Success, redefined 
 The day after Sheetal’s success with attracting women’s participation for the 
nutrition camp, I went to attend the nutrition camp at Sethu slum. The GRC had arranged 
a large colorful tent in sparse open space. Different food items were on display with 
nutrition charts in Hindi pinned up in the background. A nutritionist sat at one of the 
food stalls while more than hundred women poured in and out to get free food. Sheetal 
was happy and so was her project coordinator. The attendance of women had exceeded 
their expectations. One GRC staff moved around smoothly taking photographs of the 
camp. Within a few hours, the crowds of women subsided and I got a chance to talk with 
Sheetal. 
RD: Sheetal, do women understood ‘paushtik ahaar camp’ [nutrition camp].  
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Sheetal: yes, they know they will learn about what food is nutritious and all that…but 
they don’t really have the time to pay too much attention to it…These women don’t care 
about which food would be healthiest…they first need food, whatever kind that might 
be. 
 
RD: I noticed yesterday that none of the women asked you about why they will get free 
food there… 
Sheetal: Yeah. These women are used to having people like us [from different NGOs] 
call them for some event or the other. They don’t ask details…bas kaam kii baat puchte 
hain [they only ask what is relevant to them]. 
 
RD: So what do you think…is the nutrition camp of any use? 
Sheetal: it is utterly useless. We are supposed to teach them which vegetables are cheap 
and nutritious…we are supposed to have lectures especially for pregnant women…and 
they do happen sometimes. Bu usually women are in such a hurry that they want us to 
give them whatever food there is and then they run back home. 
 
RD: so why doesn’t Mission stop doing these camps? 
Sheetal: Our entire team knows how useless [bekaar] these camps and the coordinator 
has even talked about this with the higher-ups but nothing has happened as yet…bas 
chale jaa raha haii aise hii…[things just go on as they are…]…and if we say too much 
[about the uselessness of nutrition camp] then Mission staff will say, “No, camp is not 
useless, you are not doing your job properly”…Kucch bolne se mera hii kaam badhega 
[saying something will only increase my work] 
  
 Sheetal was hinting at the tip of the iceberg. Women mobilizers like Sheetal are 
the negotiators of project ideals. But they are also cogs in the wheels of power that 
maintains status quo while giving the impression of change and empowerment. O’Reilly 
(2003) notes the difference between participation and empowerment is well understood 
by NGO staffs in ways that they recognize the expected/ idealistic link between the two 
but do not work towards essentially linking the two through their work. NGO staff 
realizes that projects run on numbers that can be garnered through participation while 
allocating the back burner for empowerment-related outcomes. The fluidity and 
fuzziness surrounding the concept of ‘empowerment’ further enables project policy 
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makers as well as implementers to pay more attention to the more visible component – 
participation. Such numbers not only falsely imply empowerment of ‘some’ kind but 
also keep controversial interventions in local cultures at bay. By actively (and often 
subconsciously) floating their own interpretations of project ideals, women mobilizers 
were able to extract participation from several poor women in their communities, but in 
ways that created two effects: 1) diluted Mission’s already weak political objectives for 
women’s empowerment, and; 2) popularized Mission’s women’s empowerment 
programs as successful interventions of the caring state. 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
 The overlapping subject-agent identity of the “poor women” provides a complex 
perspective on how development projects are translated on the ground through a mix of 
NGO expectations, personal experiences as poor gendered subjects, and a nuanced 
knowledge of the field. The fluidity with which women mobilizers create interpretations 
of their work between project expectations, project pressures, and personal experiences 
show that their identity as “poor women” overshadowed their identity as community 
mobilizers. The poor woman as mobilizer is passionate but frustrated with entrenched 
gendered subordination (Mobina), is sympathetic but authority-less to act (Neetu), is 
empathetic but rational about her decisions (Shakeela). And between her own emotions 
and those expected by Mission to maintain participation, between her lived reality and 
the reality of others she was expected to change, and between her rational choices and 
the technical pressures of showing success, women mobilizers were normalizing their 
hybrid identity as poor local women who were best suited for this work. They were 
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working hard to meet project expectations, even though their work often wavered from 
Mission’s scripts. Women mobilizers recognized the limitations of their work and that of 
Mission, but the salaried labor sustained their immersion into its practices – the state’s 
extraction of their paid labor allowed them to create their own exit routes out of income-
poverty; their exalted status as empowered women working for their community asserted 
their empowerment as responsible and caring women who can defy gendered restrictions 
to serve their community. Such asserted empowerment was expected to create a chain 
reaction for producing more ladlis like Deepa who were willing to serve their families 
and communities. 
 Projects like Mission are expected to redefine state-poor relations so that poor 
women like Sheetal, Mobina, Neetu and Shakeela can exercise their political citizenship 
to make rightful demands of the state, equalize gendered relations, and reduce their 
poverty. But the workings of Mission at the grassroots indicate that some complex 
relations and decisions on the ground produce the circulation of the status quo and the 
maintenance of development categories like “poor women”. When the GRC office shuts 
in the evening and the mobilizer returns home, she becomes a woman who is not 
income-poor owing to her salary but still exists within a massed category in the registers 
of the state – “poor woman” who lives in slums and similar other low-income areas, has 
few opportunities, faces gendered discrimination, needs empowerment through the 
programs of Mission, and therefore must be included as a subject or an agent – Mission 
assumes that either way the participating poor woman will achieve empowerment by 
expanding her gendered, local, interactive and emotional labor beyond the domestic.  
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 Through a feminist economic interpretation of the labor of poor women, I pay 
special attention to the role of state in engaging in a dichotomous economy of 
empowerment. I have argued in Section 4 that Mission’s programs focus on training the 
labor of poor women to become economic instruments for alleviating the poverty of their 
families and communities. In this Section, I add women mobilizers to that argument to 
show that the state wants to hire poor women to extend their gendered, local, interactive, 
emotional labor to create those economic instruments. In either case, the state uses 
women’s caring and nurturing labor to contribute towards the economic growth of their 
families, communities, and the city (Folbre, 2001). Women as mobilizers and as 
beneficiaries continue to work in lower paying, local, and gendered vocations, thus 
maintaining their secondary economic position in their families and communities 
through (and despite) their engagement with Mission. Further, by not emphasizing on 
the political and social consciousness-raising of women, the government re-inscribed 
poor women’s secondary role as care givers for supporting the working of a male-
oriented and neoliberal economy. Through its women’s empowerment programs, 
Mission allowed the state to extract salaried (and therefore controlled), local, emotional, 
and interactive labor from poor women to empower other women through a chain 
reaction of kinds. After all, the labor of poor women who mobilize and the labor of poor 
women who are mobilized and trained through Mission’s programs could fast-track 
Delhi’s world-class aspirations, but what use would their “holistic empowerment” be in 
this neoliberal scheme of urban development? The mass participation of poor women in 
different programs of Mission could translate Mission into a successful program that 
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bolsters the idea of a caring state that is also competent to manage and govern the poor 
of an aspiring world-class city. Government initiatives like Mission work to produce 
mass categories like “poor women” to entrench political consent and bureaucratic 
control by disseminating programs for the supposed dissolution of such categories. 
Considering the growing demands of global capitalism, the Delhi government was more 
concerned with how women like Deepa and Sheetal can provide their gendered, local, 
and interactive labor to spread the state’s bureaucratic control in the slums of Delhi by 
mobilizing poor women like themselves to participate in Mission’s programs – even if 
these programs continued to circulate their disparities and perpetuate their identity as a 
poor woman existing on the margins of the state and society. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
	  
6.1 Reaching the unreached? 
 For several years I have been interested in understanding why the poor remained 
poor despite several government and nongovernmental interventions working to alleviate 
their poverty and enhance their well being. I also wanted to know how seemingly 
divergent and contradictory policies of the government came together to produce more 
poor and more solutions to end their poverty. These questions have guided my journey 
across the disciplines of anthropology, geography, urban planning and feminist theory. 
When I started fieldwork in May 2009, the questions and theories merged as my 
ethnography of Mission Convergence peeled away layers that define the complex 
relationship between the poor residents of Delhi and the Delhi government within a 
neoliberal urban development paradigm.   
  Government projects like Mission Convergence expanded services for the 
welfare and empowerment of the poor in Delhi at a time when the city was undergoing 
massive transformations to join the circuits of footloose global capital. The project was 
well-intentioned. It was the brainchild of a group of concerned civil society and 
government officials who genuinely wanted to devise solutions to reduce poverty, 
empower poor women, and assimilate the poor within the social and economic fabric of 
an aspiring world-class city, thus also aspiring to make Delhi an inclusive city. My 
ethnographic study of Mission examined its side-effects and behind-the-scene politics 
within the larger exclusionary neoliberal urban development paradigm. I assert that 
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multiple complex relations of economic and political power at the local and the global 
levels came together to necessitate as well as alter Mission’s programs and practices. 
Findings from this research indicate that Mission met with roadblocks and criticisms that 
altered its core programs and truncated its core objectives, but is nonetheless continuing 
to extend its presence and services in all low-income pockets of Delhi. Despite its visible 
and growing spread, Mission has not enabled an evident reduction of poverty in the 
slums of Delhi. Nonetheless, it took more fluid and nuanced outcomes as more than 100 
NGOs partnered and extended government services to the poor, and more than 400,000 
women from slums and resettlement colonies participated in its different programs while 
exclusionary exercises of city modernization like slum demolitions, privatization of land, 
construction of modern infrastructure gained pace and diminished the rights of the poor 
to the city. 
 Ethnographic data suggests that 104 NGOs working as Gender Resource Centers 
of the Delhi government facilitated the participation of the poor through voluntary but 
incisive technologies that merged self-government and panoptic power of the state 
through vocational trainings, self help groups, free health and nutrition camps, recurrent 
surveys, family vulnerability index, UID cards – all provided at the doorsteps of the poor 
by community-based NGOs and their community-based mobilizers. While such 
programs produced the self-interest of the citizen-subject to reduce her poverty, they also 
entrenched and made visible the aura of a caring and inclusive state – the larger intention 
being the creation of a stable and safe socio-political environment that is appealing to 
global capital. Such a dichotomous policy framework promoted the manifestation of an 
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exclusionary world-class city over the backs of the urban poor who were expected to be 
included within this city through the conventional programs of welfare and 
empowerment. What chance does redistributive programs for the welfare of the poor 
have in the face of the reality of neoliberal urban development? What exactly are these 
redistributive efforts intending to achieve? I argue that such a dichotomous policy 
framework between a world-class and inclusive city provides an answer to a critical 
question: why is the mass of marginalized citizens not resisting, i.e. how is the status quo 
maintained, and in what complex ways? 
6.2 Contributions of the dissertation 
 My dissertation research furthers our understanding of a complex relationship 
between the urban poor and their governments, as the latter seeks an increasingly 
tenuous balance between neoliberal urban development and social welfare of the 
growing number of poor resulting out of the city’s exclusionary urban development 
policies, among other things. My ethnographic research on Mission highlight that new 
institutional arrangements created for efficiently serving the poor are not panacea to the 
shortcomings of the developmental state. Government-NGO partnerships allow for the 
greater expansion of the government ideologies and bureaucratic channels but they do 
not provide clear solutions to the reduction of poverty or empowerment of poor women. 
The intersection of new and traditional institutions creates tensions and confusions that 
can render novel policy initiatives such as the Mission ineffective. Mission’s journey 
over the past three years clearly shows that the governance of the poor and the provision 
of resources for their welfare are embedded in the political and economic complexities 
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between traditional actors and innovative inter-sectoral solutions for making the 
government efficient.  
 Further, women’s empowerment programs do generate large-scale participation 
across Delhi but are unable to economically or socially empower most participating 
women. The conventional and apolitical nature of its programs produce a large mass of 
labor trained in gendered and low-paying vocations without the adequate resources or 
socio-familial support to transform their labor into empowerment. Institutional demands 
for showcasing success through numbers further expands the reach of these programs 
among thousands of women and shows that the government cares for them, but fails to 
address entrenched poverty and gendered social norms that continues to converge and 
produce “poor women” as a category for development interventions existing on the 
margins of an aspiring-world class city. 
 Despite roadblocks and shortcomings, Mission is viewed by policy makers and 
international development agencies (United Nations and the World Bank) as a unique 
initiative in making cities inclusive. Mission has won several international and national 
accolades since its establishment in 2008. An ethnographic examination of Mission has 
proved to be a timely and important research project. Delhi is a city at the forefront of 
governance reform efforts in India – and India's federal government is contemplating 
replication of the Mission Convergence mode; across other cities and states of India. 
Following Li (2007, p. 231), I insist that this ‘franchising’ of Mission makes it even 
more important to study Mission and to understand the ways in which it framed welfare 
and empowerment in the context of urban poverty, in how it categorized the poor, and 
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introduced a more nuanced, interceptive, and everyday means of governing them. My 
research is especially relevant for policy makers because it ethnographically captures the 
internal dynamics of project implementation across various scales (government offices, 
politicians, NGOs) and highlights barriers that initiatives such as Mission face in 
achieving their objectives. This research will be important in persuading policy makers 
to critically revisit and question Mission’s objectives, practices and limitations prior to 
its replication in other states. Whether programs like Mission can make cities inclusive, 
or simply assist the government in rearranging populations living in poverty – I am 
hopeful that my research will convince policy makers, academics, and the common 
person that this is an important question and must be asked of the Delhi government. 
6.3 Policy recommendations 
 My ethnographic study highlights the tension between new and traditional 
institutional arrangements for the welfare of the poor. The policy changes as of May 
2010 have withdrawn the role of NGOs from welfare related activities, and have 
effectively shut down efficient and alternative arrangements that could have proven 
beneficial for the poor. I recommend that policies around welfare services be 
reformulated by asking two questions: 1) how exactly does $20 a month worth welfare 
service (cash or kind) impact the vulnerability of a welfare-entitled individual; and, 2) 
how can the service delivery channels be made transparent and hassle-free for the benefit 
of the poor.  
 Mission had partially responded to the first concern by conducting surveys, 
locating the poor, understanding their vulnerabilities, and then assigning NGOs to reach 
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them and provide the required set of services. However, I would urge Mission to learn 
whether such services actually have any impact on the lives of the poor. Do these 
services support them in sending their children to school, living in safe and comfortable 
environment, improving health of family? Or do these services provide a small buffer for 
their everyday living? Mission could devise methods to strengthen the outcomes of each 
welfare program so that the programs act as “spring boards” that enable the poor to 
move ahead, and not just as “safety nets” that barely save them from falling below their 
current poverty (Ferguson, 2009). 
 In the face of recurrent changes, the “convergence” aspect of Mission 
Convergence weakened as welfare delivery was withdrawn and women’s empowerment 
programs took center stage. Women’s empowerment programs have been the most 
consistent component of Mission. High participation (400,000+) of women availing 
vocational trainings and other services contrasts with the low percentage of women who 
are able to benefit from them. Based on my findings, I recommend that greater attention 
be paid to the efficacy of all of Mission’s programs, especially vocational trainings. The 
everyday demands of running a GRC are high, and they often divert the attention of 
policy managers and staff alike from Mission’s core objective of women’s “holistic” 
empowerment. I urge that if the Delhi government must continue providing services that 
are already being provided by other organizations, then they must distinguish 
themselves. First, it must be made clear that empowerment is a process of not only 
economic but also social and political transformation. Next, Mission must learn from the 
community about the different programs that should be implemented in each of its 
287	  
	  
	  
	  
Gender Resource Center. The homogeneous expansion of a staple set of programs does 
make Mission seem like a success simply by virtue of the number of women who attend 
of participate in its programs. But this success does not tell us much about how women 
transform their participation into real-life development of capabilities to weaken the set 
of gendered and other restrictions that impact them.  
 The efficacy of the women’s empowerment projects could be better captured 
by devising evaluation tools that recognize the economic as well as social well-being of 
the participating women. Such tools should not only consider permanent businesses or 
jobs that earn a stipulated amount but also those temporary but significant jobs through 
which women are able to improve their social and economic capabilities. Such an 
evaluation tool would allow Mission to know how, if at all, the different programs are 
accessed by women to reduce poverty, improve health, or develop social and political 
networks. The community-based Gender Resource Centers should be instrumental in not 
only helping women reduce their poverty by learning vocations but also in assisting 
women in recognizing their rights as women and as citizens of an aspiring “inclusive” 
and “world-class” city.  
 Lastly, Mission is a Delhi government initiative for the welfare and 
empowerment of the poor. And the Delhi government has multiple other policies that 
disable rights of the poor in the city. The threat of slum demolition looms large in 
several of Mission’s catchment areas. I was often asked in the field whether the onset of 
Mission’s programs meant that the slum would be made pucca (an authorized residential 
colony) in government records. Mission must recognize that in the face of an 
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overarching exclusionary paradigm, the poor cannot be expected to empower themselves 
and rise above poverty by simply availing its services. In order to move beyond a token 
“caring” program of the government, Mission must convince the Delhi government to 
reconsider its policies that displace poor residents. In the absence of a permanent sense 
of place, Mission’s services will have minimal impact on improving the lives of slum 
residents. I am confident that such an intervention could politicize the rights of the poor 
and enlarge the vision for the making of a holistically inclusive Delhi. 
6.4 Future directions 
 My ethnographic research on Mission Convergence has captured the ground 
realities of an ambitious socio-economic project within the larger neoliberal paradigm of 
urban development and governance. My ethnography was time-bound, and therefore 
captures only a slice of the larger picture. In the near future, my aim is to move beyond 
my dissertation research on a project to ethnographically examine the city from the 
exclusive lens of those served by such projects. I plan to collaborate with the residents of 
Delhi slums that are on the verge of demolition to examine their everyday experiences of 
negotiation and resistance with the dichotomous material and human development 
programs of the aspiring world-class and inclusive city. I am most interested in the 
voices of women who reside in slums to know more precisely an often overlooked 
gendered dimension of state-citizen relations in the context of neoliberal urban 
development. I am confident that such a collaborative ethnographic enquiry will enable 
us to reconsider the idea of a world-class city and the policy interventions that are 
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required for the sustainable and productive inclusion of poor into its social and economic 
fabric.   
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